It seems that British Prime Minister, has finally decided to endorse a soft Brexit.
Basically, she proposes a future agreement somewhere between the current European Economic Area (EEA) model and the Canadian Trade Agreement (CETA) plus a new security treaty, to be implemented after a two-year transition period, when everything would remain the same, expiring before the UK general election in 2022.
It seems a moderate approach, but it risks being contested by both sides of her party, and leaves open the question of whether she will survive long enough as Prime Minister.
From a European perspective, it is important to ascertain whether the UK wishes to be closer to Norway or Canada, before the EU can accept a pick-and-choose approach to the benefits of the single market.
For instance, will the UK wish to remain in the single market for financial services, but not in other sectors? These and many other issues have to be addressed as soon as possible, and the broader the agreement the better.
However, even if the UK opts for an agreement closer to the EEA, my previous estimate (Mendes 2017) that Brexit may cost the UK a long-term slowdown in GDP growth of approximately 20% is not significantly reduced.
In the end, Brexit is still a bad “deal” for Britain.
Showing posts with label European Union. Show all posts
Showing posts with label European Union. Show all posts
Friday, 22 September 2017
Friday, 24 March 2017
The 60th anniversary of the EU does not need to mean decadence
My personal contribution to commemorate the EU 60th anniversary was to publish a second edition of my 1987 book on Economic Integration and Growth, to which I added a second part dealing with enlargement and the risk of disintegration following Brexit. A link for the book is found on the left and next I reproduce its concluding chapter.
How to Rebuild a Collapsing Castle
As in relation to historical buildings, common sense dictates that the restoration of a collapsing integrated union cannot be done by demolishing first to build after. Instead, it needs some education about the value of preserving past achievements. Here lies the difficulty, but not at the technical and legal level. This is so because the required political will to preserve economic freedom is not only wavering, it risks being reversed by rising political populism in America and Europe.
This book provides plenty of theoretical and empirical evidence about the economic superiority of free trade over protectionism. However, integration is not just about economic gains and losses; it is also about institutional and political arrangements that are efficient and fair to mobilise all members regardless of their specificities. As said in chapter 10, there is no point in being a member if a country wishes to be part of other integration process or believes that an atomised world of independent states is a better road to achieve global liberalisation.
So far, it is not yet clear which of these roads Britain wishes to follow. However, this is not really important for the remaining EU members. What they need to consider is whether they should use the Brexit opportunity to change their own organisation to deal with other “unsatisfied members” and future entries and exits.
The current situation, in relation to neighbouring countries, is depicted in the diagram shown above in page 207, which needs to completed by a list of six Western Balkan countries, of which four (Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia) are already official candidates and two (Bosnia and Kosovo) are potential candidates. The Balkan problem can be resolved swiftly through a bold enlargement. Although the Balkan countries are problematic due to rampant criminality (Albania), ties to Russia (Serbia), and Islamic population (Bosnia and Kosovo), they should not be excluded.
Indeed, their membership would make more compelling the need to transform the European Union into an official multi-tier union, based on a variable geometry as discussed in chapter 10. The institutionalisation of a variable geometry would allow member countries to opt out or to be demoted from some policies without major political upheavals. For instance, temporarily, Greece could leave the euro until she has sorted out her foreign debt. Romania could be demoted from the free movement of people while the current members could repatriate professional beggars from that country. Likewise, countries like Hungary and Poland, which are diverging from the EU pattern of democracy, could be demoted to a lower level of integration.
The long-waiting candidacy of Turkey to join the European Union should be abandoned; it seems to have replaced its strategic membership of the EU by an attempt to become the leading Islamic power in the Middle East.
Indeed, the end of the American leadership in the free world brought about by the new Trump administration is likely to generate a new drive towards the creation of rival spheres of influence. In Europe, Britain, Russia and Turkey are likely to strive to create their own spheres of influence at the expense of the European Union.
This new XXI rivalry will differ from nineteenth-century imperialism. It will use modern weapons to impact on the policies pursued by the European Union. For instance, Erdogan’s Turkey might use migration and refugees to destabilise Europe; Putin’s Russia may use energy and its spies and corrupt oligarchs to trap neighbouring countries and discredit democratic EU institutions; while Theresa May’s Britain may be tempted to use tax competition to break the social security net in the European Union.
Although individually, each of these countries is too small to threaten the EU economically, when combined, their challenge cannot be ignored in the design of new EU policies to keep and foster the integration process.
To cope with this challenge, the EU needs to simultaneously launch new common policies whilst disengaging or scaling back some of the current, more divisive policies. Moreover, the new exclusive policies should have a significant budgetary value (e.g., raising its level from less than 2 percent to a value closer to 10 percent) to have a macroeconomic role. Moreover, they should not be of a sector nature and distort international competition.
At the top of the list should be a single policy on migration and refugees, inspired by the Canadian or Australian models. In second place should be a policy of common defence and security, including a nuclear deterrent, so that the EU becomes ready to lead NATO should the United States weaken its commitment to the alliance.
Next should be the financing of the high end of two fundamental public services—education and healthcare. Given the success of the Erasmus student mobility program and the rising costs and competition of research, higher education and hospital healthcare are two obvious candidates to be funded at the European level.
Looking forwards, a regionally differentiated basic-income policy for unemployed, destitute, and old people should also be considered.
Of course, a multi-tier Europe with new single policies can only work with proximity and the trust of the people. The model based in the centralisation of the European civil servants in Brussels is no longer efficient or acceptable to guarantee accountability and democracy.
The current institutions have not done enough to prove their accountability, and direct elections for the European Parliament have not contributed to create truly European parties where the electors feel represented. Moreover, the idea that the current institutions—commission, council, and parliament—may transform into a government, senate, and congress of a future federation or confederation is utopian.
The EU needs to create institutions that are adapted to its diversified country basis. One such solution would be to split the European Parliament into upper and lower houses, the first made of members elected by the national parliaments and the second by members elected directly in European lists.
To sum up, like the founding fathers had to select policies that were then crucial, any restoration of the European Union has to do the same. Back then, the challenge was to reconstruct a democratic Europe from destruction. The obvious industries were atomic, coal, steel, and farming. Now the challenge is to win the race for talent and technology and to do so with social stability and security, in a world threatened again by multi-polar power players.
