If you watch the Jane Austen TV series you may have wondered how much time her characters spend organizing their leisure activities. She wrote in an epoch when leisure was the only respectable occupation for the rich. In contrast, the poor had very little leisure. This sharp distinction between leisure and work had not been so marked before the industrial revolution and has been weakening again since then.
So, it is not surprising that in those days Engels and other writers suggested that leisure was a reaction or compensation for work. The concept was taken a step further by some economists who took leisure as the opposite of labor. The first was seen as contributing to utility while the second reduced utility. Therefore, for some the value of work could be measured by its opportunity cost in terms of leisure.
This simplistic view was then corrected by Jevons who defined labor as "any painful exertion of mind or body undergone partly or wholly with a view to future good." and shifted attention from work or leisure as such to the marginal units of utility derived from each activity. This view that a person stops working only when the marginal disutility of work exceeds the marginal utility of the consumption derived from additional work, still underlies today’s economic thinking.
However, as was suspected then and has been confirmed in our time, there is no clear cut relation between work and leisure. Psychologists have been measuring whether people take leisure as a spillover, as compensation or as simply neutral in relation to work. In general, they found some causality between work and leisure. But, it was too weak and too complex to warrant the economists’ assumptions.
This problem, together with the need to distinguish free time from leisure, voluntary from involuntary leisure, the reinterpretation of work as a playful activity, the results of human capital investment and exertion, etc. raise important challenges for economists. In particular, unless they have a coherent interpretation of all these issues it is unlikely that they can develop a sound theory to explain the relation between work in general and the motivation for paid work (wages). The later involves both the satisfaction provided by the fruits of work as well as that of sharing such results.
Monday, 12 September 2011
Work and Leisure
Labels:
Austen,
leisure,
motivation,
productive work,
wages,
work
Friday, 9 September 2011
António José Seguro: Guterres número três?
Afinal o Congresso do Partido Socialista que decorre este fim-de-semana não vai ser apenas a coroação do recém-eleito Secretário-Geral. O facto de Mário Soares regressar ao Congresso após uma ausência de mais de 25 anos é mais do que simbólico. Para se perceber isso é preciso regressar a meados da década de 1980.
Então, a até aí incontestável dominância do PS por Mário Soares foi quebrada com a ascensão ao poder do chamado ex-secretariado; de que António Guterres viria a ser o líder, e mais tarde Primeiro-ministro. Lembro-me que na época Guterres, um jovem promissor político, era dirigente da distrital de Castelo Branco onde tinha como “assessores” dois jovens – José Sócrates e António José Seguro. Quando chegou ao poder levou-os naturalmente para cargos governamentais da sua confiança pessoal em Lisboa.
Acontece porém que o promissor António Guterres veio a revelar-se um desastre enquanto Primeiro-ministro, por duas razões bastante diferentes. A primeira, do foro pessoal, resultou da desmotivação e apatia causadas pela doença fatídica da esposa. A segunda razão deve-se aos compromissos que fez para assegurar uma convivência pacífica com os Soaristas e antigos companheiros de IPE, entregando-lhes a condução das áreas governativas mais relevantes para o mundo dos negócios. Por isso, se tinha alguma visão para o país ela foi imediatamente ofuscada pela apatia e pelos compromissos com os interesses instalados.
É comum o número dois dos líderes fortes serem maus líderes, pelas razões explicadas na teoria das organizações, e como ficou claramente demonstrado com o Dr. Fernando Nogueira quando substituiu o Professor Cavaco Silva. Quando se trata de líderes desmotivados ou fracos a sua substituição pelos auxiliares é ainda mais desastrosa, como ficou cabalmente demonstrado com o Eng. José Sócrates. Quando se opta por escolher o número três, como o PS acaba de fazer, os auspícios não são nada bons.
Com a perspicácia que lhe é reconhecida, o Dr. Mário Soares percebe que o Guterrismo de António José Seguro não conseguirá sobreviver a quatro anos fora do poder. Por isso apareceu novamente, acompanhado de dois dos seus co-fundadores do PS, para tentar iniciar um processo de restauração do Soarismo sem Soares. Ora isso não augura nada de bom para o PS e para o país.
É verdade que o PS tem de se modernizar. Mas para isso precisa de perceber o que estava errado no falso liberalismo do Guterrismo e não de ressuscitar as múmias do republicanismo laico. Só um PS modernizado e mais liberal poderá fazer a oposição construtiva que o país precisa.
