Even under free and fair elections, democracy can fall to demagogues, would be dictators, kleptocrats, criminals or morons. Can such elected representatives be removed before their term ends?
Impeachment is the removal of elected representatives by legal means other than by elections. By definition, impeachment must be a last resort weapon used in democracy for special circumstances. These must be clearly defined in the constitution and should not be based on the whim of the electorate that might have changed its mind about the elected representatives.
The electorate must bear the burden of its ill-defined choices until the end of the mandate given to the elected representatives. This a question of principle and also a practical rule to avoid that representatives elected by a small margin of votes be subject to the swings in the opinion of the electorate.
However, there are special circumstances when impeachment is necessary and acceptable. For instance, if due to serious illness the elected representative is unable to fulfil his job. Likewise, if the representative committed a serious crime (e.g. treason or bribery) or wants to circumvent the law to suppress democracy.
Nevertheless, such circumstances must be clearly defined to avoid confusing serious with minor offenses. Let me illustrate this issue using as an example the American President. Despite his drawbacks identified in a previous post, Donald Trump was elected by a narrow majority and has many of the flaws that may be seen as a reason for impeachment.
Mr Trump is clearly a person with many personality tracts deemed as disqualifying for the office of president. He is erratic in his behaviour and a compulsive liar obsessed with his ego.
Does this mean he is sufficiently mentally ill to be incapable of doing his job? Clearly, psychiatrists can not give a definitive diagnostics. Moreover, it is a well-known fact that several world leaders were mildly schizophrenic or paranoid. So mental illnesses should be carefully graded before concluding that they are a reason for impeachment.
Yet, such assessment should not be separated from the policies pursued. For instance, while in the past Nero could only burn Rome, in our time a deranged personality may trigger a nuclear holocaust capable of destroying mankind. So, unless Trump suddenly becomes excited by pressing the nuclear button there is no strong reason for his impeachment on this count.
Turning to serious crimes, the Trump campaign has been accused of violating financing rules or colliding with the Russians. Moreover, Trump has not hidden his sympathy towards dictators like Putin. Given that Russia was the traditional enemy of the USA, can his behaviour be considered treason as suggested by former heads of the intelligence services? So far, the Muller investigation has not yet presented its report. But, unless it provides strong evidence of treason, there is no sufficient reason to impeach Trump.
The fact that Trump likes to meet with dictators like Putin, Kim Jong-un and Xi Jinping and feels uneasy when dealing with traditional democratic US allies like Merkel, Trudeau and Abe, or, more seriously, wishes to reverse international alliances to become friendly with former foes and unfriendly with former allies, is this a legitimate shift in policy or treason? As long as he does not pass state secrets to those countries he cannot be condemned on treason grounds.
Likewise, when Trump declined to disclose his tax statements before the election, refused to reorganize his business interests to avoid conflicts of interest and selected key family members for office can this be considered a serious crime? As long as such behaviour does not violate any laws it may be reproachable but it is not a crime.
Similarly, the fact that he is often described as incompetent, idiot, ignorant, racist, sexist or narcissistic cannot be used to impeach him since these tracts are not impeachable.
Note that the many Trump flaws were well known by the electorate. In 1999, well before the election, his would be trade secretary Will Ross, described the following about Trump: “The Taj Mahal casino was within sight, perhaps haps 150 yards away, its main, drive-up entrance on a side street off the Boardwalk. "On a bright sunny day in August, you'd think normal people would walk from the helipad into the casino," said Ross. "No. A stream of limos." As he recounted the scene, he made a sweeping motion with his hand to illustrate the arrival of four stretch limousines, their chauffeurs garbed in black shirts and white ties. Everyone climbed in, and the procession moved at about a half a mile per hour down the Boardwalk in front of the Taj as policemen shooed people out of the way. The level of electricity in the air was palpable as people screamed "Donny! Donny!" and eagerly shoved their cameras at his car. Ross imagined that this could not be much different from the return of a third world country's dictator from a trip abroad”. Excerpts from Hilary Rosenberg. The Vulture Investors (Kindle Locations 3820-3825). Kindle Edition”.
But, when one considers cases of obstruction of justice and witness tampering (e.g. comments on the Muller investigation and undue pressure on the FBI and witnesses) here we may find reasons for impeachment. However, these have to be materially significant. For instance, the fact that he tweets obnoxious comments about witnesses is not enough to convict him for obstruction of justice. Just as with the Clinton impeachment, on the grounds that he had lied about his affair with an intern, such conviction would be revoked by the US Senate. In such cases we need an independent assessment of the gravity of the imputed misdemeanour.
Finally, we need to consider if numerous border-line reasons for impeachment should be added to give sufficient reason for impeachment. In criminal justice, if someone is convicted of (or pleads guilty to) multiple offenses in the same case, the judge has the power to decide that sentences be served concurrently or sequentially which often makes the sentence duration vary between a few months and dozens of years. If the same reasoning were applied in the case of impeachment then it would be for a supreme court to decide if someone like Trump should be removed from office. Although this parallel has its attractions, it is prudent not to leave such discretionary power to a single body, especially if there are no strong guarantees about its independence (e.g. in the USA the president nominates judges to the Supreme Court).
So, unless there is strong evidence that clearly defined grounds for impeachment exist, elected politicians should not be removed from office through impeachment.
However, clearly defined grounds for impeachment are not enough to guarantee the perversion of democracy. We need an equally well defined due process. While it is reasonable to accept that other elected representatives might initiate the impeachment process, together with the attorney general, it should not be for them to decide. Here the decision should belong to the highest court in the land.
To conclude, well defined and subject to proper due process, impeachment is acceptable in a democracy as a last resort.
However, the proper and legitimate way of removing elected representatives is at the end of their mandate through the vote in periodic, fair and free elections.
Showing posts with label representative democracy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label representative democracy. Show all posts
Thursday, 7 March 2019
Trump: To impeach or not to impeach?
Labels:
impeachment,
Muller investigation,
representative democracy,
Trump,
USA
Sunday, 10 February 2019
Representation is not about proportionality
Why transfer power to elected representatives? Because we believe that a few representatives can do the governing job better than if we all tried to be involved in political decisions.
Now, because voters can be grouped into different identities, say: sex, age, ethnicity, ancestry, hair color, weight, literacy, religion, honesty, sexual orientation, handedness, IQ and many other personal characteristics does it mean that each of such groupings should be entitled to elect its representatives? This is absurd! Not only because we can multiply such identity groups indefinitely, but mostly because we have multiple identities and identity has little to do with the job of government or guarantees that such representatives would be qualified for the governing job.
That is why representation must be entrusted to like-minded people that we believe to be the best qualified for the job. That is the reason why we entrust representation to open party organizations.
However, what happens when such parties are closed or overtaken by self-perpetuating special interest groups or partocracies that discriminate or discourage members from specific identities (e.g. women or gypsies)? The solution is for the electors not to vote on such parties.
But, what happens if, without discriminating, some parties do not seek actively for talent among several identity groups (e.g. retired, young, Jews, immigrants, etc.) without this really causing a decline in the quality of its candidates for election? Should the electors also punish such parties at the vote? This is not necessarily so if voters are not in favor of positive discrimination or think that such identity groups do not really wish to be involved in politics.
This is the fundamental reason why policies of positive discrimination should never be part of the electoral rules. It is a matter for the parties to implement such policies and for the electors to judge their actions.
However, today there is a danger for democracy because parties are replacing the fight for their ideologies and ideals by claims over representation of specific identity groups (e.g. businessmen instead of market capitalism or LGBTs instead of sexual freedom).
Instead of disputing elections on the basis of policies parties try to divide the electorate into as many identities (electoral tribes) as possible which they claim to represent.
That is the reason why proportionality represents a return to a new type of tribalism and a threat to genuine representation. In the extreme, identity policies may even destroy democracy.
Now, because voters can be grouped into different identities, say: sex, age, ethnicity, ancestry, hair color, weight, literacy, religion, honesty, sexual orientation, handedness, IQ and many other personal characteristics does it mean that each of such groupings should be entitled to elect its representatives? This is absurd! Not only because we can multiply such identity groups indefinitely, but mostly because we have multiple identities and identity has little to do with the job of government or guarantees that such representatives would be qualified for the governing job.
That is why representation must be entrusted to like-minded people that we believe to be the best qualified for the job. That is the reason why we entrust representation to open party organizations.
However, what happens when such parties are closed or overtaken by self-perpetuating special interest groups or partocracies that discriminate or discourage members from specific identities (e.g. women or gypsies)? The solution is for the electors not to vote on such parties.
But, what happens if, without discriminating, some parties do not seek actively for talent among several identity groups (e.g. retired, young, Jews, immigrants, etc.) without this really causing a decline in the quality of its candidates for election? Should the electors also punish such parties at the vote? This is not necessarily so if voters are not in favor of positive discrimination or think that such identity groups do not really wish to be involved in politics.
This is the fundamental reason why policies of positive discrimination should never be part of the electoral rules. It is a matter for the parties to implement such policies and for the electors to judge their actions.
However, today there is a danger for democracy because parties are replacing the fight for their ideologies and ideals by claims over representation of specific identity groups (e.g. businessmen instead of market capitalism or LGBTs instead of sexual freedom).
Instead of disputing elections on the basis of policies parties try to divide the electorate into as many identities (electoral tribes) as possible which they claim to represent.
That is the reason why proportionality represents a return to a new type of tribalism and a threat to genuine representation. In the extreme, identity policies may even destroy democracy.
Labels:
discrimination,
electoral rules,
identity policies,
proportionality,
quotes,
representation,
representative democracy,
true democracy,
women
Sunday, 25 November 2018
Fighting Populism: Doing the right thing and better
Progressives and conservatives feel uncomfortable or paralyzed when populists and other extremists adopt what looks like popular and necessary policies.
It does not need to be so.
When in the 1930s Hitler managed an economic recovery in Germany, through what we would call Keynesian policies of public investment, and in 1940 his finance minister Funk published a plan for a New Economic Order for Europe, John Maynard Keynes was invited by the British Ministry of Information to make a broadcast for American and Dominion audiences to discredit it. Keynes replied that the plan was “excellent and just what we ourselves ought to be thinking of doing. If it is to be attacked, the way to do it would be to cast doubt and suspicion on its bona fides.” For instance, “Funk´s talk of a rational division of labour was merely a cloak for concentrating industry in Germany and pastoralising the rest of Europe.”
Today, progressives face a similar problem in relation to some populist policies. Let me illustrate with three examples.
(1) The migrants’ caravan, which started in the Honduras and reached the Mexico/USA border today is a good example. Whoever started and facilitated the caravan, and it could be anyone from local village demagogues, criminal gangs, left-wing activists, religious idealists, Putin or Trump himself, is irrelevant.
Nobody can accept that a crowd, claiming poverty or whatever, organized in a country, decides to try to invade another country in search of settlement there.
However, how to stop them is a different matter. During the Roman times the army had to fight the armed invaders. But Trump’s decision to deploy the army in the border with an order to shoot unarmed civilians, seems out of proportion and risks causing a slaughter.
There are obviously more humane and efficient ways to stop the invaders and punish the organizers. For instance, by moving them into a refugee camp where the children and sick will be fed and treated prior being repatriated with a little bit of pocket money to help them settle back in their country of origin. Meanwhile, while in the camp, they need to be taught a lesson to dissuade further incursions. For instance, the leaders and organizers could be separated and taken into custody where they would remain until earning the money necessary to reimburse their deportation costs, while the remaining could be registered into a DNA database to prevent them from applying legally for residence in the USA during the next 10 years.
