The trigger for the next financial crisis

We know that financial crisis are recurring. The last one was in 2008, almost 8 years ago, so it is not difficult to forecast that a new one is in the making.

The trouble for investors is that it is almost impossible to forecast when a new crisis will arrive. It may be next month, next year or in five years. Who knows?

Another annoying feature of financial crisis is that it is equally difficult to foresee which drop will spill the glass, that is, what will be blamed as its trigger.

Paul Krugman just listed two possible candidates – China and oil – in his NYT op-ed “The 8 A. M. Call”.

So, let me add another candidate – IRRBB Interest rate risk in the banking book – caused by the excessive reliance of banks on the derivatives market.

This choice may sound odd, given that the Basle Committee has been working hard on new standards for this risk which will be implemented in 2018, aimed at preventing IRRBB to materialize when interest rates normalise from historically low levels. Indeed, the notional value OTC derivatives which at end-2014 was 6.5 times larger than all outstanding debt securities has been reduced by 70 trillion USD in the first half of 2015.

It really does not matter if the crisis is triggered in these markets, or any other place like the M&A or the currency markets. The “fire” can be started anywhere, as long as the “wood” is close enough to spread it by contagion.

What matters is to know whether the “firemen” are capable of containing it.

In this regard the perspectives are frightening, given the resistance to apply the so-called Volcker rule to ring-fence commercial banking from investment banking, the exhaustion of ammunition by central banks to deal with a liquidity trap and the balance of public finances in some major economies.

Capitalism without democracy?

Is capitalism indifferent to the form of government? Not in its pure form of market capitalism.

Just like competition and free markets are indispensable for economic success, democracy and freedom are essential for a good system of government and the rule of law. For this reason, capitalism and democracy are often said to go hand in hand.

Yet, there are some on the right and left who still believe the opposite. Some take such view on the basis of a mistaken interpretation of democracy and capitalism, while others simply dislike the outcomes of both systems.

Democracy is “Government of the people, by the people, for the people”. This form of government is achieved through majority rule by people's representatives, subject to the constitutional separation of powers and the rights of the minorities, who are elected periodically on the basis of one person one vote.

The alternatives to democracy can be gathered into two groups – totalitarian and authoritarian. Totalitarian regimes are typically governed by a despot or a small group of leaders, invoking an ideology or religion as the general basis for all aspects of life, where any form of opposition is brutally repressed. Authoritarian regimes are a softer version with less dogmatism in terms of ideology or creed, and granting some level of economic and religious freedom as long as their personal enrichment and hold on power is not challenged.

Former examples of totalitarian regimes include Nazi Germany and Stalin’s USSR, while living examples can be found now in countries like North Korea and Saudi Arabia. Today, the classification as totalitarian or authoritarian in countries like Iran, Russia or China is controversial.

For instance, the classification within a given category is not indifferent to the regime evolution, and in this sense one may say that China is moving towards an authoritarian regime while Russia is moving towards a totalitarian system, although, objectively, now there is still more freedom in Russia than in China. Likewise, the distinction between democratic and authoritarian regimes is also controversial in countries like Singapore.

In fact, nowadays, authoritarian and totalitarian regimes do not follow an open anti-capitalist ideology and may even portray as strong capitalist supporters, as long as their rule is not challenged.

The two standard yardsticks to judge the evolution of a political regime are the direct state involvement in the economy and the exercise of civic freedoms under the rule of law. These do not necessarily preclude regimes with strong leaders or with one-party long-term dominance.

However, these inevitably end up creating a self-perpetuating elite that will oppose any competition. To overcome such danger the pursuit of liberalism constitutes an important antidote to preserve both capitalism and democracy.

Indeed representative democracy and capitalism share similar problems in terms of governance. As sometimes I remind my students, there is a remarkable similitude between shareholders and electors. For instance, elections are the equivalent of the shareholders annual meeting, asset managers are similar to political parties, the board of directors resembles the parliament, and the executive officers the government while the senior managers are like the top civil servants.

Therefore, they share similar challenges. For instance, in terms of representation, the need to avoid a divorce between the electors and the elected is analogous to the separation between shareholders and management. Likewise, the rise of self-perpetuating insider elites in political parties is similar to that found in the selection of company board members.