Então, a até aí incontestável dominância do PS por Mário Soares foi quebrada com a ascensão ao poder do chamado ex-secretariado; de que António Guterres viria a ser o líder, e mais tarde Primeiro-ministro. Lembro-me que na época Guterres, um jovem promissor político, era dirigente da distrital de Castelo Branco onde tinha como “assessores” dois jovens – José Sócrates e António José Seguro. Quando chegou ao poder levou-os naturalmente para cargos governamentais da sua confiança pessoal em Lisboa.
Acontece porém que o promissor António Guterres veio a revelar-se um desastre enquanto Primeiro-ministro, por duas razões bastante diferentes. A primeira, do foro pessoal, resultou da desmotivação e apatia causadas pela doença fatídica da esposa. A segunda razão deve-se aos compromissos que fez para assegurar uma convivência pacífica com os Soaristas e antigos companheiros de IPE, entregando-lhes a condução das áreas governativas mais relevantes para o mundo dos negócios. Por isso, se tinha alguma visão para o país ela foi imediatamente ofuscada pela apatia e pelos compromissos com os interesses instalados.
É comum o número dois dos líderes fortes serem maus líderes, pelas razões explicadas na teoria das organizações, e como ficou claramente demonstrado com o Dr. Fernando Nogueira quando substituiu o Professor Cavaco Silva. Quando se trata de líderes desmotivados ou fracos a sua substituição pelos auxiliares é ainda mais desastrosa, como ficou cabalmente demonstrado com o Eng. José Sócrates. Quando se opta por escolher o número três, como o PS acaba de fazer, os auspícios não são nada bons.
Com a perspicácia que lhe é reconhecida, o Dr. Mário Soares percebe que o Guterrismo de António José Seguro não conseguirá sobreviver a quatro anos fora do poder. Por isso apareceu novamente, acompanhado de dois dos seus co-fundadores do PS, para tentar iniciar um processo de restauração do Soarismo sem Soares. Ora isso não augura nada de bom para o PS e para o país.
É verdade que o PS tem de se modernizar. Mas para isso precisa de perceber o que estava errado no falso liberalismo do Guterrismo e não de ressuscitar as múmias do republicanismo laico. Só um PS modernizado e mais liberal poderá fazer a oposição construtiva que o país precisa.
Labels:
congresso,
Guterres,
Liberalismo,
liberalismo constitucional,
liberalismo socialista,
partido socialista,
PS,
seguro,
Soares
Thursday, 8 September 2011
Prós e Contras da Eleição Directa dos Líderes Partidários
Não é possível melhorar o funcionamento da democracia representativa sem aplicar os seus princípios básicos ao funcionamento dos próprios partidos. Entre estes princípios destaca-se o sufrágio universal, intransmissível e secreto.
A aplicação deste princípio na eleição directa dos líderes partidários tem méritos indiscutíveis. Desde logo porque dá voz a todos os membros do partido. Depois, porque torna públicas as disputas eleitorais dentro do partido; o que permite aos eleitores que não são membros do partido conhecer melhor as ideias dos seus futuros líderes e candidatos a governantes.
Alguns defensores deste princípio defendem também que a eleição por voto directo seja alargada aos restantes dirigentes nacionais, locais e regionais do Partido; e outros, vão ainda mais longe, propondo que as eleições sejam abertas a não membros do partido. Os primeiros têm razão e porventura isso será mesmo indispensável para assegurar a aplicação do princípio da eleição directa.
Já a proposta dos segundos resultaria numa perversão total do que devem os partidos políticos. Sob o ponto de vista do marketing a sua proposta parece razoável, uma vez que se trataria de replicar a técnica dos grupos de opinião (“focus groups”) usada nas vendas. Porém, os partidos não se podem transformar em simples máquinas de conquista do poder que buscam permanentemente o líder que mais rapidamente lhes permita chegar ao poder.
Quanto aos inconvenientes da eleição directa dos líderes eles ficaram claramente ilustrados nas recentes eleições ocorridas no Partido Socialista. O primeiro inconveniente é que permite perpetuar a eleição incontestável do líder quando o partido está no poder, mesmo quando ele é indesejado pela maioria dos eleitores.
Uma ilustração clara deste problema ocorreu com José Sócrates que alguns dias depois de ser eleito por mais de 90% dos membros do partido teve de se demitir por ser responsável pela maior derrota eleitoral do PS.
