It seems that British Prime Minister, has finally decided to endorse a soft Brexit.
Basically, she proposes a future agreement somewhere between the current European Economic Area (EEA) model and the Canadian Trade Agreement (CETA) plus a new security treaty, to be implemented after a two-year transition period, when everything would remain the same, expiring before the UK general election in 2022.
It seems a moderate approach, but it risks being contested by both sides of her party, and leaves open the question of whether she will survive long enough as Prime Minister.
From a European perspective, it is important to ascertain whether the UK wishes to be closer to Norway or Canada, before the EU can accept a pick-and-choose approach to the benefits of the single market.
For instance, will the UK wish to remain in the single market for financial services, but not in other sectors? These and many other issues have to be addressed as soon as possible, and the broader the agreement the better.
However, even if the UK opts for an agreement closer to the EEA, my previous estimate (Mendes 2017) that Brexit may cost the UK a long-term slowdown in GDP growth of approximately 20% is not significantly reduced.
In the end, Brexit is still a bad “deal” for Britain.
Showing posts with label Brexit. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Brexit. Show all posts
Friday, 22 September 2017
Friday, 24 March 2017
The 60th anniversary of the EU does not need to mean decadence
My personal contribution to commemorate the EU 60th anniversary was to publish a second edition of my 1987 book on Economic Integration and Growth, to which I added a second part dealing with enlargement and the risk of disintegration following Brexit. A link for the book is found on the left and next I reproduce its concluding chapter.
How to Rebuild a Collapsing Castle
As in relation to historical buildings, common sense dictates that the restoration of a collapsing integrated union cannot be done by demolishing first to build after. Instead, it needs some education about the value of preserving past achievements. Here lies the difficulty, but not at the technical and legal level. This is so because the required political will to preserve economic freedom is not only wavering, it risks being reversed by rising political populism in America and Europe.
This book provides plenty of theoretical and empirical evidence about the economic superiority of free trade over protectionism. However, integration is not just about economic gains and losses; it is also about institutional and political arrangements that are efficient and fair to mobilise all members regardless of their specificities. As said in chapter 10, there is no point in being a member if a country wishes to be part of other integration process or believes that an atomised world of independent states is a better road to achieve global liberalisation.
So far, it is not yet clear which of these roads Britain wishes to follow. However, this is not really important for the remaining EU members. What they need to consider is whether they should use the Brexit opportunity to change their own organisation to deal with other “unsatisfied members” and future entries and exits.
The current situation, in relation to neighbouring countries, is depicted in the diagram shown above in page 207, which needs to completed by a list of six Western Balkan countries, of which four (Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia) are already official candidates and two (Bosnia and Kosovo) are potential candidates. The Balkan problem can be resolved swiftly through a bold enlargement. Although the Balkan countries are problematic due to rampant criminality (Albania), ties to Russia (Serbia), and Islamic population (Bosnia and Kosovo), they should not be excluded.
Indeed, their membership would make more compelling the need to transform the European Union into an official multi-tier union, based on a variable geometry as discussed in chapter 10. The institutionalisation of a variable geometry would allow member countries to opt out or to be demoted from some policies without major political upheavals. For instance, temporarily, Greece could leave the euro until she has sorted out her foreign debt. Romania could be demoted from the free movement of people while the current members could repatriate professional beggars from that country. Likewise, countries like Hungary and Poland, which are diverging from the EU pattern of democracy, could be demoted to a lower level of integration.
The long-waiting candidacy of Turkey to join the European Union should be abandoned; it seems to have replaced its strategic membership of the EU by an attempt to become the leading Islamic power in the Middle East.
Indeed, the end of the American leadership in the free world brought about by the new Trump administration is likely to generate a new drive towards the creation of rival spheres of influence. In Europe, Britain, Russia and Turkey are likely to strive to create their own spheres of influence at the expense of the European Union.
This new XXI rivalry will differ from nineteenth-century imperialism. It will use modern weapons to impact on the policies pursued by the European Union. For instance, Erdogan’s Turkey might use migration and refugees to destabilise Europe; Putin’s Russia may use energy and its spies and corrupt oligarchs to trap neighbouring countries and discredit democratic EU institutions; while Theresa May’s Britain may be tempted to use tax competition to break the social security net in the European Union.