How to Rebuild a Collapsing Castle
As in relation to historical buildings, common sense dictates that the restoration of a collapsing integrated union cannot be done by demolishing first to build after. Instead, it needs some education about the value of preserving past achievements. Here lies the difficulty, but not at the technical and legal level. This is so because the required political will to preserve economic freedom is not only wavering, it risks being reversed by rising political populism in America and Europe.
This book provides plenty of theoretical and empirical evidence about the economic superiority of free trade over protectionism. However, integration is not just about economic gains and losses; it is also about institutional and political arrangements that are efficient and fair to mobilise all members regardless of their specificities. As said in chapter 10, there is no point in being a member if a country wishes to be part of other integration process or believes that an atomised world of independent states is a better road to achieve global liberalisation.
So far, it is not yet clear which of these roads Britain wishes to follow. However, this is not really important for the remaining EU members. What they need to consider is whether they should use the Brexit opportunity to change their own organisation to deal with other “unsatisfied members” and future entries and exits.
The current situation, in relation to neighbouring countries, is depicted in the diagram shown above in page 207, which needs to completed by a list of six Western Balkan countries, of which four (Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia) are already official candidates and two (Bosnia and Kosovo) are potential candidates. The Balkan problem can be resolved swiftly through a bold enlargement. Although the Balkan countries are problematic due to rampant criminality (Albania), ties to Russia (Serbia), and Islamic population (Bosnia and Kosovo), they should not be excluded.
Indeed, their membership would make more compelling the need to transform the European Union into an official multi-tier union, based on a variable geometry as discussed in chapter 10. The institutionalisation of a variable geometry would allow member countries to opt out or to be demoted from some policies without major political upheavals. For instance, temporarily, Greece could leave the euro until she has sorted out her foreign debt. Romania could be demoted from the free movement of people while the current members could repatriate professional beggars from that country. Likewise, countries like Hungary and Poland, which are diverging from the EU pattern of democracy, could be demoted to a lower level of integration.
The long-waiting candidacy of Turkey to join the European Union should be abandoned; it seems to have replaced its strategic membership of the EU by an attempt to become the leading Islamic power in the Middle East.
Indeed, the end of the American leadership in the free world brought about by the new Trump administration is likely to generate a new drive towards the creation of rival spheres of influence. In Europe, Britain, Russia and Turkey are likely to strive to create their own spheres of influence at the expense of the European Union.
This new XXI rivalry will differ from nineteenth-century imperialism. It will use modern weapons to impact on the policies pursued by the European Union. For instance, Erdogan’s Turkey might use migration and refugees to destabilise Europe; Putin’s Russia may use energy and its spies and corrupt oligarchs to trap neighbouring countries and discredit democratic EU institutions; while Theresa May’s Britain may be tempted to use tax competition to break the social security net in the European Union.
Although individually, each of these countries is too small to threaten the EU economically, when combined, their challenge cannot be ignored in the design of new EU policies to keep and foster the integration process.
To cope with this challenge, the EU needs to simultaneously launch new common policies whilst disengaging or scaling back some of the current, more divisive policies. Moreover, the new exclusive policies should have a significant budgetary value (e.g., raising its level from less than 2 percent to a value closer to 10 percent) to have a macroeconomic role. Moreover, they should not be of a sector nature and distort international competition.
At the top of the list should be a single policy on migration and refugees, inspired by the Canadian or Australian models. In second place should be a policy of common defence and security, including a nuclear deterrent, so that the EU becomes ready to lead NATO should the United States weaken its commitment to the alliance.
Next should be the financing of the high end of two fundamental public services—education and healthcare. Given the success of the Erasmus student mobility program and the rising costs and competition of research, higher education and hospital healthcare are two obvious candidates to be funded at the European level.
Looking forwards, a regionally differentiated basic-income policy for unemployed, destitute, and old people should also be considered.
Of course, a multi-tier Europe with new single policies can only work with proximity and the trust of the people. The model based in the centralisation of the European civil servants in Brussels is no longer efficient or acceptable to guarantee accountability and democracy.
The current institutions have not done enough to prove their accountability, and direct elections for the European Parliament have not contributed to create truly European parties where the electors feel represented. Moreover, the idea that the current institutions—commission, council, and parliament—may transform into a government, senate, and congress of a future federation or confederation is utopian.
The EU needs to create institutions that are adapted to its diversified country basis. One such solution would be to split the European Parliament into upper and lower houses, the first made of members elected by the national parliaments and the second by members elected directly in European lists.
To sum up, like the founding fathers had to select policies that were then crucial, any restoration of the European Union has to do the same. Back then, the challenge was to reconstruct a democratic Europe from destruction. The obvious industries were atomic, coal, steel, and farming. Now the challenge is to win the race for talent and technology and to do so with social stability and security, in a world threatened again by multi-polar power players.
Sunday, 26 June 2016
A fine balance between the breakup of Britain or the EU
After the British vote to leave the EU, what should the EU offer the new UK (or England)?
The first thing that the EU must offer is time. Time to let the Brits reflect on what they wish to do about their new position in Europe and whether they wish to do it together in the UK or separately.
This should not stop the EU from setting the maximum it can offer. There is an obvious answer to this, which is the signing of a European Economic Area agreement. This is the obvious offer whether the new Britain decides to rejoin EFTA or not.
This would allow the English to participate in the EU internal market which is what they value most.
However, this creates a major problem because it forces the signatories to accept the EU rules on free movement of people, goods and services without much substantive discussion. Yet, not being ruled by Brussels was precisely the main motive for the leave vote.
Without signing an EEA agreement Britain may be in a position similar to Switzerland, which also did not sign with fear of labor mobility and loss of independence. However the Swiss Cantons are not as pro-European as Scotland and Northern Ireland are.
So, what are the options?
Basically, the EU can design a new type of EEA agreement to meet the Swiss and British fears and hope that it would be enough to prevent the choice of independence in Scotland and Northern Ireland.
Alternatively, it might advise the UK to rejoin EFTA with a promise to let Scotland and Ireland sign separate EEA agreements, by using a reverse of the formula found for the Norwegian Svalbard archipelago in the Arctic Ocean. I doubt that this would be enough to stop the breakup of Britain, but it is worth consideration.
What the EU should not do, is to give Britain better terms than the current EEA members have or encourage a breakup of Britain. The first would encourage more EU exits and the second would weaken NATO’s role and the prospect for lasting security and peace in Europe.