Um outro contra do sistema de eleição directa está no facilitar da eleição dos candidatos que tenham o apoio da máquina partidária. Este problema também foi claramente ilustrado na recente eleição de António José Seguro para líder do PS.
De igual modo, as eleições directas esvaziam o debate do Congresso subsequente para eleger os restantes órgãos do Partido, transformando o Congresso numa espécie de cerimónia de coroação do novo líder.
Isto é tanto mais grave quanto os partidos foram meras associações de interesses, onde os militantes se agregam em “baronatos” pessoais e não ideológicos. Entre nós, este problema é claramente visível no PSD, partido sem ideologia definida, onde as pessoas se dividem em Barrosistas, Santanistas, ou Cavaquistas em vez de se dividirem em liberais, sociais-democratas e democratas-cristãos.
Ponderados os prós e os contras do sistema de eleição directa, alguns partidos têm introduzido sistemas mistos. Por exemplo, em Inglaterra os principais partidos têm vários tipos de eleitores com votos diferentes desde os deputados aos sindicalistas e organizações de jovens.
No entanto, os sistemas mistos só funcionarão bem se houver uma clara distinção entre eleições para dirigentes partidários e eleições primárias para escolha de candidatos a eleições para cargos governativos. Por exemplo, nalguns partidos Ingleses os líderes das concelhias não podem ser candidatos a deputado ou presidente de câmara. Esses candidatos só podem ser propostos pela direcção nacional do partido; mas têm de ser aprovados pela concelhia que irão representar.
Em conclusão, a opção ou rejeição do método de eleição directa só deve ser tomada depois de definido o modelo de relacionamento entre as várias estruturas partidárias e a escolha de candidatos a cargos partidários ou governamentais.
A aplicação deste princípio na eleição directa dos líderes partidários tem méritos indiscutíveis. Desde logo porque dá voz a todos os membros do partido. Depois, porque torna públicas as disputas eleitorais dentro do partido; o que permite aos eleitores que não são membros do partido conhecer melhor as ideias dos seus futuros líderes e candidatos a governantes.
Alguns defensores deste princípio defendem também que a eleição por voto directo seja alargada aos restantes dirigentes nacionais, locais e regionais do Partido; e outros, vão ainda mais longe, propondo que as eleições sejam abertas a não membros do partido. Os primeiros têm razão e porventura isso será mesmo indispensável para assegurar a aplicação do princípio da eleição directa.
Já a proposta dos segundos resultaria numa perversão total do que devem os partidos políticos. Sob o ponto de vista do marketing a sua proposta parece razoável, uma vez que se trataria de replicar a técnica dos grupos de opinião (“focus groups”) usada nas vendas. Porém, os partidos não se podem transformar em simples máquinas de conquista do poder que buscam permanentemente o líder que mais rapidamente lhes permita chegar ao poder.
Quanto aos inconvenientes da eleição directa dos líderes eles ficaram claramente ilustrados nas recentes eleições ocorridas no Partido Socialista. O primeiro inconveniente é que permite perpetuar a eleição incontestável do líder quando o partido está no poder, mesmo quando ele é indesejado pela maioria dos eleitores.
Uma ilustração clara deste problema ocorreu com José Sócrates que alguns dias depois de ser eleito por mais de 90% dos membros do partido teve de se demitir por ser responsável pela maior derrota eleitoral do PS.
Um outro contra do sistema de eleição directa está no facilitar da eleição dos candidatos que tenham o apoio da máquina partidária. Este problema também foi claramente ilustrado na recente eleição de António José Seguro para líder do PS.
De igual modo, as eleições directas esvaziam o debate do Congresso subsequente para eleger os restantes órgãos do Partido, transformando o Congresso numa espécie de cerimónia de coroação do novo líder.
Isto é tanto mais grave quanto os partidos foram meras associações de interesses, onde os militantes se agregam em “baronatos” pessoais e não ideológicos. Entre nós, este problema é claramente visível no PSD, partido sem ideologia definida, onde as pessoas se dividem em Barrosistas, Santanistas, ou Cavaquistas em vez de se dividirem em liberais, sociais-democratas e democratas-cristãos.
Ponderados os prós e os contras do sistema de eleição directa, alguns partidos têm introduzido sistemas mistos. Por exemplo, em Inglaterra os principais partidos têm vários tipos de eleitores com votos diferentes desde os deputados aos sindicalistas e organizações de jovens.