Not surprisingly, the false alternatives to representative democracy, namely direct and “guided” democracy, have an equivalent in the attempts to extend voting rights to non-shareholders and on collusion to adopt rules restricting voting rights.

In conclusion, capitalism and democracy are two distinct but mutually-reinforcing systems. When in pursuit of their true form – market capitalism and representative democracy – they are inseparable. Temporary moves away from any one of them is only possible for short periods or under perverse forms of capitalism.

Russian fears after 20 years

Since the fall of communism, Russia has become again a case study on the loss of freedom in non-capitalist systems, this time the result of a system of oligarchic state capitalism developed in the country.

I am not an expert on Russia, a country I visited only twice and briefly. I visited Moscow in 1991 and S. Petersburg in 2013. The last time, during the visit to the over-crowded Hermitage Museum I seated for a while wondering what had struck me more and it was not the museum.

Mostly, I wondered why after more than 20 years this beautiful imperial city still looked dilapidated and decrepit, and people in the streets and tourist shops still looked fearful, nationalistic and resentful of westerns. It also struck me how limited was the offer of products beyond the babushkas, amber and other semi-precious stones and communist memorabilia.

Having lived my youth under Salazar’s authoritarian regime, a model admired by President Putin, I can understand the Russians’ fear, longing and delusions about past imperial might and equality in poverty. It also lets me sense the body language of those living in fear of the authorities or in servility before those in authority to whom they owe their business.

For instance, a souvenir shop I visited still exhibited a wall plaque stating that it had been opened by special permission of a minister. I also had lunch in a restaurant housed in a former Czar palace and headquarters of the Soviet Trade Unions. It housed many other “companies” which did not have any identification and nobody knew what they did or who owned the place. The meal itself was not much different from what one gets in a workers canteen and the service was very poor. However it have the “luxury” of classical live music played by a young violinist. The whole setting was quite surreal.

Only a lack of truly free enterprise can explain the absence of progress in Russia. In fact, the Russian economy continues totally dependent on the exports of arms and energy, with the later accounting for almost 70% of its exports and, together with other commodities, account for about 50% of the Federal Government tax revenue. Overall, Russian exports are less than 15% of the Euro-Area exports.

Searching for explanations for Russia’s poor performance, Chrystia Freeland’s Plutocrats (2013) compares the rent-seeking strategies of the Russian oligarchs with that of the Chinese Communist Party bosses and concluded that “China’s market reforms have been slower and its avenues for rent-seeking have been more varied and more opaque than a quick privatization drive led from the top”. In my view, this does not explain much about the disparate performances of Russia and China.

The key difference resides in the openness and participation of the two countries in international trade. While China began by creating special free trade regions for foreign investors and sought an early entry into the WTO organization, Russia only fulfilled the WTO membership requirements in 2012.

Equally important was the contempt for small business inherited from the communist regime which, coupled with a lack of property protection, rampant corruption and business fear, discouraged free enterprise and entrepreneurship.

The Russian experience confirms the importance of freedom for capitalism and economic development. Otherwise the incumbents fear the loss of power and people the loss of security and sooner or later turn to authoritarian nationalism invoking the risk of social unrest or imaginary external threats.

These fears can only be overcome through genuine democracy and a move towards market capitalism, by opening up to foreign competition and achieving significant progress in complying with the six principles of market capitalism.

Communist state capitalism in China

China currently lives under a complex mishmash of the leftovers of communism, state capitalism, crony capitalism and laissez faire in the special economic zones. The communist party remains in power, but has progressively replaced the communist ideology by a mix of nationalism and mercantilism.

This new model has been very successful in terms of economic growth and attraction of foreign direct investment. Due to its huge population (1/4 of all humanity), China is now seen as a kind of manufacturing factory for the world.

Under Deng Xiaoping, China introduced in 1979 a policy to modernize their state owned companies by granting them more decision making power and the possibility of retaining a share of the profits. Along with this, marginal players operating outside the boundary of socialism were tolerated as long as they did not threaten the state sector or challenge the Party’s political power. The later spur a movement of entrepreneurial activity through private farming, township and village enterprises, private business in cities, and Special Economic Zones.