So, let us hope that the European Council meeting this Tuesday to discuss what to do about Brexit is a calm one, which decides to preserve the unity of Britain and of the remaining EU above all else.
The first thing that the EU must offer is time. Time to let the Brits reflect on what they wish to do about their new position in Europe and whether they wish to do it together in the UK or separately.
This should not stop the EU from setting the maximum it can offer. There is an obvious answer to this, which is the signing of a European Economic Area agreement. This is the obvious offer whether the new Britain decides to rejoin EFTA or not.
This would allow the English to participate in the EU internal market which is what they value most.
However, this creates a major problem because it forces the signatories to accept the EU rules on free movement of people, goods and services without much substantive discussion. Yet, not being ruled by Brussels was precisely the main motive for the leave vote.
Without signing an EEA agreement Britain may be in a position similar to Switzerland, which also did not sign with fear of labor mobility and loss of independence. However the Swiss Cantons are not as pro-European as Scotland and Northern Ireland are.
So, what are the options?
Basically, the EU can design a new type of EEA agreement to meet the Swiss and British fears and hope that it would be enough to prevent the choice of independence in Scotland and Northern Ireland.
Alternatively, it might advise the UK to rejoin EFTA with a promise to let Scotland and Ireland sign separate EEA agreements, by using a reverse of the formula found for the Norwegian Svalbard archipelago in the Arctic Ocean. I doubt that this would be enough to stop the breakup of Britain, but it is worth consideration.
What the EU should not do, is to give Britain better terms than the current EEA members have or encourage a breakup of Britain. The first would encourage more EU exits and the second would weaken NATO’s role and the prospect for lasting security and peace in Europe.
So, let us hope that the European Council meeting this Tuesday to discuss what to do about Brexit is a calm one, which decides to preserve the unity of Britain and of the remaining EU above all else.
Thursday, 14 April 2016
Brexit: A brief history of economic disintegration
History is full of episodes of political and economic disintegration, which were often the natural culmination of experiences of forced integration. With a few exceptions, most empires ended through a process of violent and anarchic disintegration. Whether we think about the ancient empires of Alexander, Rome, the Qin Dynasty or Persia, or if we consider medieval empires like the Charlemagne Empire, the Islamic Caliphate or the Mongol Empire, or if we look at the modern empires of Britain, Ottoman, the German Reich and the Japanese Empire or the breakup of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, the lessons are the same. The separating regions often end up in civil war and always erect barriers to trade and investment through tariffs and instable currencies which bring economic decline.
The inevitable initial sacrifice in terms of economic and human misery is often followed by prolonged periods of underdevelopment (all too visible in Africa) in the separating regions, but there are some notable exceptions like the separation of the United States of America from Britain.
Do these lessons of history have any relevance in the case of an eventual separation of Britain from the European Union (the so-called Brexit)? If so, would the UK follow the general pattern of decadence and misery or could it replicate the US successful experience?
The first question is relevant because the European Union is a voluntary association of countries, not a forced empire. So, an eventual exit of a member state should be seen as the natural counterpart to a voluntary membership and should not be cause for war or vicious conflict. Nevertheless, we cannot ignore that Great Britain is itself an association of three nations – the English, the Welsh and the Scots – which may have quite distinct views in relation to the European Union, wish may lead some to question in which union they wish to participate - the European or the British.
Although military violence cannot be expected, social unrest may still arise in a strongly divided nation in relation to an eventual separation. Moreover, it will also depend on the attitude of the remaining member states in the European Union. Namely, whether they will be understanding and friendly or will be hostile and competitive, for example, by promoting an international financial centre to rival the City of London.
So, political attitudes in London, Brussels, Berlin and Paris would have an important bearing in the outcome of an eventual separation. Nevertheless, the answer to the question whether a separate Britain would be a failure or a success story requires an understanding of the economics of disintegration.
As a preamble to that understanding, let me just give the reader a chart depicting the experience of economic growth in Britain relative to that of France and the USA, before and after joining the European Union.
The chart is impressive. Before joining the European Union, the UK lagged France by over 30%. Since joining, it still lagged the USA by 20% until 1998, but managed to match the GDP growth in France. Since the creation of the Euro, Britain managed to overtake France by 10% and to match the growth in the US economy.
Given the success of Britain in the European Union, for outsiders it is hard to understand the decision to hold a referendum on its continuation in the Union. Is it simply local politics, or there are any fundamental reasons?
The inevitable initial sacrifice in terms of economic and human misery is often followed by prolonged periods of underdevelopment (all too visible in Africa) in the separating regions, but there are some notable exceptions like the separation of the United States of America from Britain.
Do these lessons of history have any relevance in the case of an eventual separation of Britain from the European Union (the so-called Brexit)? If so, would the UK follow the general pattern of decadence and misery or could it replicate the US successful experience?
The first question is relevant because the European Union is a voluntary association of countries, not a forced empire. So, an eventual exit of a member state should be seen as the natural counterpart to a voluntary membership and should not be cause for war or vicious conflict. Nevertheless, we cannot ignore that Great Britain is itself an association of three nations – the English, the Welsh and the Scots – which may have quite distinct views in relation to the European Union, wish may lead some to question in which union they wish to participate - the European or the British.
Although military violence cannot be expected, social unrest may still arise in a strongly divided nation in relation to an eventual separation. Moreover, it will also depend on the attitude of the remaining member states in the European Union. Namely, whether they will be understanding and friendly or will be hostile and competitive, for example, by promoting an international financial centre to rival the City of London.
So, political attitudes in London, Brussels, Berlin and Paris would have an important bearing in the outcome of an eventual separation. Nevertheless, the answer to the question whether a separate Britain would be a failure or a success story requires an understanding of the economics of disintegration.
As a preamble to that understanding, let me just give the reader a chart depicting the experience of economic growth in Britain relative to that of France and the USA, before and after joining the European Union.
Given the success of Britain in the European Union, for outsiders it is hard to understand the decision to hold a referendum on its continuation in the Union. Is it simply local politics, or there are any fundamental reasons?
Wednesday, 10 September 2014
The economics of disintegration and why the Scottish should vote no
The world and Scotland fear what may happen if next week the Scottish people votes for Independence. Economic theory has a solid knowledge about economic integration and there are a few empirical studies measuring its costs and benefits (including my own here). Independence is the reversal of integration, so we may apply most of the theory to disintegration.