Although individually, each of these countries is too small to threaten the EU economically, when combined, their challenge cannot be ignored in the design of new EU policies to keep and foster the integration process.
To cope with this challenge, the EU needs to simultaneously launch new common policies whilst disengaging or scaling back some of the current, more divisive policies. Moreover, the new exclusive policies should have a significant budgetary value (e.g., raising its level from less than 2 percent to a value closer to 10 percent) to have a macroeconomic role. Moreover, they should not be of a sector nature and distort international competition.
At the top of the list should be a single policy on migration and refugees, inspired by the Canadian or Australian models. In second place should be a policy of common defence and security, including a nuclear deterrent, so that the EU becomes ready to lead NATO should the United States weaken its commitment to the alliance.
Next should be the financing of the high end of two fundamental public services—education and healthcare. Given the success of the Erasmus student mobility program and the rising costs and competition of research, higher education and hospital healthcare are two obvious candidates to be funded at the European level.
Looking forwards, a regionally differentiated basic-income policy for unemployed, destitute, and old people should also be considered.
Of course, a multi-tier Europe with new single policies can only work with proximity and the trust of the people. The model based in the centralisation of the European civil servants in Brussels is no longer efficient or acceptable to guarantee accountability and democracy.
The current institutions have not done enough to prove their accountability, and direct elections for the European Parliament have not contributed to create truly European parties where the electors feel represented. Moreover, the idea that the current institutions—commission, council, and parliament—may transform into a government, senate, and congress of a future federation or confederation is utopian.
The EU needs to create institutions that are adapted to its diversified country basis. One such solution would be to split the European Parliament into upper and lower houses, the first made of members elected by the national parliaments and the second by members elected directly in European lists.
To sum up, like the founding fathers had to select policies that were then crucial, any restoration of the European Union has to do the same. Back then, the challenge was to reconstruct a democratic Europe from destruction. The obvious industries were atomic, coal, steel, and farming. Now the challenge is to win the race for talent and technology and to do so with social stability and security, in a world threatened again by multi-polar power players.
How to Rebuild a Collapsing Castle
As in relation to historical buildings, common sense dictates that the restoration of a collapsing integrated union cannot be done by demolishing first to build after. Instead, it needs some education about the value of preserving past achievements. Here lies the difficulty, but not at the technical and legal level. This is so because the required political will to preserve economic freedom is not only wavering, it risks being reversed by rising political populism in America and Europe.
This book provides plenty of theoretical and empirical evidence about the economic superiority of free trade over protectionism. However, integration is not just about economic gains and losses; it is also about institutional and political arrangements that are efficient and fair to mobilise all members regardless of their specificities. As said in chapter 10, there is no point in being a member if a country wishes to be part of other integration process or believes that an atomised world of independent states is a better road to achieve global liberalisation.
So far, it is not yet clear which of these roads Britain wishes to follow. However, this is not really important for the remaining EU members. What they need to consider is whether they should use the Brexit opportunity to change their own organisation to deal with other “unsatisfied members” and future entries and exits.
The current situation, in relation to neighbouring countries, is depicted in the diagram shown above in page 207, which needs to completed by a list of six Western Balkan countries, of which four (Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia) are already official candidates and two (Bosnia and Kosovo) are potential candidates. The Balkan problem can be resolved swiftly through a bold enlargement. Although the Balkan countries are problematic due to rampant criminality (Albania), ties to Russia (Serbia), and Islamic population (Bosnia and Kosovo), they should not be excluded.
Indeed, their membership would make more compelling the need to transform the European Union into an official multi-tier union, based on a variable geometry as discussed in chapter 10. The institutionalisation of a variable geometry would allow member countries to opt out or to be demoted from some policies without major political upheavals. For instance, temporarily, Greece could leave the euro until she has sorted out her foreign debt. Romania could be demoted from the free movement of people while the current members could repatriate professional beggars from that country. Likewise, countries like Hungary and Poland, which are diverging from the EU pattern of democracy, could be demoted to a lower level of integration.