Three years after the Tiananmen Square Massacre the Communist Party officially endorsed the “socialist market economy” in 1992. This was followed from 1992 to 1994 by a second round of reforms aimed at creating a true internal market within China by abolishing or reducing the many trade and tax barriers at provincial borders and through the privatization of some state enterprises.

Two other important milestones were the membership of the World Trade Organization in 2001 and the constitutional amendment of 2004 recognizing the protection of private property.

The most radical departure from communism was the 1980 establishment of Special Economic Zones in Zhuhai, Xiamen, Shenzhen, and Shantou opened to foreign investment to experiment with the market economy, import advanced technology and managerial know-how, and sell goods to the global markets without undermining socialism in the rest of the country.

These were later extended to other regions and transformed China from a backward rural economy into the largest offshore processing center of the world. These areas attracted 70% of all foreign investment and contributed to over 70% of its exports. Foreign direct investment (FDI), including from Chinese living abroad, became the driver of an unprecedented export-led boom.

Source: UNCTAD World Investment Report 2014

There are two remarkable features in the evolution of FDI in China. Its ten-fold increase during the 1990-1994 second round of reforms that followed Tiananmen and the fact that since 2005 China also became a major source of FDI. Most of the Chinese outward investment went to Hong Kong and offshore centers but the Chinese have also invested significantly in Australia, South Africa and other African countries rich in natural resources.

These flows are an unquestionable testimony and consequence of the success of China’s mercantilist dualist economy – a state owned economy supported by the largest offshore territory in the world. Indeed, in 2006 its foreign currency reserves, already the world's biggest, topped $1 trillion. They are also the best proof of the power of capitalism as an economic system, even in its distorted version of state capitalism.

The question is to know whether it can survive in its current form and how it may evolve. Judging from previous experiences it is unlikely that the current model will last more than 30-40 years.

For instance, despite the initial economic role of the Chinese military complex and a rising nationalism one hopes that it will not derive into a Nazi/Japanese-like military adventure that would kill its early success and endanger world peace.

Similarly, any drive to obstruct the growth of joint stock companies while transforming the still large and inefficient state enterprises into some form of Tito’s Yugoslav model of self-managed enterprises is equally doomed to fail.

An evolution towards a Scandinavian model of state capitalism would be equally short-lived and does not seem feasible given the cultural differences between the Nordics and the Chinese. Likewise with a move towards a Mediterranean corporatist form.

The Chinese state capitalism is already showing signs of fatigue. As usual, these are more visible in disastrous investments abroad and in a fragile banking system. The latter is a time-bomb in waiting. Some, like C. E. Walter and J.T.H. Fraser (2009), alerted to how the banks are risking the retirement of an ageing population of more than 300 million people. The “heroic savings capacity of the Chinese people” are being used to finance loss making state companies as well as property bubbles and gigantic “Pharaonic” infrastructure investments.

Despite these worrisome signs, the Chinese people have embraced a commitment to education and learning from the Western countries experience without parallel in history. For instance, in the academic year 2010-2011 there were about 340 thousand students studying abroad, most of them financed by their own families. Indeed, in the USA and the UK there are now Universities that survive on Chinese students. These students are very competitive and will foster a new rise in entrepreneurship and modernization as long as their drive to succeed is not diverted towards nationalistic adventures.

Indeed, contrary to what some claim, I do not believe that the peaceful transition from communist state capitalism towards a democratic market capitalism needs a new “third way”. I totally disagree with the Nobel Laureate Ronald Coase predicament that: “Capitalism will be much more robust if it’s not a monopoly of the West, but flourishes in societies with different cultures, religions, histories, and political systems.”

It is not possible to achieve true market capitalism within a communist political system. However, the two transition processes can reinforce each other rather than deter one another.

By correcting the many deficiencies in the Chinese pillars of capitalism, from relying less in joint ventures and better protecting private property to the abolishment of internal restrictions to labor mobility and the opening up of its domestic financial market to achieve international capital mobility on both current and capital transactions, China would ease its political transition towards representative democracy and constitutional liberalism. For instance, a strong adherence to a system of limited liability will enforce credit prudence in the banking sector and might avoid the foreseeable problems with old age pensions.

