It appears that Aristotle defined tragicomedy as a serious action with a happy ending. So can we write the recent tragedy of the Greek bailout and the ongoing comic infighting of the Greek politicians as a prelude to a plot with a happy ending?
Last night’s refusal to agree on a Greek government of national salvation might lead to either new elections or a referendum on the bailout program. This should be the democratic way to solve the current deadlock. The people should be given the last word; even if the results leave the nation divided in two almost identical camps the winning camp has the mandate to carry out his policies. That is the foundation of democracy and it is preferable to forcing the Greeks to accept the undemocratic tutelage of the shameful duo Merkel-Sarkozy.
Now, let’s imagine that the camp opposing the current bailout wins and decides to declare a unilateral default on the Icelandic-style, but decides to keep the Euro. This is the scenario feared by the “very serious people in pin stripes” and some economists who fear the contagion of a disorderly bail-out.
What can Mr. Juncker, Draghi and Barroso do about it? According to Mr. Barroso the Lisbon Treaty does not have any legal mechanism to expel a Euro-zone member. Mr. Draghi’s interpretation of the European Central Bank remit is that it does not include any responsibility as lender of last resort for any member country. Mr. Junker’s Eurogroup meeting of the Finance Ministers of the Eurozone countries was institutionalized by the Lisbon treaty without any power over its members. So, let us image also that they decide to do nothing.
Would this mean the end of the Eurozone? In principle no! For instance, in the Dollarzone (USA) when a local government defaults on its Muni-bonds the Federal Bonds barely move. Yes, I know, the USA has a Federal budget. However, its interstate transfers are not enough to justify the decoupling between the Munis and the Treasuries. What is different is that the FED (the US central bank) has an implicit remit to bailout the major banks whose failure would represent a systemic risk as it has shown in the crisis of 2008.
This is a key weakness of the current ECB thinking. Should the markets attack the other highly leveraged countries to an extent that would bankrupt some of their major banks in those countries the ECB might feel restrained in continuing to lend to such countries.
Indeed, as illustrated by its continuing purchase of low quality securities, the ECB does not need to have an explicit lender of last resort mandate enshrined in the European Union treaty. Nor does it need to take massive losses on its ABS holdings, as has been propagated by the German Press. For instance, it can simply print money to finance an off-balance sheet vehicle to park such securities and ask the EFSF and the Governments rescued to share on its capitalization.
So here is a script for a happy ending to the Greek tragicomedy:
1) Greece reasserts its firm commitment to remain in the Euro;
2) Greece defaults on its debts and goes to the London and Paris clubs for a restructuring deal with better terms than those currently on offer;
3) To support the debt restructuring program Greece applies to the IMF for a new extended facility;
4) Meanwhile the ECB extends an unlimited liquidity line to one or two of the best Greek banks to keep the financial system afloat, subject to Greece agreeing to points 1-3;
5) The ECB announces that it will provide such lines to any other member who needs them;
6) To kill any doubts about its own strength the ECB will begin selling its low quality assets to special purpose vehicles;
7) Faced with such determination the markets will begin pricing the sovereign debt spreads of the various Eurozone members in accordance with their respective risk profile; and
8) After the successful implementation of programs 2 and 3, Greece regains market access within three years.
Here is the lesson from such tragicomedy. One should never give up on the ability of democracy to find a solution. It may be convoluted; it may take some time, but it will be better than a dictatorial solution under a veil of technocracy or to a shameful begging for help from a mixed bag of world leaders gathering in the G20 group.
Showing posts with label Paris Club. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Paris Club. Show all posts
Friday, 4 November 2011
Democracy and the Euro-Greek Tragicomedy
Labels:
bailouts,
democracy,
Euro,
Eurozone,
G20,
Greece,
London club,
Paris Club,
shameful Merkel-Sarkozy,
sovereign debt restructuring,
tragicomedy
Friday, 22 April 2011
A new job for Mr. Trichet
Recently the media has been concentrating on the race to replace Mr. Jean Claude Trichet at the helm of the European Central Bank, when his mandate terminates in October. However, what he will do next may be equally important.
Mr. Trichet had a distinguished career in banking before taking over at the ECB, and that contributed to the success of his tenure at the helm of the ECB. He is certainly looking forward to a well deserved retirement.
Yet, given his unique statesmanship, Europe would be well advised to ask him for a last service to Europe – to restructure the sovereign debt in the periphery countries. He was a driving force in the ECB policy of rescuing the banks in the periphery of the Euro Zone and his past position at the helm of the Paris Club makes him specially qualified to lead the process of debt restructuring in the periphery countries of the Euro Area.
Yes I know, one must deny the need for foreign debt restructuring until the last minute. However, with 2-year rates in Greece at 23%, one can hardly pretend that things can go on for long. Moreover, the recent experience of dealing with bailouts on a case by case basis was not exactly a success.
So the appointment of a restructuring czar within the European Financial Stability Facility must be considered now. This is preferable to letting things deteriorate until they have to recur to the traditional Paris Club mechanisms.
Such czar needs a credibility that only a few like Mr. Trichet have.
Mr. Trichet had a distinguished career in banking before taking over at the ECB, and that contributed to the success of his tenure at the helm of the ECB. He is certainly looking forward to a well deserved retirement.
Yet, given his unique statesmanship, Europe would be well advised to ask him for a last service to Europe – to restructure the sovereign debt in the periphery countries. He was a driving force in the ECB policy of rescuing the banks in the periphery of the Euro Zone and his past position at the helm of the Paris Club makes him specially qualified to lead the process of debt restructuring in the periphery countries of the Euro Area.
Yes I know, one must deny the need for foreign debt restructuring until the last minute. However, with 2-year rates in Greece at 23%, one can hardly pretend that things can go on for long. Moreover, the recent experience of dealing with bailouts on a case by case basis was not exactly a success.
So the appointment of a restructuring czar within the European Financial Stability Facility must be considered now. This is preferable to letting things deteriorate until they have to recur to the traditional Paris Club mechanisms.
Such czar needs a credibility that only a few like Mr. Trichet have.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)