The long-waiting candidacy of Turkey to join the European Union should be abandoned; it seems to have replaced its strategic membership of the EU by an attempt to become the leading Islamic power in the Middle East.
Indeed, the end of the American leadership in the free world brought about by the new Trump administration is likely to generate a new drive towards the creation of rival spheres of influence. In Europe, Britain, Russia and Turkey are likely to strive to create their own spheres of influence at the expense of the European Union.
This new XXI rivalry will differ from nineteenth-century imperialism. It will use modern weapons to impact on the policies pursued by the European Union. For instance, Erdogan’s Turkey might use migration and refugees to destabilise Europe; Putin’s Russia may use energy and its spies and corrupt oligarchs to trap neighbouring countries and discredit democratic EU institutions; while Theresa May’s Britain may be tempted to use tax competition to break the social security net in the European Union.
Although individually, each of these countries is too small to threaten the EU economically, when combined, their challenge cannot be ignored in the design of new EU policies to keep and foster the integration process.
To cope with this challenge, the EU needs to simultaneously launch new common policies whilst disengaging or scaling back some of the current, more divisive policies. Moreover, the new exclusive policies should have a significant budgetary value (e.g., raising its level from less than 2 percent to a value closer to 10 percent) to have a macroeconomic role. Moreover, they should not be of a sector nature and distort international competition.
At the top of the list should be a single policy on migration and refugees, inspired by the Canadian or Australian models. In second place should be a policy of common defence and security, including a nuclear deterrent, so that the EU becomes ready to lead NATO should the United States weaken its commitment to the alliance.
Next should be the financing of the high end of two fundamental public services—education and healthcare. Given the success of the Erasmus student mobility program and the rising costs and competition of research, higher education and hospital healthcare are two obvious candidates to be funded at the European level.
Looking forwards, a regionally differentiated basic-income policy for unemployed, destitute, and old people should also be considered.
Of course, a multi-tier Europe with new single policies can only work with proximity and the trust of the people. The model based in the centralisation of the European civil servants in Brussels is no longer efficient or acceptable to guarantee accountability and democracy.
The current institutions have not done enough to prove their accountability, and direct elections for the European Parliament have not contributed to create truly European parties where the electors feel represented. Moreover, the idea that the current institutions—commission, council, and parliament—may transform into a government, senate, and congress of a future federation or confederation is utopian.
The EU needs to create institutions that are adapted to its diversified country basis. One such solution would be to split the European Parliament into upper and lower houses, the first made of members elected by the national parliaments and the second by members elected directly in European lists.
To sum up, like the founding fathers had to select policies that were then crucial, any restoration of the European Union has to do the same. Back then, the challenge was to reconstruct a democratic Europe from destruction. The obvious industries were atomic, coal, steel, and farming. Now the challenge is to win the race for talent and technology and to do so with social stability and security, in a world threatened again by multi-polar power players.
Sunday, 26 June 2016
A fine balance between the breakup of Britain or the EU
After the British vote to leave the EU, what should the EU offer the new UK (or England)?
The first thing that the EU must offer is time. Time to let the Brits reflect on what they wish to do about their new position in Europe and whether they wish to do it together in the UK or separately.
This should not stop the EU from setting the maximum it can offer. There is an obvious answer to this, which is the signing of a European Economic Area agreement. This is the obvious offer whether the new Britain decides to rejoin EFTA or not.
This would allow the English to participate in the EU internal market which is what they value most.
However, this creates a major problem because it forces the signatories to accept the EU rules on free movement of people, goods and services without much substantive discussion. Yet, not being ruled by Brussels was precisely the main motive for the leave vote.
Without signing an EEA agreement Britain may be in a position similar to Switzerland, which also did not sign with fear of labor mobility and loss of independence. However the Swiss Cantons are not as pro-European as Scotland and Northern Ireland are.
So, what are the options?
Basically, the EU can design a new type of EEA agreement to meet the Swiss and British fears and hope that it would be enough to prevent the choice of independence in Scotland and Northern Ireland.
Alternatively, it might advise the UK to rejoin EFTA with a promise to let Scotland and Ireland sign separate EEA agreements, by using a reverse of the formula found for the Norwegian Svalbard archipelago in the Arctic Ocean. I doubt that this would be enough to stop the breakup of Britain, but it is worth consideration.