Apart from the immediate impact caused by changing existing relations and institutions, which may be enormous if independence is not a peaceful process, the long term advantages of separation must be proved in terms on how it will impact on the four basic freedoms – free movement of labour, capital, goods and services. To these one may add the pros and cons of financial transfers through a centralized budget and the use of a common currency.
Let me speculate on each one of them. For this I shall assume, optimistically, that the process will be peaceful and Scotland will remain in the European Union, which itself will not disintegrate if the independence movement extends to countries like Spain, Belgium, etc.
In terms of labour market Scotland is now fully integrated with the UK and workers move freely between Scotland and the rest of the UK. So nothing can be won by independence, but losses are foreseeable in terms of job opportunities.
Likewise, in relation to the free movement of goods and services, as long as Scotland remains within the EU, these will remain relatively free. Again, nothing can be gained through separation but the risk of non-tariff barriers will rise.
When it comes to the free movement of capital the answer is not straightforward, because it depends on what the separatists would decide in terms of their future currency. They promise to retain the British Pound but this may prove untenable. Using a foreign currency only works until the rulers of that currency (in this case the Bank of England) pursue a monetary policy that is good for the local economy, but this is uncertain. What is sure is that there will be a significant change in Scotland’s current account because of the North Sea revenues.
Indeed, the case for independence rests on little else than retaining such revenues in Scotland. However, there is no certainty on how long those reserves will last. And, more importantly, they would only reduce the current government deficit from 14 to 8%, or probably much less if one accounts for loss of revenue in the financial sector and increased sovereignty costs, let alone the local politicians’ eagerness for more spending.
This bet on becoming an oil-producing country is a very dangerous mirage. Not only because of the likely effects of the so-called “Dutch disease”, but also due to the rise of populism and anarchy in the fight for such revenues (Venezuela comes to mind when one thinks about it).
Traditionally, the Scottish are viewed as tight-fisted and prudent people. Let’s trust that these characteristics will lead them to prefer the certain to the uncertain and to avoid embarking on an independence adventure with so many risks for them and the rest of Europe.
Apart from the immediate impact caused by changing existing relations and institutions, which may be enormous if independence is not a peaceful process, the long term advantages of separation must be proved in terms on how it will impact on the four basic freedoms – free movement of labour, capital, goods and services. To these one may add the pros and cons of financial transfers through a centralized budget and the use of a common currency.
Let me speculate on each one of them. For this I shall assume, optimistically, that the process will be peaceful and Scotland will remain in the European Union, which itself will not disintegrate if the independence movement extends to countries like Spain, Belgium, etc.
In terms of labour market Scotland is now fully integrated with the UK and workers move freely between Scotland and the rest of the UK. So nothing can be won by independence, but losses are foreseeable in terms of job opportunities.
Likewise, in relation to the free movement of goods and services, as long as Scotland remains within the EU, these will remain relatively free. Again, nothing can be gained through separation but the risk of non-tariff barriers will rise.
When it comes to the free movement of capital the answer is not straightforward, because it depends on what the separatists would decide in terms of their future currency. They promise to retain the British Pound but this may prove untenable. Using a foreign currency only works until the rulers of that currency (in this case the Bank of England) pursue a monetary policy that is good for the local economy, but this is uncertain. What is sure is that there will be a significant change in Scotland’s current account because of the North Sea revenues.
Indeed, the case for independence rests on little else than retaining such revenues in Scotland. However, there is no certainty on how long those reserves will last. And, more importantly, they would only reduce the current government deficit from 14 to 8%, or probably much less if one accounts for loss of revenue in the financial sector and increased sovereignty costs, let alone the local politicians’ eagerness for more spending.
This bet on becoming an oil-producing country is a very dangerous mirage. Not only because of the likely effects of the so-called “Dutch disease”, but also due to the rise of populism and anarchy in the fight for such revenues (Venezuela comes to mind when one thinks about it).
Traditionally, the Scottish are viewed as tight-fisted and prudent people. Let’s trust that these characteristics will lead them to prefer the certain to the uncertain and to avoid embarking on an independence adventure with so many risks for them and the rest of Europe.
Wednesday, 19 September 2012
Multiculturalism and Democracy
We define here multiculturalism in a narrow sense to include only major differences based on ethnicity or religion, leaving aside other rivalries created by geography or ideology.
Theoretically, one may expect multiculturalism and democracy to conflict or even to be irreconcilable, because people tend to rally around single issue parties along ethnic or religious lines.
In reality we find democracy in large multicultural countries like India, a country where 20% of the population follows a religion different from Hinduism, where cohabit more than 700 tribes, with 18 official languages and 450 linguistic groups.
In contrast we currently have many smaller multicultural countries like Syria and Iraq being ravaged by civil war. At the same time we have totalitarian multicultural countries like China, also a big country, where less than 50% of the population follow Shenism-Taoism and Buddhism among the Han Chinese and the other 55 official ethnic groups speaking 292 languages. Despite Mandarin being the only national official language in China, other languages like the Cantonese are also official languages at the regional level.
The question then is: why is multiculturalism consistent with democracy, tolerance and diversity in some places but not elsewhere?
One explanation is that democracy was possible where there was an over-riding cultural inheritance; often originating from the leadership of independence movements. India, where Gandhi’s party – the National Congress Party – dominated the political life in the first 25 years of independence, is such an example.
What makes the Indian experience interesting is how such party dominance could be ended in a peaceful way. Indeed, democracy survived despite the emergence of a plethora of small regional and ethnic parties and, at times, being governed by a 14-party coalition.
Many factors might have contributed for such outcome, but among the most important we must certainly include the choice of a federal system of government, the adoption of a unified and independent judicial system and the acceptance of coalition governments instead of a more traditional two-party rotation system.
All those currently pushing to jump towards political union in the European Union must think about these factors.
Theoretically, one may expect multiculturalism and democracy to conflict or even to be irreconcilable, because people tend to rally around single issue parties along ethnic or religious lines.
In reality we find democracy in large multicultural countries like India, a country where 20% of the population follows a religion different from Hinduism, where cohabit more than 700 tribes, with 18 official languages and 450 linguistic groups.
