Regardless of whether we think about individual liberty as the absence of obstacles, barriers or constraints (negative liberty) or we consider collective liberty as the possibility to take control of one’s life and fundamental purposes (positive liberty), there is no doubt that freedom must be defined in relation to the availability of options. However, since options may be incompatible one must frequently balance them. For instance, we have a tradeoff between privacy and safety or between individual and collective wage negotiations.
Equally, when analyzing the relationship between capitalism and freedom, one needs to consider the freedoms essential for capitalism as well as the way it contributes to the many freedoms. Indeed, capitalism is an economic system that requires two fundamental freedoms – private property and freedom of exchange – and these two types of freedom enhance further other forms of freedom, namely the freedom of association required by joint ownership and free consumer choice and the freedom of information necessary for free trading.
Overall, by promoting individual wealth, capitalism contributes to the creation of more options and individual choice thus overcoming one of the major obstacles to liberty. But, through its principles, it also promotes many other fundamental freedoms not directly related to material goods.
For instance, freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression is promoted by the capitalist’s drive to advertise its products and services. This commercial interest can only be achieved with freedom to choose the channels to reach clients and a free media.
Freedom to contract and exchange is indispensable for competitive markets and it can only be achieved by freedom of movement, absence of coercion and access to information. Freedom of information, like the freedom of expression is crucial for commercial as well investment decisions. Since asymmetric information is a major source of market inefficiency, capitalism thrives better under free markets.
Likewise, free peaceful assembly is a requirement of capitalism so that employers, employees and consumers can discuss their relative interests both in private and in public places, such as conferences, fairs and exhibitions. This freedom extends also to the right to establish unions and peaceful union picketing to persuade other parties to a wage bargaining.
Freedom of association is crucial under capitalism not only for representation purposes, but also to pool private property into forms of joint ownership, namely joint stock companies. Moreover, by separating personal from corporate responsibility through limited liability, capitalism manages a substantial reduction in risk which is essential to foster entrepreneurship.
Most importantly, capitalism generally promotes peace because all forms of social unrest and war destroy assets, production and profits. The profit motive requires all the above mentioned liberties and, not surprisingly, all totalitarian regimes (whether pro or anti-capitalism) are usually searching for new excuses and ways to control capitalism.
To resist such attacks on freedom, it is important to understand when the fundamental freedoms that capitalism requires and promotes can be subject to some restrictions. For instance, freedom of expression does not mean that corporations are free to lie and manipulate consumers and investors. Likewise, freedom of assembly does not mean that such assemblies may be used to collude on illegal and anti-competition practices. Just like the right of association does not mean that it can be used to establish cartels or the right to information allows them to procure insider information from privileged parties.
The definition of such limits on business freedom is usually controversial and difficult to delimit. In particular, there is a widespread tendency to consider that the role of the state is to protect individual freedom against business practices. This is erroneous, because the state and capitalism should not be adversaries but allies in the promotion of freedom. To avoid this dangerous error it is important that regulators understand the differences between market capitalism and other “distorted” versions of capitalism because only the first guarantees the pursuit of liberty.
To conclude, we should not assume that people are either extremely naïve or evil. All restrictions to freedom must be carefully assessed and, if needed, the error should be on the side of liberty.
Showing posts with label individual freedom. Show all posts
Showing posts with label individual freedom. Show all posts
Wednesday, 19 August 2015
Capitalism and individual freedom rights
Labels:
free markets,
free movement,
free trade,
freedom,
freedom of association,
freedom of contract,
individual freedom,
liberty,
market capitalism
Monday, 23 December 2013
Dress codes and individual freedom: Topless vs. Burkas
In many countries politicians try to rule about what is acceptable or not in terms of dressing in open public places. Frequently, legislators are moved by political and religious prejudices and fail to distinguish between the various dress codes and the distinct nature of public places.
Currently the debate is mostly about the use of burkas and veils by women. In the past similarly heated discussions were about topless, barefoot and mini-skirts. Then as now, many justify the prohibition on the grounds that its use offends other people´s beliefs and moral values. Namely, that they encourage the oppression of women or the lust of men.
Whether these are true or not (they may be true) they should not be an acceptable reason to limit individual freedom. Indeed, any offence taken is the result of one’s moral and religious beliefs. But, one of the basic freedoms is the freedom of religion. Therefore we cannot use one’s freedom to prevent other people’s freedom.
Acceptable limits to individual freedom may be universal or apply only to designated professions or places, and their justification varies. Nevertheless, one should only apply universal limits to individual freedom if it may endanger other people’s life or property, not its moral beliefs. For instance, the public use of balaclavas or burkas may be prohibited only if there are reasonable grounds to assert that they pose a threat to our security.