What the EU should not do, is to give Britain better terms than the current EEA members have or encourage a breakup of Britain. The first would encourage more EU exits and the second would weaken NATO’s role and the prospect for lasting security and peace in Europe.
So, let us hope that the European Council meeting this Tuesday to discuss what to do about Brexit is a calm one, which decides to preserve the unity of Britain and of the remaining EU above all else.
The first thing that the EU must offer is time. Time to let the Brits reflect on what they wish to do about their new position in Europe and whether they wish to do it together in the UK or separately.
This should not stop the EU from setting the maximum it can offer. There is an obvious answer to this, which is the signing of a European Economic Area agreement. This is the obvious offer whether the new Britain decides to rejoin EFTA or not.
This would allow the English to participate in the EU internal market which is what they value most.
However, this creates a major problem because it forces the signatories to accept the EU rules on free movement of people, goods and services without much substantive discussion. Yet, not being ruled by Brussels was precisely the main motive for the leave vote.
Without signing an EEA agreement Britain may be in a position similar to Switzerland, which also did not sign with fear of labor mobility and loss of independence. However the Swiss Cantons are not as pro-European as Scotland and Northern Ireland are.
So, what are the options?
Basically, the EU can design a new type of EEA agreement to meet the Swiss and British fears and hope that it would be enough to prevent the choice of independence in Scotland and Northern Ireland.
Alternatively, it might advise the UK to rejoin EFTA with a promise to let Scotland and Ireland sign separate EEA agreements, by using a reverse of the formula found for the Norwegian Svalbard archipelago in the Arctic Ocean. I doubt that this would be enough to stop the breakup of Britain, but it is worth consideration.
What the EU should not do, is to give Britain better terms than the current EEA members have or encourage a breakup of Britain. The first would encourage more EU exits and the second would weaken NATO’s role and the prospect for lasting security and peace in Europe.
So, let us hope that the European Council meeting this Tuesday to discuss what to do about Brexit is a calm one, which decides to preserve the unity of Britain and of the remaining EU above all else.
Brexit and direct democracy: the double referendum option
Now that a petition to hold a new referendum has surpassed the 3 million signatures I need to discuss this option which I left out in my previous post.
I left it out because it does not solve the basic problem of direct democracy.
While a simple majority (even by one vote) is reasonable for easily reversible decisions, like the election of a parliament for a legislative period of four or five years, it should not be enough for decade lasting decisions. Typically, constitutions and major international treaties should last for several decades and not be subject to frequent changes because of the huge costs in terms of economic and political stability. Therefore, a repeat referendum is not a solution to heal a divided electorate. Only the requirement of a qualified majority solves the problem, because it guarantees a minimum of stability by avoiding the consequences of frequent reversals of opinion.
This said, I do not believe that such qualified majority needs to be extreme. Two thirds or three quarters majorities are clearly anti-democratic. However, majorities of 10 to 15% are a reasonable compromise between the rule by majority and the need to protect the minorities.
Obviously, these rules should be constitutional.
The case of the UK is peculiar in this regard because it does not have a written constitution. So, can a sitting parliament, the House of Lords or a high court cancel (or make non-mandatory) last week’s referendum? I do not know enough about the British rules, but, given the risk of UK disintegration, they should at least require a new election to decide on the future relationship with Europe; even if that means asking the former EU partners for more patience.
I left it out because it does not solve the basic problem of direct democracy.
While a simple majority (even by one vote) is reasonable for easily reversible decisions, like the election of a parliament for a legislative period of four or five years, it should not be enough for decade lasting decisions. Typically, constitutions and major international treaties should last for several decades and not be subject to frequent changes because of the huge costs in terms of economic and political stability. Therefore, a repeat referendum is not a solution to heal a divided electorate. Only the requirement of a qualified majority solves the problem, because it guarantees a minimum of stability by avoiding the consequences of frequent reversals of opinion.
This said, I do not believe that such qualified majority needs to be extreme. Two thirds or three quarters majorities are clearly anti-democratic. However, majorities of 10 to 15% are a reasonable compromise between the rule by majority and the need to protect the minorities.
