Brexit and the danger of direct democracy

The Brexit vote provides a clear example of why direct democracy is a poor form of democracy. The reasons against direct voting are well know.Irreversible and long lasting decisions are taken in the spur of the moment without due regard for its consequences, based on lateral issues.

For instance, the Brexit debate was decided mostly on issues related to emigration which are a minor issue compared with the consequences of Britain leaving the EU.

If the worst comes to the worst, the voters may find out that they voted to break up the United Kingdom, an issue that was never envisaged by most of them.

So, if referendum and other forms of direct democracy are acceptable to decide local or sectional issues they are not suitable to decide complex issues with many ramifications.

In particular, regime change decisions such as independence, constitutional changes or decisions on important international treaties should not be subject to popular vote based on a simple majority. Think for instance in voting for independence. If they are voted on a simple majority vote we would end up with a country deciding one day for independence a the following wishing to reverse its decision based on a change of mind by a few voters.

If such decisions require a popular consult then they should be based on a qualified majority that will not disappear easily overnight(e.g. a 2/3 or 10% majority).

So David Cameron’s assertion in his defeat speech that “There are times when it is right to ask the people themselves – and that is what we have done”, is not a convincing excuse for his fatal mistake of calling referendum on Scotland independence and European Union membership.

In conclusion, direct democracy has its place in a representative democracy but can endanger democracy itself if not limited in scope and quorum.

The German Surplus and the Euro Zone Demise

Here are some figures someone should have explained to Mrs. Merkel, before she coerced European leaders (with the exception of Mr. Cameron, the UK prime minister) into fiscal fundamentalism.

First, a look at German savings:

With a slow growing economy, Germans save every year €130 billion, or 6% of their income, that they have to lend abroad. With the exception of the government, all sectors of the economy are net savers. Even the government managed to run a balanced budget during the financial crisis of 2008.

The problem with this Teutonic frugality is that it puts a burden on its trading partners, in particular those in the Euro Zone. Germany is currently running a current account surplus of about €140 billion per year, of which more than half (€73 billion) with her Euro Zone partners (of which Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal account for half):

Simple national accounting arithmetic tells us that the reverse picture of a surplus is a deficit. Therefore, a reduction in the external deficits in the southern European countries will have to be matched by a partial reduction of the German surplus.

Should Germany succeed in the policy of bringing its Government deficit to zero as well those of the other Euro countries, this would have to be matched either by an increased external surplus (with the US, UK and other countries) or by a reduction in German economic growth and savings. Lower growth with the same rate of saving by Germans will depress the exports of other Euro area deficit countries to Germany and will depress further their growth in a recessionary spiral.

In summary, the misunderstanding of economic interdependence between Euro Area member countries and Mrs. Merkel housewife economics risk ruining the rest of Europe.

Is the ECB Intent on Replacing Euro Hara-Kiri by Euthanasia?

Another useless EU Summit - thank you Mr. Cameron for killing the new “Merkozy” version of an absurd fiscal union for the entire EU. This time, the absurdity of setting a budget limit of 0.5% of GDP (when it has been unable to comply with the existing limit of 3%), was compounded by requiring its inscription as a rule in national legal systems at constitutional or equivalent level (see here why this is a mistake).

Let us now hope that a referendum in Ireland or any other country will kill the alternative proposal for a fiscal union among Euro Zone members through a new "fiscal compact". As we said here, a fiscal union between Germany and France may make sense but it would be a disaster for the entire Euro Zone.

The potential collapse of the Euro Zone will not be due to a fiscal problem in the Euro Area; which does not exist, despite the fact that three smaller members have excessive debt and Germany has an excessive current account surplus. The problem resides in the ECB’s refusal to act to stop the speculation against the Euro by invoking that its charter does not allow for the monetization of fiscal deficits.

Mr. Draghi is either naïve or wants us to believe in fairy tales. During his last press conference, he said that funding the IMF to finance exclusively the Euro Zone governments would be against the ECB charter. However, the ECB practice of accepting modern day versions of accommodation bills, in the form of bank drafts and bonds issued and subscribed by the same bank with a government guarantee and used to purchase the debt of the said government, is a more dangerous form of debt monetization since it lacks any kind of conditionality. Moreover, it puts those governments in the position of sitting ducks for speculative attacks.

As we said before bank-to-bank loans with strong conditionality are preferable. Obviously, we do not advocate that the ECB should negotiate or monitor such conditionality. Specialized institutions such as the IMF or the EFSF/ESM should do that.

Unfortunately, as we said repeatedly and the experience of Greece, Ireland and Portugal shows the IMF adjustment policies for monetary unions are seriously flawed.

Yet the ECB did not demand from the European Council that the ESM should take its place. Instead, the Council decided that all EU member states would lend to the IMF an extra 200 million Euros in the hope that non-EU countries might do the same.

In summary, by accepting the self-inflicted fiscal Darwinism of Germany that will lead to expelling peripheral countries from the Euro Zone, despite a half-baked mix of ECB and IMF support, will not restore confidence in the Euro. All it does is to replace the previous ECB hara-kiri intent with a slow euthanasia carried out by an IMF firing squad.