However, in restricted places it is acceptable that the operators of such places impose specific dress codes, such as uniforms for schools or the military, formal dress for some concerts and casual for others. The objective of such dress codes is to facilitate identification or to signal specific characteristics.
Humans’ dressing varies not only with income, tradition, climate or circumstances but also with the desire to signal specific messages. For instance, in egalitarian institutions without a dress code such as universities, it is often observed that finance professors dress formal while sociologists may dress in rags. The first wish to signal the financial relevance of their field while the later may wish to signal their left leaning politics.
Yet, there are some types of signalling that we may consider controversial. Among the most controversial is the signalling of mating desires. The arousal of sexual interest in humans is stimulated by displaying some parts of the body. Therefore, some types of dressing (topless, mini-skirts, etc.) can be designed to display such parts and be used to signal a mating mood. Here we confront two distinct possibilities. First, to argue that if society forbids sexual relations in public it should also ban the signalling of mating desires. The second is to argue that signalling is not the same as soliciting and therefore the public exhibition of such body parts should be free.
In general, the second argument seems more reasonable. Especially if one bears in mind that the interpretation of the signalling may diverge substantially between issuer and receptor due to tradition and personal circumstances. For instance, the male reaction to a topless female is substantially different whenever he is before a young or an old female and whether he is in the beach or in a night club.
So, we may conclude by saying that, under liberal principles, the ban of some forms of dressing in free public spaces can only be justified in the case of unequivocal danger to people and property. Prohibitions based on whim, fashion or religious beliefs do not qualify as legitimate restrictions of individual freedom. However, in delimited public spaces more restrictive dress codes may be applied. For instance, if, within his power, the director of a public school decides to ban mini-skirts or burkas he should be entitled to do so. Another completely different matter is the civilized expression of disapproval or dislike in relation to some outfits. In a polite manner we may criticise friends and acquaintances.
Currently the debate is mostly about the use of burkas and veils by women. In the past similarly heated discussions were about topless, barefoot and mini-skirts. Then as now, many justify the prohibition on the grounds that its use offends other people´s beliefs and moral values. Namely, that they encourage the oppression of women or the lust of men.
Whether these are true or not (they may be true) they should not be an acceptable reason to limit individual freedom. Indeed, any offence taken is the result of one’s moral and religious beliefs. But, one of the basic freedoms is the freedom of religion. Therefore we cannot use one’s freedom to prevent other people’s freedom.
Acceptable limits to individual freedom may be universal or apply only to designated professions or places, and their justification varies. Nevertheless, one should only apply universal limits to individual freedom if it may endanger other people’s life or property, not its moral beliefs. For instance, the public use of balaclavas or burkas may be prohibited only if there are reasonable grounds to assert that they pose a threat to our security.
However, in restricted places it is acceptable that the operators of such places impose specific dress codes, such as uniforms for schools or the military, formal dress for some concerts and casual for others. The objective of such dress codes is to facilitate identification or to signal specific characteristics.
Humans’ dressing varies not only with income, tradition, climate or circumstances but also with the desire to signal specific messages. For instance, in egalitarian institutions without a dress code such as universities, it is often observed that finance professors dress formal while sociologists may dress in rags. The first wish to signal the financial relevance of their field while the later may wish to signal their left leaning politics.
Yet, there are some types of signalling that we may consider controversial. Among the most controversial is the signalling of mating desires. The arousal of sexual interest in humans is stimulated by displaying some parts of the body. Therefore, some types of dressing (topless, mini-skirts, etc.) can be designed to display such parts and be used to signal a mating mood. Here we confront two distinct possibilities. First, to argue that if society forbids sexual relations in public it should also ban the signalling of mating desires. The second is to argue that signalling is not the same as soliciting and therefore the public exhibition of such body parts should be free.
In general, the second argument seems more reasonable. Especially if one bears in mind that the interpretation of the signalling may diverge substantially between issuer and receptor due to tradition and personal circumstances. For instance, the male reaction to a topless female is substantially different whenever he is before a young or an old female and whether he is in the beach or in a night club.
So, we may conclude by saying that, under liberal principles, the ban of some forms of dressing in free public spaces can only be justified in the case of unequivocal danger to people and property. Prohibitions based on whim, fashion or religious beliefs do not qualify as legitimate restrictions of individual freedom. However, in delimited public spaces more restrictive dress codes may be applied. For instance, if, within his power, the director of a public school decides to ban mini-skirts or burkas he should be entitled to do so. Another completely different matter is the civilized expression of disapproval or dislike in relation to some outfits. In a polite manner we may criticise friends and acquaintances.
Labels:
burkas,
constitutional liberalism,
individual freedom,
moral values,
public places,
religion,
topless
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)