Obviously, these rules should be constitutional.
The case of the UK is peculiar in this regard because it does not have a written constitution. So, can a sitting parliament, the House of Lords or a high court cancel (or make non-mandatory) last week’s referendum? I do not know enough about the British rules, but, given the risk of UK disintegration, they should at least require a new election to decide on the future relationship with Europe; even if that means asking the former EU partners for more patience.
Friday, 24 June 2016
Brexit and the danger of direct democracy
The Brexit vote provides a clear example of why direct democracy is a poor form of democracy. The reasons against direct voting are well know.Irreversible and long lasting decisions are taken in the spur of the moment without due regard for its consequences, based on lateral issues.
For instance, the Brexit debate was decided mostly on issues related to emigration which are a minor issue compared with the consequences of Britain leaving the EU.
If the worst comes to the worst, the voters may find out that they voted to break up the United Kingdom, an issue that was never envisaged by most of them.
So, if referendum and other forms of direct democracy are acceptable to decide local or sectional issues they are not suitable to decide complex issues with many ramifications.
In particular, regime change decisions such as independence, constitutional changes or decisions on important international treaties should not be subject to popular vote based on a simple majority. Think for instance in voting for independence. If they are voted on a simple majority vote we would end up with a country deciding one day for independence a the following wishing to reverse its decision based on a change of mind by a few voters.
If such decisions require a popular consult then they should be based on a qualified majority that will not disappear easily overnight(e.g. a 2/3 or 10% majority).
So David Cameron’s assertion in his defeat speech that “There are times when it is right to ask the people themselves – and that is what we have done”, is not a convincing excuse for his fatal mistake of calling referendum on Scotland independence and European Union membership.
In conclusion, direct democracy has its place in a representative democracy but can endanger democracy itself if not limited in scope and quorum.
Sunday, 19 June 2016
Trump, Iglesias and Boris: The new faces of evil in western democracies
Although extremists have a right to express peacefully and freely their views in a democratic society, it is expected that electors are sufficiently educated to not elect them. Yet, opinion polls on next week’s election in Spain and the UK referendum on EU membership suggest that such radical candidates are not far from winning. Likewise, in the US presidential election later in the year. So, is this because such candidates are wolves in sheep’s clothing misleading the electors?
Clearly not! They do not hide their hideous ideas, as I explained in previous posts. For instance, Donald Trump’s xenophobic ideas and hate for migrants are clearly dispelled in his so-called program to Make America Great Again. Likewise, the program of the Spanish party Podemos led by Pablo Iglésias, is a crude restatement of the Trotskyist version of communism coloured with populist claims of direct democracy, regional separatism and a phony rebellious youth. Finally, the proponents of Brexit, whether they are represented by Nigel Farage leader of UKIP or by Boris Johnson the former populist Mayor of London, play on the fear of immigration and loss of sovereignty, in a manner reminiscent of the infamous 1968 Enoch Powell’s speech on the Rivers of Blood. They downplay the costs of protectionism and economic disintegration, while bullying voters by claiming that they will be sissies if they do not vote out of the EU.
So, are these evil leaders gaining followers because the moderate media and politicians have given up on fighting their populist and nationalistic propaganda? Partly, this is true and it is often fostered by a media willing to resort to the dodgiest forms of reporting as long as it increases their audiences.
However, in my view, there are more important and genuine reasons for dissatisfaction with the current political systems. First, there is an inevitable peace lethargy among the young generations who do not remember the two world wars nor have they lived the age of utopias in the turn of the XIX century and the 1960s. Second, this is compounded by a generalized low regard for professional politicians who rotate in power and corruption fighting for special interest groups with an evident lack of public service spirit.
This real crisis of representative democracy and the new forms of media have been exploited expertly by the new evil leaders to disseminate their reactionary ideas. So, unless new leaders rise, as Churchill did in the 1930s against the appeasers and the nationalistic rhetoric of Hitler, and fight these new evil leaders, the Western World, as we know it, is in serious danger. This week’s electoral results in Spain and Britain will give us a first outlook of how real such danger is.