No entanto, os sistemas mistos só funcionarão bem se houver uma clara distinção entre eleições para dirigentes partidários e eleições primárias para escolha de candidatos a eleições para cargos governativos. Por exemplo, nalguns partidos Ingleses os líderes das concelhias não podem ser candidatos a deputado ou presidente de câmara. Esses candidatos só podem ser propostos pela direcção nacional do partido; mas têm de ser aprovados pela concelhia que irão representar.
Em conclusão, a opção ou rejeição do método de eleição directa só deve ser tomada depois de definido o modelo de relacionamento entre as várias estruturas partidárias e a escolha de candidatos a cargos partidários ou governamentais.
Labels:
democracia representativa,
eleição directa,
eleições,
eleições primárias,
grupos de opinião,
partido políticos,
partido socialista,
psd,
seguro,
Sócrates,
sufrágio universal
Wednesday, 7 September 2011
Palestinians – With Friends Like These Who Needs Enemies?
The old say that a nation gets the leaders they deserve should not be applied lightly to the Palestinians or any other nation. Truly, in recent history, they have been ruled by a series of terrorist and corrupt leaders. But in a non-democratic society people cannot truly choose their leaders, just like in a gang controlled slam its poor residents cannot be blamed for their criminal rulers.
However the saddest fact about the Palestinians, a poor migrant people, is the way they have literally been used as cannon fodder in the many Middle East conflicts.
The most well known was the Israeli-Arab conflict, because one third of the estimated 10 million Palestinians live in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip areas of Israel. The other third live in Jordan (where they account for half of the population) and in Israel proper. The final third are dispersed throughout the world with large numbers in conflict-prone Syria and Lebanon.
For many years the oil-producing Arab countries used the Palestinians' plight for a nation state to stir up the fear of disruptions in oil supplies and raise the price of oil. There is even a bad taste joke saying that the Arabs will fight for the Palestinians to the last Palestinian.
Then the theocratic rulers of Iran, in their drive the rebuild an ancient Caliphate or Persian Empire, decided to take over their cause. They did so by sponsoring the Hezbollah and Hamas terrorist camps in Syria, Lebanon and Gaza.
Fortunately for the Palestinians, the oil suppliers are now more spread all over the world and the alternative energy industries in the oil-importing countries are the main lobbyists to keep the prices higher. Likewise the Al Qaeda and Iran-sponsored terrorists are now largely discredited even among Arabs.
However, while the embryonic Arab Spring Revolution brought a new hope for a democratic era in the region, a dangerous new “savior” for the Palestinians appeared in the scene.
We refer to the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Erdogan, the maverick leader of the Islamist AK party that now rules Turkey. Seizing the current political vacuum in Egypt, Erdogan is moving swiftly to assert himself in the Arab world by taking a hostile stance against Israel. This can only be bad news for the poor Palestinians. They cannot become once more cannon fodder in another bid to restore an ancient empire, this time the Ottoman.
In a globalised and free world, people will no longer accept new empires, especially religion-driven, whether by Christians or Muslims. So all attempts by any of the largest Islamic nations (Indonesians, Turks, Persians, Saudis or Egyptians) or sects (e.g. Al-Qaeda) to enlarge their area of influence by reclaiming ancient caliphates or empires is doomed to fail and can only harm the Palestinians.
However the saddest fact about the Palestinians, a poor migrant people, is the way they have literally been used as cannon fodder in the many Middle East conflicts.
The most well known was the Israeli-Arab conflict, because one third of the estimated 10 million Palestinians live in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip areas of Israel. The other third live in Jordan (where they account for half of the population) and in Israel proper. The final third are dispersed throughout the world with large numbers in conflict-prone Syria and Lebanon.
For many years the oil-producing Arab countries used the Palestinians' plight for a nation state to stir up the fear of disruptions in oil supplies and raise the price of oil. There is even a bad taste joke saying that the Arabs will fight for the Palestinians to the last Palestinian.
Then the theocratic rulers of Iran, in their drive the rebuild an ancient Caliphate or Persian Empire, decided to take over their cause. They did so by sponsoring the Hezbollah and Hamas terrorist camps in Syria, Lebanon and Gaza.
Fortunately for the Palestinians, the oil suppliers are now more spread all over the world and the alternative energy industries in the oil-importing countries are the main lobbyists to keep the prices higher. Likewise the Al Qaeda and Iran-sponsored terrorists are now largely discredited even among Arabs.