In conclusion, China is at a crossroad. If she wants to preserve its recent economic success and avoid descending into other forms of state capitalism or to become a crony capitalist system of the Russian type it must fully embrace market capitalism. The more it does so the greater the chances of also managing a peaceful political transition.

Os libertários e os Vistos Gold: Uma nota adicional

Na controvérsia sobre o caso dos Vistos Gold, alguns libertários tentaram separar, e bem, a política de Vistos Gold da sua implementação por parte de funcionários eventualmente corruptos. Porém, alguns foram longe de mais ao defender a política de vistos com o argumento que o dinheiro é todo igual, quer seja obtido através das exportações para a China ou da venda de imobiliário em Portugal aos Chineses.

Já explicámos num outro post porque é que este argumento é falacioso quando estamos perante externalidades significativas. Porém, no caso dos vistos a falácia é ainda maior. De facto, não existe nenhum problema se um país decidir tributar os estrangeiros que o visitam. E, na verdade, quase todos o fazem usando expedientes vários desde o pagamento de selo nas autoestradas da Suíça até à exigência de comprar um visto de entrada para turismo nas fronteiras dos Países Bálticos e muitos outros países. Mais ainda, se esses "impostos" resultarem de um tratamento de reciprocidade ou não forem claramente discriminatórios então serão aceitáveis mesmo numa perspetiva libertária que defende a livre circulação de pessoas, bens e capitais.

Porém, a atual política de Vistos Gold, é totalmente contrária aos princípios liberais por três razões fundamentais:

1) Os Vistos Gold são mais valiosos do que um visto normal, não porque permitem a entrada no espaço de Schengen, mas porque garantem benefícios adicionais em termos de direitos de residência, investimento e tratamento fiscal que não são nem transparentes nem acessíveis a todos. Pelo contrário, parecem concebidos para atrair fundos de origem duvidosa ou para facilitar a evasão fiscal. Ora, não se percebe que Portugal continue a perseguir fiscalmente os seus cidadãos que investem no estrangeiro e ao mesmo tempo queira transformar-se num paraíso para branqueamento de capitais numa clara violação dos princípios de um estado de direito;

2) A “venda” dos vistos não é feita para benefício do erário público mas apenas para benefício de interesses particulares específicos. Se o estado concedesse os vistos a quem investisse em divida pública ainda se compreenderia pois não teriam externalidades negativas nos outros setores da sociedade e beneficiava a todos. Porém, como a sua utilização interessa apenas aos vendedores de imobiliário, os restantes sectores de atividade e os contribuintes ficam com a fatura dos custos de vizinhança indesejável, da má reputação nacional e dos encargos policiais e judiciais. A julgar pelos casos que já surgiram, parece que a hipotética receita adicional de 80 milhões de Euros de IMI não vai sequer ser suficiente para cobrir os últimos;

3) Finalmente, e mais importante sob o ponto de vista liberal, os Vistos Dourados violam claramente os princípios básicos das regras de concorrência internacional. Por exemplo, porquê conceder vistos a quem comprar casas e não a quem comprar sapatos ou recapitalizar empresas? É sabido que os chamados acordos de investimento geralmente distorcem o investimento internacional e por isso organizações como a OCDE têm pugnado pela sua regulamentação e Portugal só ganharia com isso.

Em conclusão, num mundo libertário não havia pura e simplesmente necessidade de vistos. Porém, no mundo atual onde muitos violam as regras de concorrência, a existência de vistos Gold só pode ser justificada em termos de reciprocidade e se comprovadamente os seus benefícios coletivos excederem os respetivos custos. Nunca em nome dos princípios liberais.

Multiculturalism and Democracy

We define here multiculturalism in a narrow sense to include only major differences based on ethnicity or religion, leaving aside other rivalries created by geography or ideology.

Theoretically, one may expect multiculturalism and democracy to conflict or even to be irreconcilable, because people tend to rally around single issue parties along ethnic or religious lines.

In reality we find democracy in large multicultural countries like India, a country where 20% of the population follows a religion different from Hinduism, where cohabit more than 700 tribes, with 18 official languages and 450 linguistic groups.