(2) The USA-China trade conflict is another example where the populist approach is wrong. Again, there is no doubt that China has often misbehaved in international trade, namely in relation to intellectual property.
However, Trump’s policy of imposing selective import tariffs and trying to negotiate some “deal” with Xi Ping is not only chimerical but also risks to backfire. For starters, it is an unprecedented reversal of roles, the USA has become the protectionist and China the free trader.
Yet, there are better solutions to lead China into behaving in accordance with international trade rules. For instance, the Trans Pacific Agreement, abandoned by Trump, had an important role in this regard. Likewise, encouraging China to join the OECD and follow its rules in terms of international competition and transparency is a better way. In the end, having China as part of the current liberal international order is better than driving them into trying to create a rival alternative.
(3) Finally, Bolsonaro’s decision to stop the use of Cuban medical slaves in Brazil is another example. Shamefully, for many years western countries (including Portugal) have tolerated the hiring of medical staff to the Cuban government, while ignoring that the doctors were forced to leave their families in Cuba as hostages and received only a pittance of the fees contracted with the Cuban government. So, Bolsonaro’s intention is laudable, but is it the best solution?
Of course, no. There are better ways to achieve the same result, without repatriation.
For instance, renegotiating the contracts to force Cuba to allow the doctors’ families to join them in Brazil would preserve their jobs and benefit their patients. Likewise, paying directly to the doctors. The slave doctors ended up being the victims of two extremists.
These examples and many others show why progressives and conservatives cannot be complacent with the populists. More than ever, they need to show the shortcomings of such policies and how they can do better. They must show that there are humane, liberal and civilized ways of dealing with such problems and the anxiety and fear associated with them.
It does not need to be so.
When in the 1930s Hitler managed an economic recovery in Germany, through what we would call Keynesian policies of public investment, and in 1940 his finance minister Funk published a plan for a New Economic Order for Europe, John Maynard Keynes was invited by the British Ministry of Information to make a broadcast for American and Dominion audiences to discredit it. Keynes replied that the plan was “excellent and just what we ourselves ought to be thinking of doing. If it is to be attacked, the way to do it would be to cast doubt and suspicion on its bona fides.” For instance, “Funk´s talk of a rational division of labour was merely a cloak for concentrating industry in Germany and pastoralising the rest of Europe.”
Today, progressives face a similar problem in relation to some populist policies. Let me illustrate with three examples.
(1) The migrants’ caravan, which started in the Honduras and reached the Mexico/USA border today is a good example. Whoever started and facilitated the caravan, and it could be anyone from local village demagogues, criminal gangs, left-wing activists, religious idealists, Putin or Trump himself, is irrelevant.
Nobody can accept that a crowd, claiming poverty or whatever, organized in a country, decides to try to invade another country in search of settlement there.
However, how to stop them is a different matter. During the Roman times the army had to fight the armed invaders. But Trump’s decision to deploy the army in the border with an order to shoot unarmed civilians, seems out of proportion and risks causing a slaughter.
There are obviously more humane and efficient ways to stop the invaders and punish the organizers. For instance, by moving them into a refugee camp where the children and sick will be fed and treated prior being repatriated with a little bit of pocket money to help them settle back in their country of origin. Meanwhile, while in the camp, they need to be taught a lesson to dissuade further incursions. For instance, the leaders and organizers could be separated and taken into custody where they would remain until earning the money necessary to reimburse their deportation costs, while the remaining could be registered into a DNA database to prevent them from applying legally for residence in the USA during the next 10 years.
(2) The USA-China trade conflict is another example where the populist approach is wrong. Again, there is no doubt that China has often misbehaved in international trade, namely in relation to intellectual property.
However, Trump’s policy of imposing selective import tariffs and trying to negotiate some “deal” with Xi Ping is not only chimerical but also risks to backfire. For starters, it is an unprecedented reversal of roles, the USA has become the protectionist and China the free trader.
Yet, there are better solutions to lead China into behaving in accordance with international trade rules. For instance, the Trans Pacific Agreement, abandoned by Trump, had an important role in this regard. Likewise, encouraging China to join the OECD and follow its rules in terms of international competition and transparency is a better way. In the end, having China as part of the current liberal international order is better than driving them into trying to create a rival alternative.
(3) Finally, Bolsonaro’s decision to stop the use of Cuban medical slaves in Brazil is another example. Shamefully, for many years western countries (including Portugal) have tolerated the hiring of medical staff to the Cuban government, while ignoring that the doctors were forced to leave their families in Cuba as hostages and received only a pittance of the fees contracted with the Cuban government. So, Bolsonaro’s intention is laudable, but is it the best solution?
Of course, no. There are better ways to achieve the same result, without repatriation.
For instance, renegotiating the contracts to force Cuba to allow the doctors’ families to join them in Brazil would preserve their jobs and benefit their patients. Likewise, paying directly to the doctors. The slave doctors ended up being the victims of two extremists.
These examples and many others show why progressives and conservatives cannot be complacent with the populists. More than ever, they need to show the shortcomings of such policies and how they can do better. They must show that there are humane, liberal and civilized ways of dealing with such problems and the anxiety and fear associated with them.
Labels:
Bolsonaro,
constitutional liberalism,
Cuba,
doctors slavery,
Keynes,
migrants' caravan,
populism,
representative democracy,
Trump,
US-China trade conflict
Monday, 19 June 2017
The Legacy of Hollande
In 2011, after the election of Hollande, I published a post with a table depicting 13 OECD social and economic indicators on which I would judge his presidency. I also made a bet that 77% of them (10 out of the 13) would get worse. Meanwhile, the OECD abandoned some of the indicators and changed others. So, for consistency, I publish below a new table with the existing indicators before and after Holland to evaluate his mandate.
Out of the initial 13 indicators, the OECD now publishes only 8 but I added the debt/GDP ratio which is equivalent to the previous indicator to end up with 9 indicators to compare the pre and the post Hollande.
First, I lost my bet. Hollande was bad, but not as bad I had forecasted. Only 55% (or 67% if I count the current account evolution as negative) of the indicators worsened during his mandate.
Actually, the breakdown of the indicators to see where there was improvement and deterioration is more interesting.
The French economy did not do too bad under Holland, with the productivity gap in relation to the USA substantially reduced, the current account deficit kept at a low level and inflation substantially reduced.
In terms of public finances, Holland continued the socialist tradition of increased public spending. Its rise of 2.6 percentage points, to reach 57.9% of GDP, was partially financed by a higher tax revenue. However, it was not enough to prevent a 20% increase in public debt, which rose from 100% to 120% of GDP.
What is more significant is that in relation to social policies, which the left traditionally claims to be its priority, Hollande’s score was quite negative. With the exception of youth unemployment which fell from 20 to 18 per cent, the other social indicators worsened. Employment declined slightly to 63.8% of the working age population, while unemployment rose significantly from 8.3 to 10.3%.
Overall, one may say that Hollande’s zigzagging between traditional socialist policies and some forms of timid liberalization offsetted each other so that his legacy was not as dire as I had anticipated.
Let me comment briefly on his political legacy.
At the international level, Hollande’s performance was reasonable and aligned with the promotion of traditional western values.
The same cannot be said at the national political level. Apart from his matrimonial adventures and other minor internal affairs which may had weighted on his presidency ending with the lowest approval ratings of any previous president, his legacy will certainly be remembered by the eclipse of the socialist party and the emergence of Macron’s new centrist party.
To be fair, Hollande made some modest contribution to the victory of the new President.
So, his final political balance will depend on the failure or success of his successor to stop France from falling into left (Melechon) and right wing (Le Pen) anti-European extremisms.
Out of the initial 13 indicators, the OECD now publishes only 8 but I added the debt/GDP ratio which is equivalent to the previous indicator to end up with 9 indicators to compare the pre and the post Hollande.
First, I lost my bet. Hollande was bad, but not as bad I had forecasted. Only 55% (or 67% if I count the current account evolution as negative) of the indicators worsened during his mandate.
Actually, the breakdown of the indicators to see where there was improvement and deterioration is more interesting.
The French economy did not do too bad under Holland, with the productivity gap in relation to the USA substantially reduced, the current account deficit kept at a low level and inflation substantially reduced.
In terms of public finances, Holland continued the socialist tradition of increased public spending. Its rise of 2.6 percentage points, to reach 57.9% of GDP, was partially financed by a higher tax revenue. However, it was not enough to prevent a 20% increase in public debt, which rose from 100% to 120% of GDP.
What is more significant is that in relation to social policies, which the left traditionally claims to be its priority, Hollande’s score was quite negative. With the exception of youth unemployment which fell from 20 to 18 per cent, the other social indicators worsened. Employment declined slightly to 63.8% of the working age population, while unemployment rose significantly from 8.3 to 10.3%.
Overall, one may say that Hollande’s zigzagging between traditional socialist policies and some forms of timid liberalization offsetted each other so that his legacy was not as dire as I had anticipated.
Let me comment briefly on his political legacy.
At the international level, Hollande’s performance was reasonable and aligned with the promotion of traditional western values.
The same cannot be said at the national political level. Apart from his matrimonial adventures and other minor internal affairs which may had weighted on his presidency ending with the lowest approval ratings of any previous president, his legacy will certainly be remembered by the eclipse of the socialist party and the emergence of Macron’s new centrist party.
To be fair, Hollande made some modest contribution to the victory of the new President.
So, his final political balance will depend on the failure or success of his successor to stop France from falling into left (Melechon) and right wing (Le Pen) anti-European extremisms.
Labels:
Europe,
French elections,
Hollande,
Macron,
Marine Le Pen,
Melechon,
representative democracy
Wednesday, 16 November 2016
Deplorables, lumpenproletariat and the one-person one-vote rule

Brexit and Trump brought back an old debate that marked the origins of democracy – should the right to vote be a universal right or be limited to some classes?
In the beginning the major concern centred on the possibility that the destitute would vote to expropriate the rich, and therefore the right to vote was restricted to those with property. This concern was progressively abandoned and, if anything, Trump’s victory promising huge tax cuts for the rich shows that the risk of voting to take from the poor to give to the rich also exists.
Another concern was in relation to socially marginalized persons.
In The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon (1852), Karl Marx named them as the lumpenproletariat, including: “Alongside decayed roués with dubious means of subsistence and of dubious origin, alongside ruined and adventurous offshoots of the bourgeoisie, were vagabonds, discharged soldiers, discharged jailbirds, escaped galley slaves, swindlers, mountebanks, lazzaroni, pickpockets, tricksters, gamblers, maquereaux [pimps], brothel keepers, porters, literati, organ grinders, ragpickers, knife grinders, tinkers, beggars—in short, the whole indefinite, disintegrated mass, thrown hither and thither, which the French call la bohème”.
This year, in a regretted declaration, Hilary Clinton coined her modern-day equivalent of “deplorables”, by saying: “to just be grossly generalistic, you could put half of Trump’s supporters into what I call the basket of deplorables. Right? The racist, sexist, homophobic, xenophobic, Islamaphobic — you name it. And unfortunately there are people like that”. Her definition enlarges the concept of marginal to those that do not share the values of western democracies.
A third category includes the so-called welfare bums, that is people without work living on benefits. This group has grown significantly in advanced economies and is likely increase further as the pace of robotics increases. Indeed, in the future they may become the majority.
The concern about giving such people the right to vote is that they may be easily manipulated to vote for unscrupulous populist leaders like Trump or Chavez.