However, while the embryonic Arab Spring Revolution brought a new hope for a democratic era in the region, a dangerous new “savior” for the Palestinians appeared in the scene.
We refer to the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Erdogan, the maverick leader of the Islamist AK party that now rules Turkey. Seizing the current political vacuum in Egypt, Erdogan is moving swiftly to assert himself in the Arab world by taking a hostile stance against Israel. This can only be bad news for the poor Palestinians. They cannot become once more cannon fodder in another bid to restore an ancient empire, this time the Ottoman.
In a globalised and free world, people will no longer accept new empires, especially religion-driven, whether by Christians or Muslims. So all attempts by any of the largest Islamic nations (Indonesians, Turks, Persians, Saudis or Egyptians) or sects (e.g. Al-Qaeda) to enlarge their area of influence by reclaiming ancient caliphates or empires is doomed to fail and can only harm the Palestinians.
Labels:
Ancient Empires,
Arab uprising,
Arabs,
Caliphate,
Erdogan,
globalization,
Israel,
Muslims,
Ottoman Empire,
Palestinians,
religion,
representative democracy,
Turkey
Monday, 5 September 2011
Quem é Rico em Portugal?
Quando toca a pagar impostos ninguém se considera rico. Mas afinal quem é rico em Portugal? Essa classificação não é fácil, porque podemos usar três critérios fundamentalmente diferentes – os gastos, o património e o rendimento – que dariam certamente resultados muito diferentes.
Na medida em que as Finanças só publicam dados sobre os rendimentos, e estes são reportados por agregado familiar independentemente do número de membros que o agregado tem, temos de usar estes dados para classificar os ricos Portugueses. Apenas nos resta definir o limiar a partir do qual uma família é considerada rica.
Geralmente, consideram-se ricos os 10%, 5% ou 1% com maior rendimento, dependendo do grau de generosidade que se queira usar. Pessoalmente, preferimos usar os 5%; porém como os dados Finanças (ver tabela que se segue) usam escalões de rendimento em vez de percentuais iremos classificar como ricas as 52036 famílias (isto é 1.12% do total das famílias) que declararam em 2009 mais de 100 mil Euros de rendimento anual.
Agora já sabe, se em 2009 declarou mais de 100 mil Euros então está entre os mais ricos.
No entanto, sentir-se rico ou não é muito relativo. Por exemplo, o mais pobre entre os riscos considera-se pobre ou remediado quando comparado com o mais rico dos ricos. Se ganhar apenas 100 mil Euros quando pensa no milhão e meio declarado por Ricardo Salgado não se sente rico, tal como Américo Amorim, o Português mais rico, com uma fortuna estimada em 2 mil milhões de dólares, não se sente rico quando comparado com Warren Buffett cuja fortuna é 40 vezes maior.
Quando analisamos o quanto pobres e ricos pagam em impostos sobre o rendimento (ver tabela seguinte) constatamos que entre os 1.9 milhões (42.5%) de famílias mais pobres apenas uma pequena parte paga impostos que no total contribuem com menos de 0.7% para o total da receita; enquanto os 52 mil ricos pagam 28.3%.
Comparando com outros países, constatamos que ainda assim em Portugal os mais ricos pagam uma percentagem menor dos impostos sobre o rendimento. No entanto, o que é chocante entre nós é o esforço exorbitante que é pedido à classe média-alta (com rendimentos anuais entre 50 e 100 mil Euros). Estas 227 mil famílias (4.9% do total) pagam 21.3% do total dos impostos arrecadados (isto é, pagam quase tanto como os 52 mil ricos). Elas são as verdadeiras vítimas do nosso sistema fiscal.
Num país pobre como o nosso também a maioria dos ricos são necessariamente “relativamente” pobres. Por isso, muitos dos nossos políticos, da esquerda à direita (e.g. Mário Soares do PS, o meu homónimo Marques Mendes do PSD e Lobo Xavier do CDS), que na semana passada se manifestaram contra o adicional extraordinário para o escalão mais elevado do imposto sobre o rendimento ou são demagogos ou desconhecem a nossa realidade.
Os Portugueses ricos não são apenas a meia dúzia de bilionários. De facto, o adicional só pecou pela sua timidez; pois os 153 mil Euros da taxa máxima afectada apenas abrangem uma fracção das 52 mil famílias (1.12%) com rendimento mais elevado em Portugal.