In contrast we currently have many smaller multicultural countries like Syria and Iraq being ravaged by civil war. At the same time we have totalitarian multicultural countries like China, also a big country, where less than 50% of the population follow Shenism-Taoism and Buddhism among the Han Chinese and the other 55 official ethnic groups speaking 292 languages. Despite Mandarin being the only national official language in China, other languages like the Cantonese are also official languages at the regional level.

The question then is: why is multiculturalism consistent with democracy, tolerance and diversity in some places but not elsewhere?

One explanation is that democracy was possible where there was an over-riding cultural inheritance; often originating from the leadership of independence movements. India, where Gandhi’s party – the National Congress Party – dominated the political life in the first 25 years of independence, is such an example.

What makes the Indian experience interesting is how such party dominance could be ended in a peaceful way. Indeed, democracy survived despite the emergence of a plethora of small regional and ethnic parties and, at times, being governed by a 14-party coalition.

Many factors might have contributed for such outcome, but among the most important we must certainly include the choice of a federal system of government, the adoption of a unified and independent judicial system and the acceptance of coalition governments instead of a more traditional two-party rotation system.

All those currently pushing to jump towards political union in the European Union must think about these factors.

Mob Management Style in Communist State Capitalism

The success of dictatorial forms of state capitalism often depends on the adoption of a mob management style.

As is well known, the various Mafia families run both legitimate and criminal activities. Often, what is not realized is that successful mafia bosses learned that they could not run the two types of business in the same way. When taking over lawful businesses they leave in charge the previous managers or employ new professional mangers (often reputable citizens) but appoint a minder to remind such managers that they cannot step out of line. The minder may be a deputy, a security guard or even a driver but the manager cannot doubt that he is the eyes and ears of the boss. This way, the mafia boss avoids turning his criminal associates into lousy managers that would ruin his business while preserving their loyalty by giving them limited power and rewards.

Maverick dictators like Hitler used the same management approach. He used his rogue bunch of SS criminals to instill fear among top civil servants but left intact the efficient German army and government bureaucracy, including the famous financier Hjalmar Schacht as president of the Reichsbank.

In the early 1990s, I personally observed the same policy being pursued by Kazakhstan’s communist-era leader and for-life President, Nursultan Nazarbayev. Before independence, the Kazakhs were predominantly poor and uneducated and the Russians dominated the entire government administration. Instead of packing them back to Moscow, he maintained their positions and privileges if they accepted the tutelage of his handpicked ethnic Kazakhs.

More recently, after the Chinese took over Macau from Portugal I observed the same policy in action. While the Chinese swiftly erased many of the Portuguese symbols in the territory, they kept most of the Portuguese running its administration. They simply appointed a party member from mainland China to monitor them, often despite the resentment among local ethnic Chinese.

Although this mob style of management can be successful in the short run, as it was in the early days of Nazi Germany and as it is now in China, I do not believe that it will be sustainable.

Its failure will happen not because the Mafia’s boss family or the Party Nomenklatura are prone to end up fighting over power (although this often happens), but because of a fundamental flaw of the mob management style.

Lasting management success requires three distinct qualities – investment acumen, business savvy and leadership.

While the mob management style guarantees leadership and may substitute business shrewdness by corruption, robbery or outright threat it can never achieve investment wisdom. It cannot provide the vision and flexibility necessary to anticipate opportunities and allocate capital efficiently. On the contrary, it will inevitably overspend in low return projects aimed at rewarding political clienteles or at securing the bosses’ own glorification and security apparatus.

Therefore, despite its recent success, we believe that communist state capitalism in China is doomed to fail. Unless, of course, the Chinese reverse their ways and move towards market capitalism and democracy.

Shameful European Leaders

In today’s news: “AP - The chief of Europe's bailout fund visited Beijing on Friday to discuss possible terms for a bond sale aimed at raising money from China and other non-European investors”.

After months of protracted squabbling over how to solve the Greek problem, all that Sarkozy and Merkel could come up with was a convoluted scheme that involves begging support from one of the remaining communist dictatorships – China.