This is certainly true, but it is no reason to abandon voting as a universal right.
It is the essence of democracy that, in any highly contested election, the winner may win the majority with the votes of a small group of voters, no matter how outrageous their views are.
Democracy does not guarantee that the electorate always selects the best candidates. What it needs to safeguard is that people remain free to vote out the leaders.
Here resides the safety and supremacy of democracy, and it must be secured in four main domains: a) some decisions, like constitutional amendments, must be approved by a qualified majority; b) direct democracy (referendum or plebiscites) must be limited to local or moral issues; c) those in government must not use the resources of the state to promote themselves or to harass their opponents; and d) last, but not least, the constitution must enshrine the principles of the division of powers and the rule of law.
At the present, the USA applies these principles. So, the election of Trump must be seen as the normal working of democracy. All that his opponents must do is fight any attempts to pervert the principles listed above and to show that his policies are wrong.
If they do it right, he will not be re-elected and the electorate will have learned a lesson. This has nothing to do with restricting the fundamental principle of democracy - “one-person, one-vote”.
Labels:
deplorables,
Hilary Clinton,
lumpenproletariat,
Marx,
preservation of democracy,
representative democracy,
Trump,
universal vote,
voting rights,
welfare bums
Monday, 26 September 2016
Do Republicans risk becoming a neo-Nazi party?
Is Donald Trump simply a maverick inoffensive contestant from a Jerry Springer reality show?
Many moderate Republicans sincerely hope so, and refuse the similarities between Trump and Hitler.
There are certainly some differences, and Trump is no match to Hitler in terms of racism, imperialism or intelligence. However, the similarities are too many, from an anti-capitalist and protectionist stance, to an exacerbated nationalism, both being compulsive liars, demagogues, militarists and paranoid self-centered personalities.
Yet what is more frightful in relation to a possible election of Trump, is that a number of economic and political conditions are comparable to those in the 1930-1933 Germany when Hitler rose to power. I shall deal here with the political parties only.
Just like Trump, for many years until 1928, Hitler was basically seen as a wild card. Still, Hitler’s Nazi party rose to power from a 2.6% share of the vote in May 1928 to reach 37.3% in July 1932, followed by a subsequent decline to 33.1% in November 1932.
This meteoric rise was the result of a combination of the misery caused by the economic crisis of 1929, the political instability created by the fall of the so-called center-right grand-coalition brought down by the People’s Party (DVP), the 6.3% rise of the Communist Party (KPD) to 17%, at the expense of the social democrats (SPD) which declined 9.5% to become the second party, the divide in the left and right-wing liberal parties (DDP and DVP), rising anti-Semitism and, crucially, the referendum held in Germany on December 1929 to introduce a 'Law against the Enslavement of the German People' which gave prominence to the Nazis.
Throughout this period, the German Centre Party (Catholic)’s share of the vote remained stable at around 12%. But, it headed the government and, together with the German National People's Party (DNVP), was one of the main “establishment” conservative parties. The successor of this party is now the CDU (Mrs. Merkel party) and it its ideology is close to the declining moderates still in the Republican Party.
So, the main political base for Hitler’s rise came from the other conservative parties – DNVP, DVP and DDP. Let me reproduce from Wikipedia some of its characteristics, so that we may compare them to the political factions in today’s Republican Party in America.
Classical liberalism of the kind espoused now by some Tea Party and Cato Institute activists, was also split in Germany between liberals on left (DDP) and right (DVP) wing parties.
The German Democratic Party (DDP) was founded by leaders of the former Progressive People's Party, left members of the National Liberal Party, and a new group calling themselves the Democrats. The party was attacked by some for being a party of Jews and professors. Among its well-known politicians were Hugo Preuß, the main author of the Weimar constitution, and the eminent sociologist Max Weber. Hjalmar Schacht, president of the Reichsbank and one of the founders of the party, left the party in 1926 and became a supporter of Adolf Hitler. This party today would resemble some of the Bernie Sanders supporters that refuse to vote Clinton or may even vote for Trump.
The German People's Party (DVP) was a national liberal party in Weimar Germany and a successor to the National Liberal Party of the German Empire. It was the right-wing liberal or conservative-liberal party, generally thought to represent the interests of the great German industrialists. Its platform stressed Christian family values, secular education, lower tariffs, opposition to welfare spending and agrarian subsides and hostility to "Marxism" (that is, the Communists, and also the Social Democrats). Today’s equivalent names in the Trump campaign include people like Ralph Reed and Paul Ryan on the religious/political side and Aleson, Deason, Ichan and Ross on the business side. Today’s Trump financiers are mostly involved in casinos and deal making, and not so much in the traditional military industrial complex.
The German National People's Party (DNVP) was a national conservative party in Germany during the time of the Weimar Republic. Before the rise of the Nazi Party (NSDAP) it was the major conservative and nationalist party in Weimar Germany. It was an alliance of nationalists, reactionary monarchists, völkisch, and anti-Semitic elements, and supported by the Pan-German League. After 1929 the DNVP co-operated with the Nazis, joining forces in the Harzburg Front of 1931, forming coalition governments in some states and finally supporting Hitler's appointment as Chancellor in January 1933. Initially, the DNVP had a number of ministers in Hitler's government but quickly lost influence and eventually dissolved itself in June 1933, giving way to the Nazis' single-party dictatorship. The current day Republican equivalent is found among the more conservative Republicans and some Tea Party activists.
These three parties had their role in paving Hitler’s rise to power, the same way that several Republican factions paved the way to Trump’s nomination as Republican candidate for President in 2016.
Should Trump be elected, can we expect the Republican factions to merge into a neo-Nazi party?
The risk is very real.
So, what can Bush and other moderate Republicans do to stop this nightmare scenario?
They have basically two defense lines. First, recommending a vote for Clinton to stop it happening. Second, should this fail, to stop the Congress and Senate from approving an “enabling act” of the type that gave Hitler the power to obliterate the other parties and become a dictator. Not even if Trump portrays himself simply as a Putin-like dictator, and not a radical like Hitler, should the moderate Republicans conciliate.
In conclusion, Republicans have an enormous moral and historical responsibility in stopping the devil before it rises again. The Great American Nation and World Peace depend on their wisdom and courage!
Many moderate Republicans sincerely hope so, and refuse the similarities between Trump and Hitler.
There are certainly some differences, and Trump is no match to Hitler in terms of racism, imperialism or intelligence. However, the similarities are too many, from an anti-capitalist and protectionist stance, to an exacerbated nationalism, both being compulsive liars, demagogues, militarists and paranoid self-centered personalities.
Yet what is more frightful in relation to a possible election of Trump, is that a number of economic and political conditions are comparable to those in the 1930-1933 Germany when Hitler rose to power. I shall deal here with the political parties only.
Just like Trump, for many years until 1928, Hitler was basically seen as a wild card. Still, Hitler’s Nazi party rose to power from a 2.6% share of the vote in May 1928 to reach 37.3% in July 1932, followed by a subsequent decline to 33.1% in November 1932.
This meteoric rise was the result of a combination of the misery caused by the economic crisis of 1929, the political instability created by the fall of the so-called center-right grand-coalition brought down by the People’s Party (DVP), the 6.3% rise of the Communist Party (KPD) to 17%, at the expense of the social democrats (SPD) which declined 9.5% to become the second party, the divide in the left and right-wing liberal parties (DDP and DVP), rising anti-Semitism and, crucially, the referendum held in Germany on December 1929 to introduce a 'Law against the Enslavement of the German People' which gave prominence to the Nazis.
Throughout this period, the German Centre Party (Catholic)’s share of the vote remained stable at around 12%. But, it headed the government and, together with the German National People's Party (DNVP), was one of the main “establishment” conservative parties. The successor of this party is now the CDU (Mrs. Merkel party) and it its ideology is close to the declining moderates still in the Republican Party.
So, the main political base for Hitler’s rise came from the other conservative parties – DNVP, DVP and DDP. Let me reproduce from Wikipedia some of its characteristics, so that we may compare them to the political factions in today’s Republican Party in America.
Classical liberalism of the kind espoused now by some Tea Party and Cato Institute activists, was also split in Germany between liberals on left (DDP) and right (DVP) wing parties.
The German Democratic Party (DDP) was founded by leaders of the former Progressive People's Party, left members of the National Liberal Party, and a new group calling themselves the Democrats. The party was attacked by some for being a party of Jews and professors. Among its well-known politicians were Hugo Preuß, the main author of the Weimar constitution, and the eminent sociologist Max Weber. Hjalmar Schacht, president of the Reichsbank and one of the founders of the party, left the party in 1926 and became a supporter of Adolf Hitler. This party today would resemble some of the Bernie Sanders supporters that refuse to vote Clinton or may even vote for Trump.
The German People's Party (DVP) was a national liberal party in Weimar Germany and a successor to the National Liberal Party of the German Empire. It was the right-wing liberal or conservative-liberal party, generally thought to represent the interests of the great German industrialists. Its platform stressed Christian family values, secular education, lower tariffs, opposition to welfare spending and agrarian subsides and hostility to "Marxism" (that is, the Communists, and also the Social Democrats). Today’s equivalent names in the Trump campaign include people like Ralph Reed and Paul Ryan on the religious/political side and Aleson, Deason, Ichan and Ross on the business side. Today’s Trump financiers are mostly involved in casinos and deal making, and not so much in the traditional military industrial complex.
The German National People's Party (DNVP) was a national conservative party in Germany during the time of the Weimar Republic. Before the rise of the Nazi Party (NSDAP) it was the major conservative and nationalist party in Weimar Germany. It was an alliance of nationalists, reactionary monarchists, völkisch, and anti-Semitic elements, and supported by the Pan-German League. After 1929 the DNVP co-operated with the Nazis, joining forces in the Harzburg Front of 1931, forming coalition governments in some states and finally supporting Hitler's appointment as Chancellor in January 1933. Initially, the DNVP had a number of ministers in Hitler's government but quickly lost influence and eventually dissolved itself in June 1933, giving way to the Nazis' single-party dictatorship. The current day Republican equivalent is found among the more conservative Republicans and some Tea Party activists.
These three parties had their role in paving Hitler’s rise to power, the same way that several Republican factions paved the way to Trump’s nomination as Republican candidate for President in 2016.
Should Trump be elected, can we expect the Republican factions to merge into a neo-Nazi party?
The risk is very real.
So, what can Bush and other moderate Republicans do to stop this nightmare scenario?
They have basically two defense lines. First, recommending a vote for Clinton to stop it happening. Second, should this fail, to stop the Congress and Senate from approving an “enabling act” of the type that gave Hitler the power to obliterate the other parties and become a dictator. Not even if Trump portrays himself simply as a Putin-like dictator, and not a radical like Hitler, should the moderate Republicans conciliate.
In conclusion, Republicans have an enormous moral and historical responsibility in stopping the devil before it rises again. The Great American Nation and World Peace depend on their wisdom and courage!
Labels:
1930s,
anti-Semitism,
casinos,
Cato Institute,
Clinton-Trump debate,
democracy,
German Liberal Parties,
Germany,
GOP,
Hitler,
Ichan,
neo-Nazi,
representative democracy,
Republican Party candidates,
Tea Party,
Trump
Sunday, 26 June 2016
Brexit and direct democracy: the double referendum option
Now that a petition to hold a new referendum has surpassed the 3 million signatures I need to discuss this option which I left out in my previous post.
I left it out because it does not solve the basic problem of direct democracy.