In contrast we currently have many smaller multicultural countries like Syria and Iraq being ravaged by civil war. At the same time we have totalitarian multicultural countries like China, also a big country, where less than 50% of the population follow Shenism-Taoism and Buddhism among the Han Chinese and the other 55 official ethnic groups speaking 292 languages. Despite Mandarin being the only national official language in China, other languages like the Cantonese are also official languages at the regional level.
The question then is: why is multiculturalism consistent with democracy, tolerance and diversity in some places but not elsewhere?
One explanation is that democracy was possible where there was an over-riding cultural inheritance; often originating from the leadership of independence movements. India, where Gandhi’s party – the National Congress Party – dominated the political life in the first 25 years of independence, is such an example.
What makes the Indian experience interesting is how such party dominance could be ended in a peaceful way. Indeed, democracy survived despite the emergence of a plethora of small regional and ethnic parties and, at times, being governed by a 14-party coalition.
Many factors might have contributed for such outcome, but among the most important we must certainly include the choice of a federal system of government, the adoption of a unified and independent judicial system and the acceptance of coalition governments instead of a more traditional two-party rotation system.
All those currently pushing to jump towards political union in the European Union must think about these factors.
Saturday, 15 September 2012
Why the IMF therapy is not working in Ireland
After a remarkable economic success based on market capitalism, Ireland has drifted back into misery since the crisis of 2008 and risks turning into a Southern European type of state capitalism. Back in January 2011 we explained in this blog (see here) why the IMF program for Greece’s external adjustment would not work. Some of the reasons given then apply equally to Ireland (or Spain for that matter).
First, the Troika misdiagnosed the situation as a liquidity problem while in fact Ireland and Greece faced a solvency problem (albeit of a different nature).
Then, they treated the problem of excessive leverage in the wrong way. The two major mistakes in Ireland were the conversion of private debt into public debt and the reliance on internal devaluation to deleverage. It is easy to see why both policies were wrong.
Ireland had a typical situation faced by a family with irresponsible children that took excessive debt to pay for gambling losses at the Casino (or in its case to speculate in real estate). An obvious option to erase gambling debts was to default on the casino loans (in the case of the Irish real estate bubble the British and German banks). They could be charged with allowing bets that the gambler could not pay. One alternative would be to demand a debt restructuring involving partial debt forgiveness and a longer repayment period, so that with the help of family and friends (i. e. grants by national and EU institutions in the case of Irish borrowers) they could repay the remaining debt without damaging the credit of his family. Another alternative would be to ask the casino to accept an IOU without a redemption date (in case of the British and German banks accept money printed by the ECB).
Yet, the casino owners decided instead to force the collection of their loans from the children’s parents (i.e.Irish government). To save its reputation the family promised to honor the debts by putting them in their business balance sheet (the state budget in the case of Ireland). However, the debts were so huge that they would necessarily cripple an otherwise successful business (economy). It is easy to see why.
First, such an increase in leverage would bar the firm from market financing. Second, it would be forced to halt all modernization and maintenance investments. Finally, it would force the family to downsize by selling some of the best assets. Combining these three measures would inevitably lead to a lower competitiveness, declining productivity and a depressed local economy. As expected, in the last four years, investment in Ireland more than halved in real terms, while domestic demand declined by about one third.
However, the recourse to internal devaluation only made things worse. Imagine that the clientele of the parents business was mostly local (i.e. produced non-tradable goods in economists’ parlance). Therefore, cutting the wage of their workers would reduce its sales proportionally and reduce further the firms’ debt capacity.
Moreover, reducing nominal contracts in the labor market without a concomitant reduction in credit markets would inevitably lead to an increase in non-performing loans (which in 2011 indeed rose from 12% to 20%).
It is obvious that the policy of switching the debt burden from the private to the public sector only made things worse in Ireland. What we said about Greece applies equally to Ireland. It has only three options: a) to force a significant hair-cut on its bond-holders, b) to receive a major grant from other EU countries, or c) a mix of both. None of these is a pleasant solution but there is no other way out.
First, the Troika misdiagnosed the situation as a liquidity problem while in fact Ireland and Greece faced a solvency problem (albeit of a different nature).
Then, they treated the problem of excessive leverage in the wrong way. The two major mistakes in Ireland were the conversion of private debt into public debt and the reliance on internal devaluation to deleverage. It is easy to see why both policies were wrong.
Ireland had a typical situation faced by a family with irresponsible children that took excessive debt to pay for gambling losses at the Casino (or in its case to speculate in real estate). An obvious option to erase gambling debts was to default on the casino loans (in the case of the Irish real estate bubble the British and German banks). They could be charged with allowing bets that the gambler could not pay. One alternative would be to demand a debt restructuring involving partial debt forgiveness and a longer repayment period, so that with the help of family and friends (i. e. grants by national and EU institutions in the case of Irish borrowers) they could repay the remaining debt without damaging the credit of his family. Another alternative would be to ask the casino to accept an IOU without a redemption date (in case of the British and German banks accept money printed by the ECB).
Yet, the casino owners decided instead to force the collection of their loans from the children’s parents (i.e.Irish government). To save its reputation the family promised to honor the debts by putting them in their business balance sheet (the state budget in the case of Ireland). However, the debts were so huge that they would necessarily cripple an otherwise successful business (economy). It is easy to see why.
First, such an increase in leverage would bar the firm from market financing. Second, it would be forced to halt all modernization and maintenance investments. Finally, it would force the family to downsize by selling some of the best assets. Combining these three measures would inevitably lead to a lower competitiveness, declining productivity and a depressed local economy. As expected, in the last four years, investment in Ireland more than halved in real terms, while domestic demand declined by about one third.
However, the recourse to internal devaluation only made things worse. Imagine that the clientele of the parents business was mostly local (i.e. produced non-tradable goods in economists’ parlance). Therefore, cutting the wage of their workers would reduce its sales proportionally and reduce further the firms’ debt capacity.
Moreover, reducing nominal contracts in the labor market without a concomitant reduction in credit markets would inevitably lead to an increase in non-performing loans (which in 2011 indeed rose from 12% to 20%).
It is obvious that the policy of switching the debt burden from the private to the public sector only made things worse in Ireland. What we said about Greece applies equally to Ireland. It has only three options: a) to force a significant hair-cut on its bond-holders, b) to receive a major grant from other EU countries, or c) a mix of both. None of these is a pleasant solution but there is no other way out.