To realize how outrageous their incapacity was, one must recall that the haircut or debt forgiveness that Greece, Ireland and Portugal needed at the start of the crisis was about 140 billion Euros, that is, the equivalent to the European Union budget for one year.

To understand how shameful it is to rely on the support of a non-democratic country, it is important to remember that China does not have a fully convertible currency, ranks 7 and 6 respectively in terms of political rights and civil liberties in the Freedom House index (a classification worse that of Iran and Rwanda) and according to Amnesty International is by far the country with the worst record in terms of executions which remain a state secret (again worse than Iran).

This is a dark episode in the history of European integration, and a shaking foundation for the future of the Euro as a currency.

We can’t all deleverage at the same time

We can’t all deleverage at the same time. That would be equivalent to everyone moving to the same spot in a sinking ship. It would capsize immediately. To see why, imagine this nightmare scenario: everywhere and everybody – banks, firms, governments and families – think that they are overleveraged (i.e. is excessively in debt) and decide to reduce debt (deleverage) simultaneously. Regardless of whether they are right or wrong about their excessive level of debt (in a previous post we explain why this is difficult to define); the simultaneous deleveraging could start the following fatal spiral.

Banks reduced excessive leverage by not renewing their lending facilities to firms; these add misery to injury and reduce further their leverage by firing workers and trying to sell assets. Braced with lower tax revenues and higher calls for unemployment insurance, governments answer by reducing public debt through higher taxes and massive cuts in spending; which reduce the revenue streams of banks, firms and families. Families, affected by higher unemployment, loss of revenues and fearing the future, decide also to deleverage by saving more or defaulting on their loans and by massive cuts in spending. This would reduce further the revenues of banks, firms and governments. Thus, to pursue their debt reducing objectives all would initiate a new round of cuts. This would cause a downward spiral of spending cuts that would stop only after the economy was brought to a complete halt and widespread defaults.

Wait, there must exist some break point on this spiral. After all, debts are owed to someone and those receiving the debt repayments must use their surplus money. Yes, but what if, fearing that same spiral, they decide to hoard it by holding cash, exchanging it for some remote currency (e.g. the Swiss Franc) or buying some relic from the past (e.g. gold). The first, if not offset by the Central Bank, would cause a major liquidity crisis accelerating the depression. The other two may lead to absurd bubbles whose anticipated bust would hang on the heads of enterprising people. So, not much hope here.

What if there is somewhere an unleveraged entity willing to finance an orderly sequence of deleveraging through saving and inflation? To a large extent that was the situation at the end of World War II, when the US played that role. Can’t China and other emerging nations play that role now? Probably not, because they do not have the economic size needed to face a much bigger problem. Moreover, by accepting a rescue from a dictatorship, the Western democratic nations would risk losing their freedom.

Indeed, despite some double counting, the following table shows that the net international investment position of the Western countries is less than 3% of their GDP, largely because of the high level of savings in Japan. Yet, Japan has the largest government debt as a percentage of GDP (226%).

Unfortunately, a deleveraging spiral may start without all countries being overleveraged. A debt crisis in one sector (e.g. the Government) may easily infect the remaining or be started off by a generalized downgrade by the rating agencies. In fact, some fear that the leading Western nations (US, European Union and Japan) may be in the brink of getting into such a depression spiral started by deleveraging in the sovereign debt sector. So they desperately need to find an alternative solution.

First, they must plug once and for all the holes emerging in the weaker economies of the Euro Area. Second, they must mobilize the spending power of the few remaining sectors with borrowing capacity. Finally, and most importantly, they must acknowledge that at least one entity must be allowed to continue to increase its leverage while the others deleverage.

Here the obvious choice must be the Government (except in Japan), due to its policy powers, but mostly because it is the only one that can borrow with very long maturities.

Thus, although we live in a peacetime period, sovereign debt limits in the US and Europe can be increased to levels close to those observed at the end of wars. That is, countries with national debts around 60% of GDP could borrow close to a 100%, while those already above the 100% should be allowed to borrow up to 180% of GDP.

The process, relying on multilateral facilities, should be sequential with an agreed calendar and coordinated at the level of the G3 group of countries (not the G20, which should only have a consultative role).