While a simple majority (even by one vote) is reasonable for easily reversible decisions, like the election of a parliament for a legislative period of four or five years, it should not be enough for decade lasting decisions. Typically, constitutions and major international treaties should last for several decades and not be subject to frequent changes because of the huge costs in terms of economic and political stability. Therefore, a repeat referendum is not a solution to heal a divided electorate. Only the requirement of a qualified majority solves the problem, because it guarantees a minimum of stability by avoiding the consequences of frequent reversals of opinion.
This said, I do not believe that such qualified majority needs to be extreme. Two thirds or three quarters majorities are clearly anti-democratic. However, majorities of 10 to 15% are a reasonable compromise between the rule by majority and the need to protect the minorities.
Obviously, these rules should be constitutional.
The case of the UK is peculiar in this regard because it does not have a written constitution. So, can a sitting parliament, the House of Lords or a high court cancel (or make non-mandatory) last week’s referendum? I do not know enough about the British rules, but, given the risk of UK disintegration, they should at least require a new election to decide on the future relationship with Europe; even if that means asking the former EU partners for more patience.
I left it out because it does not solve the basic problem of direct democracy.
While a simple majority (even by one vote) is reasonable for easily reversible decisions, like the election of a parliament for a legislative period of four or five years, it should not be enough for decade lasting decisions. Typically, constitutions and major international treaties should last for several decades and not be subject to frequent changes because of the huge costs in terms of economic and political stability. Therefore, a repeat referendum is not a solution to heal a divided electorate. Only the requirement of a qualified majority solves the problem, because it guarantees a minimum of stability by avoiding the consequences of frequent reversals of opinion.
This said, I do not believe that such qualified majority needs to be extreme. Two thirds or three quarters majorities are clearly anti-democratic. However, majorities of 10 to 15% are a reasonable compromise between the rule by majority and the need to protect the minorities.
Obviously, these rules should be constitutional.
The case of the UK is peculiar in this regard because it does not have a written constitution. So, can a sitting parliament, the House of Lords or a high court cancel (or make non-mandatory) last week’s referendum? I do not know enough about the British rules, but, given the risk of UK disintegration, they should at least require a new election to decide on the future relationship with Europe; even if that means asking the former EU partners for more patience.
Labels:
Brexit,
direct democracy,
referendum,
representative democracy
Friday, 24 June 2016
Brexit and the danger of direct democracy
The Brexit vote provides a clear example of why direct democracy is a poor form of democracy. The reasons against direct voting are well know.Irreversible and long lasting decisions are taken in the spur of the moment without due regard for its consequences, based on lateral issues.
For instance, the Brexit debate was decided mostly on issues related to emigration which are a minor issue compared with the consequences of Britain leaving the EU.
If the worst comes to the worst, the voters may find out that they voted to break up the United Kingdom, an issue that was never envisaged by most of them.
So, if referendum and other forms of direct democracy are acceptable to decide local or sectional issues they are not suitable to decide complex issues with many ramifications.
In particular, regime change decisions such as independence, constitutional changes or decisions on important international treaties should not be subject to popular vote based on a simple majority. Think for instance in voting for independence. If they are voted on a simple majority vote we would end up with a country deciding one day for independence a the following wishing to reverse its decision based on a change of mind by a few voters.
If such decisions require a popular consult then they should be based on a qualified majority that will not disappear easily overnight(e.g. a 2/3 or 10% majority).
So David Cameron’s assertion in his defeat speech that “There are times when it is right to ask the people themselves – and that is what we have done”, is not a convincing excuse for his fatal mistake of calling referendum on Scotland independence and European Union membership.
In conclusion, direct democracy has its place in a representative democracy but can endanger democracy itself if not limited in scope and quorum.
Labels:
Brexit,
Cameron,
direct democracy,
representative democracy
Sunday, 19 June 2016
Trump, Iglesias and Boris: The new faces of evil in western democracies
In contrast with the usual faces of evil from non-democratic countries (e.g. Putin, Maduro or Kim Jong-un), the new faces of evil all come from democratic countries. So, what is wrong with western democracy? Can we no longer rely on a free press and democracy to prevent the election of evil leaders?
Although extremists have a right to express peacefully and freely their views in a democratic society, it is expected that electors are sufficiently educated to not elect them. Yet, opinion polls on next week’s election in Spain and the UK referendum on EU membership suggest that such radical candidates are not far from winning. Likewise, in the US presidential election later in the year. So, is this because such candidates are wolves in sheep’s clothing misleading the electors?
Clearly not! They do not hide their hideous ideas, as I explained in previous posts. For instance, Donald Trump’s xenophobic ideas and hate for migrants are clearly dispelled in his so-called program to Make America Great Again. Likewise, the program of the Spanish party Podemos led by Pablo Iglésias, is a crude restatement of the Trotskyist version of communism coloured with populist claims of direct democracy, regional separatism and a phony rebellious youth. Finally, the proponents of Brexit, whether they are represented by Nigel Farage leader of UKIP or by Boris Johnson the former populist Mayor of London, play on the fear of immigration and loss of sovereignty, in a manner reminiscent of the infamous 1968 Enoch Powell’s speech on the Rivers of Blood. They downplay the costs of protectionism and economic disintegration, while bullying voters by claiming that they will be sissies if they do not vote out of the EU.
So, are these evil leaders gaining followers because the moderate media and politicians have given up on fighting their populist and nationalistic propaganda? Partly, this is true and it is often fostered by a media willing to resort to the dodgiest forms of reporting as long as it increases their audiences.
However, in my view, there are more important and genuine reasons for dissatisfaction with the current political systems. First, there is an inevitable peace lethargy among the young generations who do not remember the two world wars nor have they lived the age of utopias in the turn of the XIX century and the 1960s. Second, this is compounded by a generalized low regard for professional politicians who rotate in power and corruption fighting for special interest groups with an evident lack of public service spirit.
This real crisis of representative democracy and the new forms of media have been exploited expertly by the new evil leaders to disseminate their reactionary ideas. So, unless new leaders rise, as Churchill did in the 1930s against the appeasers and the nationalistic rhetoric of Hitler, and fight these new evil leaders, the Western World, as we know it, is in serious danger. This week’s electoral results in Spain and Britain will give us a first outlook of how real such danger is.
Although extremists have a right to express peacefully and freely their views in a democratic society, it is expected that electors are sufficiently educated to not elect them. Yet, opinion polls on next week’s election in Spain and the UK referendum on EU membership suggest that such radical candidates are not far from winning. Likewise, in the US presidential election later in the year. So, is this because such candidates are wolves in sheep’s clothing misleading the electors?
Clearly not! They do not hide their hideous ideas, as I explained in previous posts. For instance, Donald Trump’s xenophobic ideas and hate for migrants are clearly dispelled in his so-called program to Make America Great Again. Likewise, the program of the Spanish party Podemos led by Pablo Iglésias, is a crude restatement of the Trotskyist version of communism coloured with populist claims of direct democracy, regional separatism and a phony rebellious youth. Finally, the proponents of Brexit, whether they are represented by Nigel Farage leader of UKIP or by Boris Johnson the former populist Mayor of London, play on the fear of immigration and loss of sovereignty, in a manner reminiscent of the infamous 1968 Enoch Powell’s speech on the Rivers of Blood. They downplay the costs of protectionism and economic disintegration, while bullying voters by claiming that they will be sissies if they do not vote out of the EU.
So, are these evil leaders gaining followers because the moderate media and politicians have given up on fighting their populist and nationalistic propaganda? Partly, this is true and it is often fostered by a media willing to resort to the dodgiest forms of reporting as long as it increases their audiences.
However, in my view, there are more important and genuine reasons for dissatisfaction with the current political systems. First, there is an inevitable peace lethargy among the young generations who do not remember the two world wars nor have they lived the age of utopias in the turn of the XIX century and the 1960s. Second, this is compounded by a generalized low regard for professional politicians who rotate in power and corruption fighting for special interest groups with an evident lack of public service spirit.
This real crisis of representative democracy and the new forms of media have been exploited expertly by the new evil leaders to disseminate their reactionary ideas. So, unless new leaders rise, as Churchill did in the 1930s against the appeasers and the nationalistic rhetoric of Hitler, and fight these new evil leaders, the Western World, as we know it, is in serious danger. This week’s electoral results in Spain and Britain will give us a first outlook of how real such danger is.
Labels:
Boris Johnson,
Brexit,
evil leaders,
immigration,
nationalism,
Pablo Iglésias,
Podemos,
representative democracy,
Trotsky,
Trump,
western democracies,
xenophobic
Wednesday, 18 May 2016
Trump: Caligula or Incitatus?
Legend has it that the Roman Emperor Caligula had his horse Incitatus elected senator. Caligula, an insane tyrant who ruled between37 and 41 AD, was famous for his cruelty, sadism, extravagance, and sexual perversity. He is said to have built for Incitatus a stable of marble, with an ivory manger, purple blankets, and a collar of precious stones. The horse would also "invite" dignitaries to dine with him in a house outfitted with servants. Some say that Caligula carried out such extravagances to ridicule and provoke the senate.
At the start, Donald Trump was also seen as an extravagant character, with a narcissistic authoritarian personality who named his buildings and casinos after himself and was a keen participant in reality shows. Yet, he is now the Republican candidate for President of the United States.
So, it is pertinent to ask if the Republican leadership (GOP) went crazy and found its own Incitatus in Trump, or if the reverse is true and Trump is a kind of Caligula who turned the GOP into his Incitatus. The answer might be the second, given that Trump was initially opposed by the GOP.
Were Trump to be elected, it would not be the first time that an electorate voted into office clowns or mavericks in a gesture of protest against the establishment. Electing a clown or an Ernest might even be a refreshing interval, if the country were not fundamental for world peace and democracy and the elected clown did not have firm crazy ideas.
Unfortunately, neither the US is a minor power, nor Trump is devoid of ingrained dangerous ideas.
To understand how dangerous are his ideas it is enough to translate them into plain English as follows:
This so-called program to Make America Great Again, will instead damage seriously the Dollar and the US economy, reduces America leadership and threatens world peace.
His nationalistic, xenophobic, homophobic and militaristic stance would alienate allies, divide Americans and create new enemies. The beacon for democracy, fairness and opportunity that America has been for more than a century would come to an end.
I do not believe that the American people will vote such candidate for President, but should it happen, Mr Trump could become simultaneously a modern-day version of Caligula and his horse.
At the start, Donald Trump was also seen as an extravagant character, with a narcissistic authoritarian personality who named his buildings and casinos after himself and was a keen participant in reality shows. Yet, he is now the Republican candidate for President of the United States.
So, it is pertinent to ask if the Republican leadership (GOP) went crazy and found its own Incitatus in Trump, or if the reverse is true and Trump is a kind of Caligula who turned the GOP into his Incitatus. The answer might be the second, given that Trump was initially opposed by the GOP.
Were Trump to be elected, it would not be the first time that an electorate voted into office clowns or mavericks in a gesture of protest against the establishment. Electing a clown or an Ernest might even be a refreshing interval, if the country were not fundamental for world peace and democracy and the elected clown did not have firm crazy ideas.
Unfortunately, neither the US is a minor power, nor Trump is devoid of ingrained dangerous ideas.
To understand how dangerous are his ideas it is enough to translate them into plain English as follows:
This so-called program to Make America Great Again, will instead damage seriously the Dollar and the US economy, reduces America leadership and threatens world peace.