Thursday, 14 April 2016
Brexit: A brief history of economic disintegration
History is full of episodes of political and economic disintegration, which were often the natural culmination of experiences of forced integration. With a few exceptions, most empires ended through a process of violent and anarchic disintegration. Whether we think about the ancient empires of Alexander, Rome, the Qin Dynasty or Persia, or if we consider medieval empires like the Charlemagne Empire, the Islamic Caliphate or the Mongol Empire, or if we look at the modern empires of Britain, Ottoman, the German Reich and the Japanese Empire or the breakup of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, the lessons are the same. The separating regions often end up in civil war and always erect barriers to trade and investment through tariffs and instable currencies which bring economic decline.
The inevitable initial sacrifice in terms of economic and human misery is often followed by prolonged periods of underdevelopment (all too visible in Africa) in the separating regions, but there are some notable exceptions like the separation of the United States of America from Britain.
Do these lessons of history have any relevance in the case of an eventual separation of Britain from the European Union (the so-called Brexit)? If so, would the UK follow the general pattern of decadence and misery or could it replicate the US successful experience?
The first question is relevant because the European Union is a voluntary association of countries, not a forced empire. So, an eventual exit of a member state should be seen as the natural counterpart to a voluntary membership and should not be cause for war or vicious conflict. Nevertheless, we cannot ignore that Great Britain is itself an association of three nations – the English, the Welsh and the Scots – which may have quite distinct views in relation to the European Union, wish may lead some to question in which union they wish to participate - the European or the British.
Although military violence cannot be expected, social unrest may still arise in a strongly divided nation in relation to an eventual separation. Moreover, it will also depend on the attitude of the remaining member states in the European Union. Namely, whether they will be understanding and friendly or will be hostile and competitive, for example, by promoting an international financial centre to rival the City of London.
So, political attitudes in London, Brussels, Berlin and Paris would have an important bearing in the outcome of an eventual separation. Nevertheless, the answer to the question whether a separate Britain would be a failure or a success story requires an understanding of the economics of disintegration.
As a preamble to that understanding, let me just give the reader a chart depicting the experience of economic growth in Britain relative to that of France and the USA, before and after joining the European Union.
The chart is impressive. Before joining the European Union, the UK lagged France by over 30%. Since joining, it still lagged the USA by 20% until 1998, but managed to match the GDP growth in France. Since the creation of the Euro, Britain managed to overtake France by 10% and to match the growth in the US economy.
Given the success of Britain in the European Union, for outsiders it is hard to understand the decision to hold a referendum on its continuation in the Union. Is it simply local politics, or there are any fundamental reasons?
The inevitable initial sacrifice in terms of economic and human misery is often followed by prolonged periods of underdevelopment (all too visible in Africa) in the separating regions, but there are some notable exceptions like the separation of the United States of America from Britain.
Do these lessons of history have any relevance in the case of an eventual separation of Britain from the European Union (the so-called Brexit)? If so, would the UK follow the general pattern of decadence and misery or could it replicate the US successful experience?
The first question is relevant because the European Union is a voluntary association of countries, not a forced empire. So, an eventual exit of a member state should be seen as the natural counterpart to a voluntary membership and should not be cause for war or vicious conflict. Nevertheless, we cannot ignore that Great Britain is itself an association of three nations – the English, the Welsh and the Scots – which may have quite distinct views in relation to the European Union, wish may lead some to question in which union they wish to participate - the European or the British.
Although military violence cannot be expected, social unrest may still arise in a strongly divided nation in relation to an eventual separation. Moreover, it will also depend on the attitude of the remaining member states in the European Union. Namely, whether they will be understanding and friendly or will be hostile and competitive, for example, by promoting an international financial centre to rival the City of London.
So, political attitudes in London, Brussels, Berlin and Paris would have an important bearing in the outcome of an eventual separation. Nevertheless, the answer to the question whether a separate Britain would be a failure or a success story requires an understanding of the economics of disintegration.
As a preamble to that understanding, let me just give the reader a chart depicting the experience of economic growth in Britain relative to that of France and the USA, before and after joining the European Union.
Given the success of Britain in the European Union, for outsiders it is hard to understand the decision to hold a referendum on its continuation in the Union. Is it simply local politics, or there are any fundamental reasons?
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