Friday, 9 December 2011
Is the ECB Intent on Replacing Euro Hara-Kiri by Euthanasia?
Another useless EU Summit - thank you Mr. Cameron for killing the new “Merkozy” version of an absurd fiscal union for the entire EU. This time, the absurdity of setting a budget limit of 0.5% of GDP (when it has been unable to comply with the existing limit of 3%), was compounded by requiring its inscription as a rule in national legal systems at constitutional or equivalent level (see here why this is a mistake).
Let us now hope that a referendum in Ireland or any other country will kill the alternative proposal for a fiscal union among Euro Zone members through a new "fiscal compact". As we said here, a fiscal union between Germany and France may make sense but it would be a disaster for the entire Euro Zone.
The potential collapse of the Euro Zone will not be due to a fiscal problem in the Euro Area; which does not exist, despite the fact that three smaller members have excessive debt and Germany has an excessive current account surplus. The problem resides in the ECB’s refusal to act to stop the speculation against the Euro by invoking that its charter does not allow for the monetization of fiscal deficits.
Mr. Draghi is either naïve or wants us to believe in fairy tales. During his last press conference, he said that funding the IMF to finance exclusively the Euro Zone governments would be against the ECB charter. However, the ECB practice of accepting modern day versions of accommodation bills, in the form of bank drafts and bonds issued and subscribed by the same bank with a government guarantee and used to purchase the debt of the said government, is a more dangerous form of debt monetization since it lacks any kind of conditionality. Moreover, it puts those governments in the position of sitting ducks for speculative attacks.
As we said before bank-to-bank loans with strong conditionality are preferable. Obviously, we do not advocate that the ECB should negotiate or monitor such conditionality. Specialized institutions such as the IMF or the EFSF/ESM should do that.
Unfortunately, as we said repeatedly and the experience of Greece, Ireland and Portugal shows the IMF adjustment policies for monetary unions are seriously flawed.
Yet the ECB did not demand from the European Council that the ESM should take its place. Instead, the Council decided that all EU member states would lend to the IMF an extra 200 million Euros in the hope that non-EU countries might do the same.
In summary, by accepting the self-inflicted fiscal Darwinism of Germany that will lead to expelling peripheral countries from the Euro Zone, despite a half-baked mix of ECB and IMF support, will not restore confidence in the Euro. All it does is to replace the previous ECB hara-kiri intent with a slow euthanasia carried out by an IMF firing squad.
Let us now hope that a referendum in Ireland or any other country will kill the alternative proposal for a fiscal union among Euro Zone members through a new "fiscal compact". As we said here, a fiscal union between Germany and France may make sense but it would be a disaster for the entire Euro Zone.
The potential collapse of the Euro Zone will not be due to a fiscal problem in the Euro Area; which does not exist, despite the fact that three smaller members have excessive debt and Germany has an excessive current account surplus. The problem resides in the ECB’s refusal to act to stop the speculation against the Euro by invoking that its charter does not allow for the monetization of fiscal deficits.
Mr. Draghi is either naïve or wants us to believe in fairy tales. During his last press conference, he said that funding the IMF to finance exclusively the Euro Zone governments would be against the ECB charter. However, the ECB practice of accepting modern day versions of accommodation bills, in the form of bank drafts and bonds issued and subscribed by the same bank with a government guarantee and used to purchase the debt of the said government, is a more dangerous form of debt monetization since it lacks any kind of conditionality. Moreover, it puts those governments in the position of sitting ducks for speculative attacks.
As we said before bank-to-bank loans with strong conditionality are preferable. Obviously, we do not advocate that the ECB should negotiate or monitor such conditionality. Specialized institutions such as the IMF or the EFSF/ESM should do that.
Unfortunately, as we said repeatedly and the experience of Greece, Ireland and Portugal shows the IMF adjustment policies for monetary unions are seriously flawed.
Yet the ECB did not demand from the European Council that the ESM should take its place. Instead, the Council decided that all EU member states would lend to the IMF an extra 200 million Euros in the hope that non-EU countries might do the same.
In summary, by accepting the self-inflicted fiscal Darwinism of Germany that will lead to expelling peripheral countries from the Euro Zone, despite a half-baked mix of ECB and IMF support, will not restore confidence in the Euro. All it does is to replace the previous ECB hara-kiri intent with a slow euthanasia carried out by an IMF firing squad.
Friday, 28 October 2011
Shameful European Leaders
In today’s news: “AP - The chief of Europe's bailout fund visited Beijing on Friday to discuss possible terms for a bond sale aimed at raising money from China and other non-European investors”.
After months of protracted squabbling over how to solve the Greek problem, all that Sarkozy and Merkel could come up with was a convoluted scheme that involves begging support from one of the remaining communist dictatorships – China.
To realize how outrageous their incapacity was, one must recall that the haircut or debt forgiveness that Greece, Ireland and Portugal needed at the start of the crisis was about 140 billion Euros, that is, the equivalent to the European Union budget for one year.
To understand how shameful it is to rely on the support of a non-democratic country, it is important to remember that China does not have a fully convertible currency, ranks 7 and 6 respectively in terms of political rights and civil liberties in the Freedom House index (a classification worse that of Iran and Rwanda) and according to Amnesty International is by far the country with the worst record in terms of executions which remain a state secret (again worse than Iran).
This is a dark episode in the history of European integration, and a shaking foundation for the future of the Euro as a currency.
After months of protracted squabbling over how to solve the Greek problem, all that Sarkozy and Merkel could come up with was a convoluted scheme that involves begging support from one of the remaining communist dictatorships – China.
To realize how outrageous their incapacity was, one must recall that the haircut or debt forgiveness that Greece, Ireland and Portugal needed at the start of the crisis was about 140 billion Euros, that is, the equivalent to the European Union budget for one year.
To understand how shameful it is to rely on the support of a non-democratic country, it is important to remember that China does not have a fully convertible currency, ranks 7 and 6 respectively in terms of political rights and civil liberties in the Freedom House index (a classification worse that of Iran and Rwanda) and according to Amnesty International is by far the country with the worst record in terms of executions which remain a state secret (again worse than Iran).
This is a dark episode in the history of European integration, and a shaking foundation for the future of the Euro as a currency.