His nationalistic, xenophobic, homophobic and militaristic stance would alienate allies, divide Americans and create new enemies. The beacon for democracy, fairness and opportunity that America has been for more than a century would come to an end.
I do not believe that the American people will vote such candidate for President, but should it happen, Mr Trump could become simultaneously a modern-day version of Caligula and his horse.
Thursday, 14 April 2016
Brexit: A brief history of economic disintegration
History is full of episodes of political and economic disintegration, which were often the natural culmination of experiences of forced integration. With a few exceptions, most empires ended through a process of violent and anarchic disintegration. Whether we think about the ancient empires of Alexander, Rome, the Qin Dynasty or Persia, or if we consider medieval empires like the Charlemagne Empire, the Islamic Caliphate or the Mongol Empire, or if we look at the modern empires of Britain, Ottoman, the German Reich and the Japanese Empire or the breakup of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, the lessons are the same. The separating regions often end up in civil war and always erect barriers to trade and investment through tariffs and instable currencies which bring economic decline.
The inevitable initial sacrifice in terms of economic and human misery is often followed by prolonged periods of underdevelopment (all too visible in Africa) in the separating regions, but there are some notable exceptions like the separation of the United States of America from Britain.
Do these lessons of history have any relevance in the case of an eventual separation of Britain from the European Union (the so-called Brexit)? If so, would the UK follow the general pattern of decadence and misery or could it replicate the US successful experience?
The first question is relevant because the European Union is a voluntary association of countries, not a forced empire. So, an eventual exit of a member state should be seen as the natural counterpart to a voluntary membership and should not be cause for war or vicious conflict. Nevertheless, we cannot ignore that Great Britain is itself an association of three nations – the English, the Welsh and the Scots – which may have quite distinct views in relation to the European Union, wish may lead some to question in which union they wish to participate - the European or the British.
Although military violence cannot be expected, social unrest may still arise in a strongly divided nation in relation to an eventual separation. Moreover, it will also depend on the attitude of the remaining member states in the European Union. Namely, whether they will be understanding and friendly or will be hostile and competitive, for example, by promoting an international financial centre to rival the City of London.
So, political attitudes in London, Brussels, Berlin and Paris would have an important bearing in the outcome of an eventual separation. Nevertheless, the answer to the question whether a separate Britain would be a failure or a success story requires an understanding of the economics of disintegration.
As a preamble to that understanding, let me just give the reader a chart depicting the experience of economic growth in Britain relative to that of France and the USA, before and after joining the European Union.
The chart is impressive. Before joining the European Union, the UK lagged France by over 30%. Since joining, it still lagged the USA by 20% until 1998, but managed to match the GDP growth in France. Since the creation of the Euro, Britain managed to overtake France by 10% and to match the growth in the US economy.
Given the success of Britain in the European Union, for outsiders it is hard to understand the decision to hold a referendum on its continuation in the Union. Is it simply local politics, or there are any fundamental reasons?
The inevitable initial sacrifice in terms of economic and human misery is often followed by prolonged periods of underdevelopment (all too visible in Africa) in the separating regions, but there are some notable exceptions like the separation of the United States of America from Britain.
Do these lessons of history have any relevance in the case of an eventual separation of Britain from the European Union (the so-called Brexit)? If so, would the UK follow the general pattern of decadence and misery or could it replicate the US successful experience?
The first question is relevant because the European Union is a voluntary association of countries, not a forced empire. So, an eventual exit of a member state should be seen as the natural counterpart to a voluntary membership and should not be cause for war or vicious conflict. Nevertheless, we cannot ignore that Great Britain is itself an association of three nations – the English, the Welsh and the Scots – which may have quite distinct views in relation to the European Union, wish may lead some to question in which union they wish to participate - the European or the British.
Although military violence cannot be expected, social unrest may still arise in a strongly divided nation in relation to an eventual separation. Moreover, it will also depend on the attitude of the remaining member states in the European Union. Namely, whether they will be understanding and friendly or will be hostile and competitive, for example, by promoting an international financial centre to rival the City of London.
So, political attitudes in London, Brussels, Berlin and Paris would have an important bearing in the outcome of an eventual separation. Nevertheless, the answer to the question whether a separate Britain would be a failure or a success story requires an understanding of the economics of disintegration.
As a preamble to that understanding, let me just give the reader a chart depicting the experience of economic growth in Britain relative to that of France and the USA, before and after joining the European Union.
The chart is impressive. Before joining the European Union, the UK lagged France by over 30%. Since joining, it still lagged the USA by 20% until 1998, but managed to match the GDP growth in France. Since the creation of the Euro, Britain managed to overtake France by 10% and to match the growth in the US economy.
Given the success of Britain in the European Union, for outsiders it is hard to understand the decision to hold a referendum on its continuation in the Union. Is it simply local politics, or there are any fundamental reasons?
Labels:
Ancient Empires,
Brexit,
British Empire,
economic decadence,
economic disintegration,
economic integration,
empires breakup,
European Union,
Great Britain,
representative democracy
Sunday, 20 March 2016
Trump vs. Hitler: some dangerous similarities
“Entire libraries have been filled with books attempting to explain how a once-homeless failed artist could have launched a war machine that eventually resulted in 60 million dead, and a death machine that killed 6 million in the Holocaust's gas chambers. More are certainly to come. The rise of the Nazis defies any simple narrative, coming as it did out of a myriad of interlacing events, ideologies and historical accidents”. http://www.spiegel.de/ “
The quote above is true, not only in relation to the policies expounded by the two men, but, more dangerously, by the social and political conditions that permitted Hitler’s rise to power.
In other posts (see: here and here) I have already explained the similarity between the economic conditions in the 1930s and today. I will just add that today they are not as dire, but can turn so if the next financial crises exceeds that of 2008 and reaches the level of 1932.
Turning now to the political conditions, I recall that today’s dissatisfaction is two-fold – a generalized disillusion with the centrist political establishment in Western countries and a rise in nationalist illusions among former communist states who failed to thrive under capitalism. Unfortunately, both disillusions may converge into a dangerous spiral of nationalism in a 1930s fashion.
What worries me is the reaction of moderates in the left and the right who seem to start taking an appeasement approach to Trump, like the one that cleared the road to Hitler.
Its worrisome, to see how many moderate Republicans are trying to embellish the Trump discourse or to believe the wishful thinking that he will moderate his views when in power.
Moreover, the same stance is being taken by some radical classical liberals’ followers of Hayek, whose dislike of Hilary Clinton blinds them enough to endorse a candidate like Trump whose policies are extremely nationalistic and protectionist (see my exchange with Don Boudreaux here).
So, we live in dangerous times. And, whether we like it or not, we have to rely on the hope that Hilary Clinton is elected and brings some sense to the political arena. She is not the candidate of the Republicans, but, if they fail to stop Trump and do not support her, they may end up playing Hindenburg’s role 83 years ago.
The quote above is true, not only in relation to the policies expounded by the two men, but, more dangerously, by the social and political conditions that permitted Hitler’s rise to power.
In other posts (see: here and here) I have already explained the similarity between the economic conditions in the 1930s and today. I will just add that today they are not as dire, but can turn so if the next financial crises exceeds that of 2008 and reaches the level of 1932.
Turning now to the political conditions, I recall that today’s dissatisfaction is two-fold – a generalized disillusion with the centrist political establishment in Western countries and a rise in nationalist illusions among former communist states who failed to thrive under capitalism. Unfortunately, both disillusions may converge into a dangerous spiral of nationalism in a 1930s fashion.
What worries me is the reaction of moderates in the left and the right who seem to start taking an appeasement approach to Trump, like the one that cleared the road to Hitler.
Its worrisome, to see how many moderate Republicans are trying to embellish the Trump discourse or to believe the wishful thinking that he will moderate his views when in power.
Moreover, the same stance is being taken by some radical classical liberals’ followers of Hayek, whose dislike of Hilary Clinton blinds them enough to endorse a candidate like Trump whose policies are extremely nationalistic and protectionist (see my exchange with Don Boudreaux here).
So, we live in dangerous times. And, whether we like it or not, we have to rely on the hope that Hilary Clinton is elected and brings some sense to the political arena. She is not the candidate of the Republicans, but, if they fail to stop Trump and do not support her, they may end up playing Hindenburg’s role 83 years ago.
Labels:
1930s,
appeasement,
Hilary Clinton,
Hitler,
representative democracy,
Republican Party candidates,
Trump,
USA
Monday, 24 August 2015
Capitalism without democracy?
Is capitalism indifferent to the form of government? Not in its pure form of market capitalism.
Just like competition and free markets are indispensable for economic success, democracy and freedom are essential for a good system of government and the rule of law. For this reason, capitalism and democracy are often said to go hand in hand.
Yet, there are some on the right and left who still believe the opposite. Some take such view on the basis of a mistaken interpretation of democracy and capitalism, while others simply dislike the outcomes of both systems.
Democracy is “Government of the people, by the people, for the people”. This form of government is achieved through majority rule by people's representatives, subject to the constitutional separation of powers and the rights of the minorities, who are elected periodically on the basis of one person one vote.
The alternatives to democracy can be gathered into two groups – totalitarian and authoritarian. Totalitarian regimes are typically governed by a despot or a small group of leaders, invoking an ideology or religion as the general basis for all aspects of life, where any form of opposition is brutally repressed. Authoritarian regimes are a softer version with less dogmatism in terms of ideology or creed, and granting some level of economic and religious freedom as long as their personal enrichment and hold on power is not challenged.
Former examples of totalitarian regimes include Nazi Germany and Stalin’s USSR, while living examples can be found now in countries like North Korea and Saudi Arabia. Today, the classification as totalitarian or authoritarian in countries like Iran, Russia or China is controversial.
For instance, the classification within a given category is not indifferent to the regime evolution, and in this sense one may say that China is moving towards an authoritarian regime while Russia is moving towards a totalitarian system, although, objectively, now there is still more freedom in Russia than in China. Likewise, the distinction between democratic and authoritarian regimes is also controversial in countries like Singapore.
In fact, nowadays, authoritarian and totalitarian regimes do not follow an open anti-capitalist ideology and may even portray as strong capitalist supporters, as long as their rule is not challenged.
The two standard yardsticks to judge the evolution of a political regime are the direct state involvement in the economy and the exercise of civic freedoms under the rule of law. These do not necessarily preclude regimes with strong leaders or with one-party long-term dominance.
However, these inevitably end up creating a self-perpetuating elite that will oppose any competition. To overcome such danger the pursuit of liberalism constitutes an important antidote to preserve both capitalism and democracy.
Indeed representative democracy and capitalism share similar problems in terms of governance. As sometimes I remind my students, there is a remarkable similitude between shareholders and electors. For instance, elections are the equivalent of the shareholders annual meeting, asset managers are similar to political parties, the board of directors resembles the parliament, and the executive officers the government while the senior managers are like the top civil servants.
Therefore, they share similar challenges. For instance, in terms of representation, the need to avoid a divorce between the electors and the elected is analogous to the separation between shareholders and management. Likewise, the rise of self-perpetuating insider elites in political parties is similar to that found in the selection of company board members.
Not surprisingly, the false alternatives to representative democracy, namely direct and “guided” democracy, have an equivalent in the attempts to extend voting rights to non-shareholders and on collusion to adopt rules restricting voting rights.
In conclusion, capitalism and democracy are two distinct but mutually-reinforcing systems. When in pursuit of their true form – market capitalism and representative democracy – they are inseparable. Temporary moves away from any one of them is only possible for short periods or under perverse forms of capitalism.
Just like competition and free markets are indispensable for economic success, democracy and freedom are essential for a good system of government and the rule of law. For this reason, capitalism and democracy are often said to go hand in hand.
Yet, there are some on the right and left who still believe the opposite. Some take such view on the basis of a mistaken interpretation of democracy and capitalism, while others simply dislike the outcomes of both systems.
Democracy is “Government of the people, by the people, for the people”. This form of government is achieved through majority rule by people's representatives, subject to the constitutional separation of powers and the rights of the minorities, who are elected periodically on the basis of one person one vote.
The alternatives to democracy can be gathered into two groups – totalitarian and authoritarian. Totalitarian regimes are typically governed by a despot or a small group of leaders, invoking an ideology or religion as the general basis for all aspects of life, where any form of opposition is brutally repressed. Authoritarian regimes are a softer version with less dogmatism in terms of ideology or creed, and granting some level of economic and religious freedom as long as their personal enrichment and hold on power is not challenged.
Former examples of totalitarian regimes include Nazi Germany and Stalin’s USSR, while living examples can be found now in countries like North Korea and Saudi Arabia. Today, the classification as totalitarian or authoritarian in countries like Iran, Russia or China is controversial.
For instance, the classification within a given category is not indifferent to the regime evolution, and in this sense one may say that China is moving towards an authoritarian regime while Russia is moving towards a totalitarian system, although, objectively, now there is still more freedom in Russia than in China. Likewise, the distinction between democratic and authoritarian regimes is also controversial in countries like Singapore.
In fact, nowadays, authoritarian and totalitarian regimes do not follow an open anti-capitalist ideology and may even portray as strong capitalist supporters, as long as their rule is not challenged.
The two standard yardsticks to judge the evolution of a political regime are the direct state involvement in the economy and the exercise of civic freedoms under the rule of law. These do not necessarily preclude regimes with strong leaders or with one-party long-term dominance.
However, these inevitably end up creating a self-perpetuating elite that will oppose any competition. To overcome such danger the pursuit of liberalism constitutes an important antidote to preserve both capitalism and democracy.
Indeed representative democracy and capitalism share similar problems in terms of governance. As sometimes I remind my students, there is a remarkable similitude between shareholders and electors. For instance, elections are the equivalent of the shareholders annual meeting, asset managers are similar to political parties, the board of directors resembles the parliament, and the executive officers the government while the senior managers are like the top civil servants.
Therefore, they share similar challenges. For instance, in terms of representation, the need to avoid a divorce between the electors and the elected is analogous to the separation between shareholders and management. Likewise, the rise of self-perpetuating insider elites in political parties is similar to that found in the selection of company board members.
Not surprisingly, the false alternatives to representative democracy, namely direct and “guided” democracy, have an equivalent in the attempts to extend voting rights to non-shareholders and on collusion to adopt rules restricting voting rights.
In conclusion, capitalism and democracy are two distinct but mutually-reinforcing systems. When in pursuit of their true form – market capitalism and representative democracy – they are inseparable. Temporary moves away from any one of them is only possible for short periods or under perverse forms of capitalism.
Labels:
authoritarian,
China,
governance,
market capitalism,
minority rights,
representative democracy,
Russia,
Saudi Arabia,
separation of powers,
Singapore,
totalitarianism
Wednesday, 12 August 2015
Political contributions and democracy
Representative democracy has become a very expensive activity. For instance, in 2008 the USA presidential candidates raised more than $1.8 billion in campaign funds, an 80% increase in relation to the 2004 campaign . The Democratic presidential nominee alone, Barack Obama, raised a total of $745.7 million in private funds for his election campaign.
It was the first time in the history of presidential public financing that a major party nominee declined to accept public funds for the general election. Is this a good or bad development and what it says about market capitalism?
The controversy between public and private financing has a long history, especially in what regards the special advantage that private financing may give to incumbents and special interest groups (e.g. trade unions and business associations) over the election process .
In abstract, the freedom of association principle should go with the principle of free financing. However, since public office gives those elected an ample scope for decisions that favor private interests, such power has a monetary value that may supersede the public service motivation. Therefore, the rule of free financing cannot be easily upheld under representative systems.
For this reason, under systems of state capitalism, capping campaign spending and restricting its financing to public funds may prove a better solution to secure a level playing field in democracy.
However, in countries close to market capitalism, why shouldn’t the candidates be able to tender some of their policies to special interest groups? For instance, party A could tender the easing of regulations in the financial sector, more private outsourcing of public services, more arms spending, etc. against political campaign contributions.
There is one fundamental reason why that cannot be made. It would be impossible to create a competitive market for political funding because of the asymmetric nature of the benefits received by the special interest groups and the public in general. Imagine for instance that one thousand banks can earn each 100 million dollars from deregulation while 200 million voters can save one thousand dollars from tighter deposit protection. That is, banks could earn up to 100 billion while depositors could save up to twice that amount. However, this difference may not be enough for voters to outbid the banks because their gain is only a potential saving while that of the bankers is a certain gain.
So, it is unquestionable that market capitalism requires the regulation of political contributions. And, in fact, all democratic countries regulate them, namely by limiting contributions by foreigners, by contractors of public services, trade associations, unions, regulated corporations, etc. These are usually complemented by rules on public disclosure.
Nevertheless, these limits and rules are easily evaded through soft dollars and by setting up special vehicles to make contributions (e.g. foundations, think tanks, etc.) or through the media and other unrelated intermediaries.
So, a level playing field in political campaigning must be promoted more vigorously, namely by capping the size of donations to small amounts, limiting the amount of advertising, etc. However, such limitations must be based in the principles of constitutional liberalism. Otherwise, the strong positive synergies that exist between market capitalism, constitutional liberalism and representative democracy are lost.
It was the first time in the history of presidential public financing that a major party nominee declined to accept public funds for the general election. Is this a good or bad development and what it says about market capitalism?
The controversy between public and private financing has a long history, especially in what regards the special advantage that private financing may give to incumbents and special interest groups (e.g. trade unions and business associations) over the election process .
In abstract, the freedom of association principle should go with the principle of free financing. However, since public office gives those elected an ample scope for decisions that favor private interests, such power has a monetary value that may supersede the public service motivation. Therefore, the rule of free financing cannot be easily upheld under representative systems.
For this reason, under systems of state capitalism, capping campaign spending and restricting its financing to public funds may prove a better solution to secure a level playing field in democracy.
However, in countries close to market capitalism, why shouldn’t the candidates be able to tender some of their policies to special interest groups? For instance, party A could tender the easing of regulations in the financial sector, more private outsourcing of public services, more arms spending, etc. against political campaign contributions.
There is one fundamental reason why that cannot be made. It would be impossible to create a competitive market for political funding because of the asymmetric nature of the benefits received by the special interest groups and the public in general. Imagine for instance that one thousand banks can earn each 100 million dollars from deregulation while 200 million voters can save one thousand dollars from tighter deposit protection. That is, banks could earn up to 100 billion while depositors could save up to twice that amount. However, this difference may not be enough for voters to outbid the banks because their gain is only a potential saving while that of the bankers is a certain gain.
So, it is unquestionable that market capitalism requires the regulation of political contributions. And, in fact, all democratic countries regulate them, namely by limiting contributions by foreigners, by contractors of public services, trade associations, unions, regulated corporations, etc. These are usually complemented by rules on public disclosure.
Nevertheless, these limits and rules are easily evaded through soft dollars and by setting up special vehicles to make contributions (e.g. foundations, think tanks, etc.) or through the media and other unrelated intermediaries.
So, a level playing field in political campaigning must be promoted more vigorously, namely by capping the size of donations to small amounts, limiting the amount of advertising, etc. However, such limitations must be based in the principles of constitutional liberalism. Otherwise, the strong positive synergies that exist between market capitalism, constitutional liberalism and representative democracy are lost.
Labels:
campaign financing,
constitutional liberalism,
election spending,
freedom of association,
freedom of financing,
market capitalism,
representative democracy,
soft dollars,
tendering public policies
Monday, 26 January 2015
The lesser evil for Greece and Europe
By electing the Syriza party, the Greeks in despair have turned what was an untenable situation into a nightmare scenario, perhaps hoping to force some kind of way out from the present situation.
What are in fact the Greek options? Using my academic hat I will put them bluntly and leave to others the task of dressing them in politically correct language. The options are basically three.
The first is that once in power, Tsipras and other radical leaders in the coalition will become realists and will not rock the boat. The second is that he will try to implement his political and economic agenda and will end up in mayhem and forced out of the Euro, or, in a worst case scenario, exit the EU and fall back into dictatorship. The third option is that he will declare a moratorium or some other form of debt default and will end up being bailed out again by the Troika.
There are several international experiences we may use as an analogy for each scenario.
The “get real” hypothesis has two versions: a) the FT hope that Tsipras becomes a Lula da Silva rather than a Hugo Chaves; and, b) Krugman’s (socialist) wishful thinking that the sudden abandonment of austerity will revive the Greek economy and the political mess will disappear. Both are very unlikely. The first, because the ideological base of Tsipras is fundamentally different from that of the Lula’s party in Brazil and the financial situation is much worse in Greece. The second ignores that the moderate socialist left has been almost wiped out of the political map and replaced by radicals without previous government experience.
The “mayhem and Euro exit” scenario is the most dangerous for Greece and Europe, if one judges from historical precedents such as the Cuban revolution or the rise of Nazism in Germany. One should not forget that it was economic anarchy, national humiliation, anti-Semitism and the fear of communism that led the Germans to vote Hitler into power. The fact that Syriza has chosen as coalition partner a nationalistic anti-Semite party and left-wing leaders in Southern Europe are increasingly endorsing anti-Semitism under the guise of pro-Palestinian support, creates an environment favorable to the Greek Golden Dawn neo-Nazi party which came third in the election.
The “new debt restructuring and new bailout” is the lesser of the three evils. In practice it means that the Troika needs to develop a new financing mechanism to lend Greece the money they need to repay their debt. This way of preventing a formal write-off of loans from international financial institutions, which enjoy preferred creditor status, has been used by the World Bank through AID lending and by the IMF through the HIPC/MDRI and PRGT Initiatives. Two countries with recently overdue repayments to the IMF were Zimbabwe and Argentina. Both with left-leaning, populist leaders who decided to challenge the international lenders. The results have been years of economic decline and rampant corruption. So, Greece, a country already rigged by alarming levels of corruption, might follow their path. However, for the good of Greece, one should hope that Tsipras will be more like Cristina Kirchner than Robert Mugabe.
To close this rather bleak outlook, I must address the question on whether there are no solutions for the Greek problem. Yes, there are. And I have written about some of them in other posts (e.g. here and here) in 2011, at the start of the Southern European crisis.
However, I do not foresee a possibility that someone will endorse them before the Greek electorates gets disillusioned with the new utopia, votes for more reliable politicians and the EU leaders reconsider their austerity bias. I hope that time will prove me wrong.
What are in fact the Greek options? Using my academic hat I will put them bluntly and leave to others the task of dressing them in politically correct language. The options are basically three.
The first is that once in power, Tsipras and other radical leaders in the coalition will become realists and will not rock the boat. The second is that he will try to implement his political and economic agenda and will end up in mayhem and forced out of the Euro, or, in a worst case scenario, exit the EU and fall back into dictatorship. The third option is that he will declare a moratorium or some other form of debt default and will end up being bailed out again by the Troika.