Thursday, 27 October 2011
European Union Tries to Limit Access of SMEs to Capital Markets
The European Union is famous for adding an ever increasing regulatory burden on companies. So when it announces that it will reduce the burden of excessive regulation one is naturally skeptic about its real motivations. This week’s announcement of proposals to reduce the burden for Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) imposed by the so-called Transparency Directive (2004/109/EC) provides a clear illustration of such dubious practices.
The Commission announced its intention to exempt SMEs and other listed firms from the obligation to provide quarterly accounts, invoking its burden in terms of cost and that it is not necessary for investor’s protection. These two arguments are clearly false. First, a firm that is so weak that it cannot support the cost of reporting on a quarterly basis should not be listed at all. Second, any investor knows that failure to publish financial information in a timely manner is the first symptom to identify troubled companies that should be avoided.
Indeed, if the Commission had surveyed professional investment analysts it would realize that they favor monitoring companies using trailing indicators for the past 12 months and obviously these cannot be calculated without quarterly accounts.
That is the reason why even stock markets famous for their lack of transparency, like South Korea and Japan, progressively had to adopt the standard practice of publishing quarterly accounts.
What will be consequences of SMEs not publishing quarterly accounts? Basically they will not be followed by analysts and consequently will not attract institutional investors, which provide most of the capital available in the market. By being forced into the speculative segment of markets they will be identified as dangerous assets and reinforce the bias in favor of large-cap stocks. That is, most SMEs will be barred from the capital market.
In fact, the large-cap bias is already a major problem in European markets. For instance, to realize the dimension of this problem one can compare the markets of Tel Aviv and Paris. In France there are 850 companies listed in the market, of which only 530 provide enough information to be correctly analyzed; while in Israel there are 460 listed companies of which 260 provide such level of information. That is, France with an economy twelve times the size of the Israeli economy barely has twice the number of investible stocks that Israel has.
To sum up, the Commission has managed to find one of the rare instances where lighter regulation is synonymous with worse regulation. Or to say it differently, it wants to persuade SMEs to shoot their own foot.
The Commission announced its intention to exempt SMEs and other listed firms from the obligation to provide quarterly accounts, invoking its burden in terms of cost and that it is not necessary for investor’s protection. These two arguments are clearly false. First, a firm that is so weak that it cannot support the cost of reporting on a quarterly basis should not be listed at all. Second, any investor knows that failure to publish financial information in a timely manner is the first symptom to identify troubled companies that should be avoided.
Indeed, if the Commission had surveyed professional investment analysts it would realize that they favor monitoring companies using trailing indicators for the past 12 months and obviously these cannot be calculated without quarterly accounts.
That is the reason why even stock markets famous for their lack of transparency, like South Korea and Japan, progressively had to adopt the standard practice of publishing quarterly accounts.
What will be consequences of SMEs not publishing quarterly accounts? Basically they will not be followed by analysts and consequently will not attract institutional investors, which provide most of the capital available in the market. By being forced into the speculative segment of markets they will be identified as dangerous assets and reinforce the bias in favor of large-cap stocks. That is, most SMEs will be barred from the capital market.
In fact, the large-cap bias is already a major problem in European markets. For instance, to realize the dimension of this problem one can compare the markets of Tel Aviv and Paris. In France there are 850 companies listed in the market, of which only 530 provide enough information to be correctly analyzed; while in Israel there are 460 listed companies of which 260 provide such level of information. That is, France with an economy twelve times the size of the Israeli economy barely has twice the number of investible stocks that Israel has.
To sum up, the Commission has managed to find one of the rare instances where lighter regulation is synonymous with worse regulation. Or to say it differently, it wants to persuade SMEs to shoot their own foot.
Wednesday, 17 August 2011
A Merkel & Sarkozy’s Europe? No, Thank You!
Yesterday’s press conference of the German and French leaders to announce their vision of Europe was so dull, leaderless and uninspiring that in itself it was enough to put off any followers of their proposals.
However, their plans for an Euro Zone closer integration are so misguided and meaningless that they need to be denounced as such. They include: a) closer economic integration; b) enforcing compliance with budgetary targets; c) greater fiscal harmonization; and d) better European governance. Let’s examine them one by one.
Full economic integration in Europe has been achieved a long time ago with the implementation of the common market and the single market. All that lacks is a more efficient judicial system to punish attempts by member-states to circumvent the rules when it benefits domestic special interest groups. To have their economic ministers meeting regularly adds nothing. Instead it might increase their propensity to mess with the competition rules whenever it suits them.
Enforcing compliance with budgetary targets by inscribing debt limits in their constitutions is a major mistake as we show in a recent post and the recent history of the US confirms. In short, once you reach the limit there is nothing you can do except to increase the ceiling while creating a lot of uncertainty about the nation’s creditworthiness. The experience in enforcing the Maastricht deficit and debt limits has also shown that France was among the first to bend the rules.
Greater fiscal harmonization on corporate taxation may suit the two countries but it would be a disaster for the rest of Europe. The OECD Tax Database for 2011 shows that France applies a combined corporate income tax rate of 34.4% with a number of special exemptions, while Germany applies a general tax rate of 30.2%. Dividends in France are taxed under a partial inclusion system without withholding, with an overall personal plus corporate income tax rate of 57.8%, while Germany uses a classical system with a withholding rate of 26.4% and a combined personal and corporate income tax rate of 48.6%. Harmonization would give Mr. Sarkozy an electoral boost by reducing tax rates and would allow Mrs. Merkel to get away with a tax rise, but the final result would still be a very high level of taxation. Should other countries follow suit, all the remaining Euro Zone countries would have to raise rates and lose their current tax advantage.
Finally, on European Governance, the two leaders propose an elected president for the Euro Zone area with a mandate of two and a half years and the appointment of an economics minister. This double-headed European Union would aggravate an already messy situation in Europe about who is in charge. What would happen to the head of the Euro Group? Who remembers the names of the current European Union President and Foreign Minister? But, most importantly, it would institutionalize a de facto two-speed Europe that would endanger progress towards an ever closer union.
Overall the meeting of the two leaders was another missed opportunity. The other European leaders should politely say: no thanks!
However, their plans for an Euro Zone closer integration are so misguided and meaningless that they need to be denounced as such. They include: a) closer economic integration; b) enforcing compliance with budgetary targets; c) greater fiscal harmonization; and d) better European governance. Let’s examine them one by one.