There are several international experiences we may use as an analogy for each scenario.
The “get real” hypothesis has two versions: a) the FT hope that Tsipras becomes a Lula da Silva rather than a Hugo Chaves; and, b) Krugman’s (socialist) wishful thinking that the sudden abandonment of austerity will revive the Greek economy and the political mess will disappear. Both are very unlikely. The first, because the ideological base of Tsipras is fundamentally different from that of the Lula’s party in Brazil and the financial situation is much worse in Greece. The second ignores that the moderate socialist left has been almost wiped out of the political map and replaced by radicals without previous government experience.
The “mayhem and Euro exit” scenario is the most dangerous for Greece and Europe, if one judges from historical precedents such as the Cuban revolution or the rise of Nazism in Germany. One should not forget that it was economic anarchy, national humiliation, anti-Semitism and the fear of communism that led the Germans to vote Hitler into power. The fact that Syriza has chosen as coalition partner a nationalistic anti-Semite party and left-wing leaders in Southern Europe are increasingly endorsing anti-Semitism under the guise of pro-Palestinian support, creates an environment favorable to the Greek Golden Dawn neo-Nazi party which came third in the election.
The “new debt restructuring and new bailout” is the lesser of the three evils. In practice it means that the Troika needs to develop a new financing mechanism to lend Greece the money they need to repay their debt. This way of preventing a formal write-off of loans from international financial institutions, which enjoy preferred creditor status, has been used by the World Bank through AID lending and by the IMF through the HIPC/MDRI and PRGT Initiatives. Two countries with recently overdue repayments to the IMF were Zimbabwe and Argentina. Both with left-leaning, populist leaders who decided to challenge the international lenders. The results have been years of economic decline and rampant corruption. So, Greece, a country already rigged by alarming levels of corruption, might follow their path. However, for the good of Greece, one should hope that Tsipras will be more like Cristina Kirchner than Robert Mugabe.
To close this rather bleak outlook, I must address the question on whether there are no solutions for the Greek problem. Yes, there are. And I have written about some of them in other posts (e.g. here and here) in 2011, at the start of the Southern European crisis.
However, I do not foresee a possibility that someone will endorse them before the Greek electorates gets disillusioned with the new utopia, votes for more reliable politicians and the EU leaders reconsider their austerity bias. I hope that time will prove me wrong.
Labels:
external adjustment,
Greece,
Greek election,
Greekexit,
IMF,
representative democracy,
Scenarios,
Syriza,
Troika,
Tsipras
Saturday, 14 January 2012
Mob Management Style in Communist State Capitalism
The success of dictatorial forms of state capitalism often depends on the adoption of a mob management style.
As is well known, the various Mafia families run both legitimate and criminal activities. Often, what is not realized is that successful mafia bosses learned that they could not run the two types of business in the same way. When taking over lawful businesses they leave in charge the previous managers or employ new professional mangers (often reputable citizens) but appoint a minder to remind such managers that they cannot step out of line. The minder may be a deputy, a security guard or even a driver but the manager cannot doubt that he is the eyes and ears of the boss. This way, the mafia boss avoids turning his criminal associates into lousy managers that would ruin his business while preserving their loyalty by giving them limited power and rewards.
Maverick dictators like Hitler used the same management approach. He used his rogue bunch of SS criminals to instill fear among top civil servants but left intact the efficient German army and government bureaucracy, including the famous financier Hjalmar Schacht as president of the Reichsbank.
In the early 1990s, I personally observed the same policy being pursued by Kazakhstan’s communist-era leader and for-life President, Nursultan Nazarbayev. Before independence, the Kazakhs were predominantly poor and uneducated and the Russians dominated the entire government administration. Instead of packing them back to Moscow, he maintained their positions and privileges if they accepted the tutelage of his handpicked ethnic Kazakhs.
More recently, after the Chinese took over Macau from Portugal I observed the same policy in action. While the Chinese swiftly erased many of the Portuguese symbols in the territory, they kept most of the Portuguese running its administration. They simply appointed a party member from mainland China to monitor them, often despite the resentment among local ethnic Chinese.
Although this mob style of management can be successful in the short run, as it was in the early days of Nazi Germany and as it is now in China, I do not believe that it will be sustainable.
Its failure will happen not because the Mafia’s boss family or the Party Nomenklatura are prone to end up fighting over power (although this often happens), but because of a fundamental flaw of the mob management style.
Lasting management success requires three distinct qualities – investment acumen, business savvy and leadership.
While the mob management style guarantees leadership and may substitute business shrewdness by corruption, robbery or outright threat it can never achieve investment wisdom. It cannot provide the vision and flexibility necessary to anticipate opportunities and allocate capital efficiently. On the contrary, it will inevitably overspend in low return projects aimed at rewarding political clienteles or at securing the bosses’ own glorification and security apparatus.
Therefore, despite its recent success, we believe that communist state capitalism in China is doomed to fail. Unless, of course, the Chinese reverse their ways and move towards market capitalism and democracy.
As is well known, the various Mafia families run both legitimate and criminal activities. Often, what is not realized is that successful mafia bosses learned that they could not run the two types of business in the same way. When taking over lawful businesses they leave in charge the previous managers or employ new professional mangers (often reputable citizens) but appoint a minder to remind such managers that they cannot step out of line. The minder may be a deputy, a security guard or even a driver but the manager cannot doubt that he is the eyes and ears of the boss. This way, the mafia boss avoids turning his criminal associates into lousy managers that would ruin his business while preserving their loyalty by giving them limited power and rewards.
Maverick dictators like Hitler used the same management approach. He used his rogue bunch of SS criminals to instill fear among top civil servants but left intact the efficient German army and government bureaucracy, including the famous financier Hjalmar Schacht as president of the Reichsbank.
In the early 1990s, I personally observed the same policy being pursued by Kazakhstan’s communist-era leader and for-life President, Nursultan Nazarbayev. Before independence, the Kazakhs were predominantly poor and uneducated and the Russians dominated the entire government administration. Instead of packing them back to Moscow, he maintained their positions and privileges if they accepted the tutelage of his handpicked ethnic Kazakhs.
More recently, after the Chinese took over Macau from Portugal I observed the same policy in action. While the Chinese swiftly erased many of the Portuguese symbols in the territory, they kept most of the Portuguese running its administration. They simply appointed a party member from mainland China to monitor them, often despite the resentment among local ethnic Chinese.
Although this mob style of management can be successful in the short run, as it was in the early days of Nazi Germany and as it is now in China, I do not believe that it will be sustainable.
Its failure will happen not because the Mafia’s boss family or the Party Nomenklatura are prone to end up fighting over power (although this often happens), but because of a fundamental flaw of the mob management style.
Lasting management success requires three distinct qualities – investment acumen, business savvy and leadership.
While the mob management style guarantees leadership and may substitute business shrewdness by corruption, robbery or outright threat it can never achieve investment wisdom. It cannot provide the vision and flexibility necessary to anticipate opportunities and allocate capital efficiently. On the contrary, it will inevitably overspend in low return projects aimed at rewarding political clienteles or at securing the bosses’ own glorification and security apparatus.
Therefore, despite its recent success, we believe that communist state capitalism in China is doomed to fail. Unless, of course, the Chinese reverse their ways and move towards market capitalism and democracy.
Labels:
China,
communist state capitalism,
Germany,
Hitler,
Kazakhstan,
Macau,
mafia,
management styles,
market capitalism,
mob,
representative democracy,
Schacht
Friday, 28 October 2011
Shameful European Leaders
In today’s news: “AP - The chief of Europe's bailout fund visited Beijing on Friday to discuss possible terms for a bond sale aimed at raising money from China and other non-European investors”.
After months of protracted squabbling over how to solve the Greek problem, all that Sarkozy and Merkel could come up with was a convoluted scheme that involves begging support from one of the remaining communist dictatorships – China.
To realize how outrageous their incapacity was, one must recall that the haircut or debt forgiveness that Greece, Ireland and Portugal needed at the start of the crisis was about 140 billion Euros, that is, the equivalent to the European Union budget for one year.
To understand how shameful it is to rely on the support of a non-democratic country, it is important to remember that China does not have a fully convertible currency, ranks 7 and 6 respectively in terms of political rights and civil liberties in the Freedom House index (a classification worse that of Iran and Rwanda) and according to Amnesty International is by far the country with the worst record in terms of executions which remain a state secret (again worse than Iran).
This is a dark episode in the history of European integration, and a shaking foundation for the future of the Euro as a currency.
After months of protracted squabbling over how to solve the Greek problem, all that Sarkozy and Merkel could come up with was a convoluted scheme that involves begging support from one of the remaining communist dictatorships – China.
To realize how outrageous their incapacity was, one must recall that the haircut or debt forgiveness that Greece, Ireland and Portugal needed at the start of the crisis was about 140 billion Euros, that is, the equivalent to the European Union budget for one year.
To understand how shameful it is to rely on the support of a non-democratic country, it is important to remember that China does not have a fully convertible currency, ranks 7 and 6 respectively in terms of political rights and civil liberties in the Freedom House index (a classification worse that of Iran and Rwanda) and according to Amnesty International is by far the country with the worst record in terms of executions which remain a state secret (again worse than Iran).
This is a dark episode in the history of European integration, and a shaking foundation for the future of the Euro as a currency.
Labels:
bail-out,
China,
Euro Zone,
European Union,
Greece,
human rights,
Ireland,
Merkel,
Portugal,
representative democracy,
Sarkozy,
shame,
sovereign debt restructuring
Monday, 24 October 2011
Democracy and Fallen Evil Dictators
Kaddafi’s killing raised again the question of how revolutionaries aspiring to democracy should treat evil dictators. Brutal dictators are often paranoid and usually commit their crimes in three different contexts: 1) by committing war crimes in savage wars against other countries; 2) by using extreme violence in civil wars among their own people; and 3) through the brutal persecution and starvation of his own citizens.
Ranking dictators in terms of brutality is usually done by counting the number of dead outside the battlefield. For instance, the atrocities committed in Portugal by Napoleon’s armies, although enormous in terms of body counting were much less than the number of those killed in the battlefield. On the contrary, the number of those killed by the Red Army during the Chinese civil war was less than those killed through famine and persecution by Mao Tse Tung during the so-called “great leap forward” and “cultural revolution”. So, not surprisingly, Mao often tops the list of the bloodiest dictators, among the likes of Hitler, Stalin and Pol Pot.
Obviously, not all dictators end up killed like Kaddafi. Some manage to die in bed and remain venerated by their followers or descendents, as in the case of Mao, Pol Pot and Kim il-sung. Others commit suicide before being arrested, as Hitler did. Some fled or were sent into exile (like Napoleon or Idi Amin). A small minority end up being judged by a domestic or an international tribunal. Of these some are condemned to capital punishment (like Saddam Hussein) and others to long imprisonment terms.
Long term imprisonment should be the normal outcome in democracies that abhor the death penalty. It would prove the superiority of democratic justice and provide a deterrent and educational role. Yet there are very few dictators that ended up this way.
The fact that victors prefer the elimination of the defeated is the result of either revenge or fear of a comeback. None are democratic virtues.
If Kaddafi had been delivered to the ICC, his trial could provide important revelations on how he corrupted many regimes throughout the world. For the sake of transparency, it is important that NATO and the new Libyan authorities conduct honest investigations on why he was not kept alive and brought to justice.
Ranking dictators in terms of brutality is usually done by counting the number of dead outside the battlefield. For instance, the atrocities committed in Portugal by Napoleon’s armies, although enormous in terms of body counting were much less than the number of those killed in the battlefield. On the contrary, the number of those killed by the Red Army during the Chinese civil war was less than those killed through famine and persecution by Mao Tse Tung during the so-called “great leap forward” and “cultural revolution”. So, not surprisingly, Mao often tops the list of the bloodiest dictators, among the likes of Hitler, Stalin and Pol Pot.
Obviously, not all dictators end up killed like Kaddafi. Some manage to die in bed and remain venerated by their followers or descendents, as in the case of Mao, Pol Pot and Kim il-sung. Others commit suicide before being arrested, as Hitler did. Some fled or were sent into exile (like Napoleon or Idi Amin). A small minority end up being judged by a domestic or an international tribunal. Of these some are condemned to capital punishment (like Saddam Hussein) and others to long imprisonment terms.
Long term imprisonment should be the normal outcome in democracies that abhor the death penalty. It would prove the superiority of democratic justice and provide a deterrent and educational role. Yet there are very few dictators that ended up this way.
The fact that victors prefer the elimination of the defeated is the result of either revenge or fear of a comeback. None are democratic virtues.
If Kaddafi had been delivered to the ICC, his trial could provide important revelations on how he corrupted many regimes throughout the world. For the sake of transparency, it is important that NATO and the new Libyan authorities conduct honest investigations on why he was not kept alive and brought to justice.
Wednesday, 7 September 2011
Palestinians – With Friends Like These Who Needs Enemies?
The old say that a nation gets the leaders they deserve should not be applied lightly to the Palestinians or any other nation. Truly, in recent history, they have been ruled by a series of terrorist and corrupt leaders. But in a non-democratic society people cannot truly choose their leaders, just like in a gang controlled slam its poor residents cannot be blamed for their criminal rulers.
However the saddest fact about the Palestinians, a poor migrant people, is the way they have literally been used as cannon fodder in the many Middle East conflicts.
The most well known was the Israeli-Arab conflict, because one third of the estimated 10 million Palestinians live in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip areas of Israel. The other third live in Jordan (where they account for half of the population) and in Israel proper. The final third are dispersed throughout the world with large numbers in conflict-prone Syria and Lebanon.
For many years the oil-producing Arab countries used the Palestinians' plight for a nation state to stir up the fear of disruptions in oil supplies and raise the price of oil. There is even a bad taste joke saying that the Arabs will fight for the Palestinians to the last Palestinian.
Then the theocratic rulers of Iran, in their drive the rebuild an ancient Caliphate or Persian Empire, decided to take over their cause. They did so by sponsoring the Hezbollah and Hamas terrorist camps in Syria, Lebanon and Gaza.
Fortunately for the Palestinians, the oil suppliers are now more spread all over the world and the alternative energy industries in the oil-importing countries are the main lobbyists to keep the prices higher. Likewise the Al Qaeda and Iran-sponsored terrorists are now largely discredited even among Arabs.
However, while the embryonic Arab Spring Revolution brought a new hope for a democratic era in the region, a dangerous new “savior” for the Palestinians appeared in the scene.
We refer to the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Erdogan, the maverick leader of the Islamist AK party that now rules Turkey. Seizing the current political vacuum in Egypt, Erdogan is moving swiftly to assert himself in the Arab world by taking a hostile stance against Israel. This can only be bad news for the poor Palestinians. They cannot become once more cannon fodder in another bid to restore an ancient empire, this time the Ottoman.
In a globalised and free world, people will no longer accept new empires, especially religion-driven, whether by Christians or Muslims. So all attempts by any of the largest Islamic nations (Indonesians, Turks, Persians, Saudis or Egyptians) or sects (e.g. Al-Qaeda) to enlarge their area of influence by reclaiming ancient caliphates or empires is doomed to fail and can only harm the Palestinians.
However the saddest fact about the Palestinians, a poor migrant people, is the way they have literally been used as cannon fodder in the many Middle East conflicts.
The most well known was the Israeli-Arab conflict, because one third of the estimated 10 million Palestinians live in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip areas of Israel. The other third live in Jordan (where they account for half of the population) and in Israel proper. The final third are dispersed throughout the world with large numbers in conflict-prone Syria and Lebanon.
For many years the oil-producing Arab countries used the Palestinians' plight for a nation state to stir up the fear of disruptions in oil supplies and raise the price of oil. There is even a bad taste joke saying that the Arabs will fight for the Palestinians to the last Palestinian.
Then the theocratic rulers of Iran, in their drive the rebuild an ancient Caliphate or Persian Empire, decided to take over their cause. They did so by sponsoring the Hezbollah and Hamas terrorist camps in Syria, Lebanon and Gaza.
Fortunately for the Palestinians, the oil suppliers are now more spread all over the world and the alternative energy industries in the oil-importing countries are the main lobbyists to keep the prices higher. Likewise the Al Qaeda and Iran-sponsored terrorists are now largely discredited even among Arabs.
However, while the embryonic Arab Spring Revolution brought a new hope for a democratic era in the region, a dangerous new “savior” for the Palestinians appeared in the scene.
We refer to the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Erdogan, the maverick leader of the Islamist AK party that now rules Turkey. Seizing the current political vacuum in Egypt, Erdogan is moving swiftly to assert himself in the Arab world by taking a hostile stance against Israel. This can only be bad news for the poor Palestinians. They cannot become once more cannon fodder in another bid to restore an ancient empire, this time the Ottoman.
In a globalised and free world, people will no longer accept new empires, especially religion-driven, whether by Christians or Muslims. So all attempts by any of the largest Islamic nations (Indonesians, Turks, Persians, Saudis or Egyptians) or sects (e.g. Al-Qaeda) to enlarge their area of influence by reclaiming ancient caliphates or empires is doomed to fail and can only harm the Palestinians.
Labels:
Ancient Empires,
Arab uprising,
Arabs,
Caliphate,
Erdogan,
globalization,
Israel,
Muslims,
Ottoman Empire,
Palestinians,
religion,
representative democracy,
Turkey
Wednesday, 31 August 2011
The Anatomy of Power Inside Political Parties
Before we discuss how to apply the principles of representative democracy to political parties, we need to understand the allocation of power inside them. Power struggles within organizations in general and within parties have many features in common studied in organizational theory.
One feature that is salient in political parties is the extreme greed for power, well expressed in the popular saying: “In the other parties I have adversaries; in my party I have enemies”. Another distinctive feature of party organizations is that members tend to be aligned in groups. However, this form of tribal or feudal organization often ends up in two opposite forms of power sharing. In some parties the contenders defeated are selectively invited to join the winners while in others they ostracized into permanent opposition or expulsion.
Such groups are formed in many different ways, including the sharing of ideals or ideology, but generally they fight for power over mundane issues. For instance, the most common is to fight over some obscure amendment to the Party’s charter, which is immediately forgotten once the fight is over. Another bizarre form of fight for succession in communist parties was over the organization of the burial ceremony of deceased leaders. Many leaders also run the parties in a courtier system and therefore give a lot of power to those with the door keys to the courtroom.
In my brief experience as member of a Party Directorate I identified three major sources of power within political parties. These are the Leader’s entourage, the Administration in charge of liaison with the local sections of the party and the Fundraisers. The Leader’s Cabinet is usually made up of at least four or five people: his head of cabinet and secretary, media and intelligence liaison officers and the head of administration.
Among them they manage a network of official and unofficial political advisers. Their role can be quite distinct and there are those who do not seat in the party’s elected bodies and some who are not even party members. There are many that come and go as policies shift and there a few with lasting influence over the leader. The later are the most powerful and are usually on the unofficial or undisclosed list of advisers, often including family members and party financiers. The Cabinet and Administration heads are essential for the relationship of the Party Leader with the party members and interest groups in general.
The second-in-command is usually the Head of Administration (with a title of Secretary-General, Chief of Staff or similar). Because of the role he plays in the control over the party membership, he is essential for the reelection of the leader. His influence derives from the power to distribute resources among the various sections of the party, and, most importantly, from his role in organizing all party events and elections. However, the way the party is organized in terms of local sections and the process of selection of its members to national elections may mitigate the influence of the Head of Administration.
Finally, the third most influential members are those responsible for fund raising. These may include three different types of fund raisers: a Party Treasurer, who in some cases has a simple accounting role without political influence, wealthy supporters of the Party, who are also some of the biggest party donors, and non-donor fund raisers. The second may have some influence in policy setting, but the later are the most active and influential in selling political favors and legislative votes to special interest groups. Among these we often find some obscure and dodgy characters that the parties reward with sinecures or by letting them take a cut in the donations received.
So it is against this background of organizational power within parties that any regulation aimed at improving representative democracy within parties has to be discussed. This will need to consider the relationship within local sections of the party and their role in the selection of candidates for national office as well as the role of the various national bodies representing the party.
One feature that is salient in political parties is the extreme greed for power, well expressed in the popular saying: “In the other parties I have adversaries; in my party I have enemies”. Another distinctive feature of party organizations is that members tend to be aligned in groups. However, this form of tribal or feudal organization often ends up in two opposite forms of power sharing. In some parties the contenders defeated are selectively invited to join the winners while in others they ostracized into permanent opposition or expulsion.
Such groups are formed in many different ways, including the sharing of ideals or ideology, but generally they fight for power over mundane issues. For instance, the most common is to fight over some obscure amendment to the Party’s charter, which is immediately forgotten once the fight is over. Another bizarre form of fight for succession in communist parties was over the organization of the burial ceremony of deceased leaders. Many leaders also run the parties in a courtier system and therefore give a lot of power to those with the door keys to the courtroom.
In my brief experience as member of a Party Directorate I identified three major sources of power within political parties. These are the Leader’s entourage, the Administration in charge of liaison with the local sections of the party and the Fundraisers. The Leader’s Cabinet is usually made up of at least four or five people: his head of cabinet and secretary, media and intelligence liaison officers and the head of administration.
Among them they manage a network of official and unofficial political advisers. Their role can be quite distinct and there are those who do not seat in the party’s elected bodies and some who are not even party members. There are many that come and go as policies shift and there a few with lasting influence over the leader. The later are the most powerful and are usually on the unofficial or undisclosed list of advisers, often including family members and party financiers. The Cabinet and Administration heads are essential for the relationship of the Party Leader with the party members and interest groups in general.
The second-in-command is usually the Head of Administration (with a title of Secretary-General, Chief of Staff or similar). Because of the role he plays in the control over the party membership, he is essential for the reelection of the leader. His influence derives from the power to distribute resources among the various sections of the party, and, most importantly, from his role in organizing all party events and elections. However, the way the party is organized in terms of local sections and the process of selection of its members to national elections may mitigate the influence of the Head of Administration.
Finally, the third most influential members are those responsible for fund raising. These may include three different types of fund raisers: a Party Treasurer, who in some cases has a simple accounting role without political influence, wealthy supporters of the Party, who are also some of the biggest party donors, and non-donor fund raisers. The second may have some influence in policy setting, but the later are the most active and influential in selling political favors and legislative votes to special interest groups. Among these we often find some obscure and dodgy characters that the parties reward with sinecures or by letting them take a cut in the donations received.
So it is against this background of organizational power within parties that any regulation aimed at improving representative democracy within parties has to be discussed. This will need to consider the relationship within local sections of the party and their role in the selection of candidates for national office as well as the role of the various national bodies representing the party.
Labels:
elections,
fund raising,
organizational theories,
political parties,
power anatomy,
representative democracy
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)