Full economic integration in Europe has been achieved a long time ago with the implementation of the common market and the single market. All that lacks is a more efficient judicial system to punish attempts by member-states to circumvent the rules when it benefits domestic special interest groups. To have their economic ministers meeting regularly adds nothing. Instead it might increase their propensity to mess with the competition rules whenever it suits them.
Enforcing compliance with budgetary targets by inscribing debt limits in their constitutions is a major mistake as we show in a recent post and the recent history of the US confirms. In short, once you reach the limit there is nothing you can do except to increase the ceiling while creating a lot of uncertainty about the nation’s creditworthiness. The experience in enforcing the Maastricht deficit and debt limits has also shown that France was among the first to bend the rules.
Greater fiscal harmonization on corporate taxation may suit the two countries but it would be a disaster for the rest of Europe. The OECD Tax Database for 2011 shows that France applies a combined corporate income tax rate of 34.4% with a number of special exemptions, while Germany applies a general tax rate of 30.2%. Dividends in France are taxed under a partial inclusion system without withholding, with an overall personal plus corporate income tax rate of 57.8%, while Germany uses a classical system with a withholding rate of 26.4% and a combined personal and corporate income tax rate of 48.6%. Harmonization would give Mr. Sarkozy an electoral boost by reducing tax rates and would allow Mrs. Merkel to get away with a tax rise, but the final result would still be a very high level of taxation. Should other countries follow suit, all the remaining Euro Zone countries would have to raise rates and lose their current tax advantage.
Finally, on European Governance, the two leaders propose an elected president for the Euro Zone area with a mandate of two and a half years and the appointment of an economics minister. This double-headed European Union would aggravate an already messy situation in Europe about who is in charge. What would happen to the head of the Euro Group? Who remembers the names of the current European Union President and Foreign Minister? But, most importantly, it would institutionalize a de facto two-speed Europe that would endanger progress towards an ever closer union.
Overall the meeting of the two leaders was another missed opportunity. The other European leaders should politely say: no thanks!
Tuesday, 16 August 2011
The Euro Zone Bond Debate: Can we have a common treasury without a common budget?
The debate on whether an European Agency (some kind of Euro Area Treasury department) should replace the Euro Zone countries in financing a substantial share of each country’s public sector borrowing requirements (some suggest a minimum of 60%) has gained new momentum since leading German business groups called for the issuance of Euro Zone bonds in defiance of the official German position.
The centralization of the debt issuing function in the Euro Zone is seen by many (including George Soros) as a solution for the current sovereign debt crisis as well as a way out of the intrinsic weakness of a Monetary Union built without a corresponding budgetary policy. Indeed, the later is the only convincing reason to argue for joint Eurobond issues and the debate should focus on its pros and cons.
Indeed, the European Union has already a long history of joint debt issues. Through the European Investment Bank it finances a non-negligible share of infrastructure projects in Europe. Through the European Commission it has also made several issues to finance specific programs of industrial restructuring and balance of payments support, the most recent being the EFSF mechanism to support the adjustment programs in Greece, Ireland and Portugal. However these issues were for limited purposes and for limited amounts. The centralization of the public sector borrowing requirements is an entirely new game.
In principle, a central Treasury Department for the Euro Zone makes sense. Indeed, that is what happens within national governments where debt issuance by local, state or regional governments is often supplemented by grants, borrowing and guarantees provided by the Ministry of Finance or National Treasurer. However, the later are usually granted under nationally agreed budgetary policies and often require the setting of borrowing limits. These are often the source of frequent disputes between national and sub-national governments that occasionally end up in blackmail by separatist movements.
In a Union like the Euro Area, which is taking the first steps towards a future political unification, a simple setting of borrowing limits by a central Treasurer (no matter how well designed they are) is more prone to such separatist threats because there is no national solidarity. These separatist threats would be a permanent risk undermining the credit standing of the central Treasurer and would become a burden for the remaining members.
To some extent national solidarity can be substituted by common interest in joint spending. For this reason, tying a large share of joint debt issues to the financing of centralized spending in common policies needs to be considered as an essential part of a monetary union package.
Although the experience of common policies in the EU is nothing to write home about (e.g. agriculture) it does not mean that it cannot succeed in areas like transport infrastructure, security (defense and policing), research and population policies (health, education, migration, etc.).
The only certainty is that, like a stool, a solid monetary union also needs three legs – a monetary authority, a treasurer and a spending authority.
The centralization of the debt issuing function in the Euro Zone is seen by many (including George Soros) as a solution for the current sovereign debt crisis as well as a way out of the intrinsic weakness of a Monetary Union built without a corresponding budgetary policy. Indeed, the later is the only convincing reason to argue for joint Eurobond issues and the debate should focus on its pros and cons.
Indeed, the European Union has already a long history of joint debt issues. Through the European Investment Bank it finances a non-negligible share of infrastructure projects in Europe. Through the European Commission it has also made several issues to finance specific programs of industrial restructuring and balance of payments support, the most recent being the EFSF mechanism to support the adjustment programs in Greece, Ireland and Portugal. However these issues were for limited purposes and for limited amounts. The centralization of the public sector borrowing requirements is an entirely new game.
In principle, a central Treasury Department for the Euro Zone makes sense. Indeed, that is what happens within national governments where debt issuance by local, state or regional governments is often supplemented by grants, borrowing and guarantees provided by the Ministry of Finance or National Treasurer. However, the later are usually granted under nationally agreed budgetary policies and often require the setting of borrowing limits. These are often the source of frequent disputes between national and sub-national governments that occasionally end up in blackmail by separatist movements.
In a Union like the Euro Area, which is taking the first steps towards a future political unification, a simple setting of borrowing limits by a central Treasurer (no matter how well designed they are) is more prone to such separatist threats because there is no national solidarity. These separatist threats would be a permanent risk undermining the credit standing of the central Treasurer and would become a burden for the remaining members.
To some extent national solidarity can be substituted by common interest in joint spending. For this reason, tying a large share of joint debt issues to the financing of centralized spending in common policies needs to be considered as an essential part of a monetary union package.
Although the experience of common policies in the EU is nothing to write home about (e.g. agriculture) it does not mean that it cannot succeed in areas like transport infrastructure, security (defense and policing), research and population policies (health, education, migration, etc.).
The only certainty is that, like a stool, a solid monetary union also needs three legs – a monetary authority, a treasurer and a spending authority.
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