Na medida em que as Finanças só publicam dados sobre os rendimentos, e estes são reportados por agregado familiar independentemente do número de membros que o agregado tem, temos de usar estes dados para classificar os ricos Portugueses. Apenas nos resta definir o limiar a partir do qual uma família é considerada rica.
Geralmente, consideram-se ricos os 10%, 5% ou 1% com maior rendimento, dependendo do grau de generosidade que se queira usar. Pessoalmente, preferimos usar os 5%; porém como os dados Finanças (ver tabela que se segue) usam escalões de rendimento em vez de percentuais iremos classificar como ricas as 52036 famílias (isto é 1.12% do total das famílias) que declararam em 2009 mais de 100 mil Euros de rendimento anual.
Agora já sabe, se em 2009 declarou mais de 100 mil Euros então está entre os mais ricos.
No entanto, sentir-se rico ou não é muito relativo. Por exemplo, o mais pobre entre os riscos considera-se pobre ou remediado quando comparado com o mais rico dos ricos. Se ganhar apenas 100 mil Euros quando pensa no milhão e meio declarado por Ricardo Salgado não se sente rico, tal como Américo Amorim, o Português mais rico, com uma fortuna estimada em 2 mil milhões de dólares, não se sente rico quando comparado com Warren Buffett cuja fortuna é 40 vezes maior.
Quando analisamos o quanto pobres e ricos pagam em impostos sobre o rendimento (ver tabela seguinte) constatamos que entre os 1.9 milhões (42.5%) de famílias mais pobres apenas uma pequena parte paga impostos que no total contribuem com menos de 0.7% para o total da receita; enquanto os 52 mil ricos pagam 28.3%.
Comparando com outros países, constatamos que ainda assim em Portugal os mais ricos pagam uma percentagem menor dos impostos sobre o rendimento. No entanto, o que é chocante entre nós é o esforço exorbitante que é pedido à classe média-alta (com rendimentos anuais entre 50 e 100 mil Euros). Estas 227 mil famílias (4.9% do total) pagam 21.3% do total dos impostos arrecadados (isto é, pagam quase tanto como os 52 mil ricos). Elas são as verdadeiras vítimas do nosso sistema fiscal.
Num país pobre como o nosso também a maioria dos ricos são necessariamente “relativamente” pobres. Por isso, muitos dos nossos políticos, da esquerda à direita (e.g. Mário Soares do PS, o meu homónimo Marques Mendes do PSD e Lobo Xavier do CDS), que na semana passada se manifestaram contra o adicional extraordinário para o escalão mais elevado do imposto sobre o rendimento ou são demagogos ou desconhecem a nossa realidade.
Os Portugueses ricos não são apenas a meia dúzia de bilionários. De facto, o adicional só pecou pela sua timidez; pois os 153 mil Euros da taxa máxima afectada apenas abrangem uma fracção das 52 mil famílias (1.12%) com rendimento mais elevado em Portugal.
Labels:
Américo Amorim,
democracia representativa,
espírito científico,
impostos sobre o rendimento,
justiça fiscal,
Lobo Xavier,
Marques Mendes,
Portugal,
Ricardo Salgdo,
ricos,
Soares,
Tributação
Friday, 2 September 2011
2º Alerta ao Governo: Não Escondam a Realidade aos Portugueses
Ainda que de forma tímida, parece que o meu primeiro alerta ao Governo para demonstrar aos Portugueses que se preocupa com o sentimento de justiça foi ouvido. Finalmente, foi anunciado um imposto extraordinário em sede de IRS e IRC para as pessoas e empresas com maiores rendimentos. Fazemos votos de que não se fique por aqui.
Entretanto, estive a ouvir a interpelação ao Ministro das Finanças na Assembleia da República e fiquei perplexo por verificar que o Prof. Vítor Gaspar parece estar a aprender rapidamente a técnica parlamentar de responder sem nada dizer. Senhor Ministro, não siga esse caminho pois o povo não conseguirá distingui-lo dos restantes políticos. Para acreditar que há realmente mudança o povo Português precisa de transparência inequívoca na forma e no conteúdo.
Tomemos um exemplo simples: O seu Documento de Estratégia Orçamental para 2011-2015, faz-me lembrar os trabalhos dos meus alunos cábulas que para disfarçarem o pouco que estudaram enchem os respectivos relatórios de “palha” irrelevante. O documento tem 65 páginas, das quais apenas 23 tratam das medidas de consolidação orçamental. Note-se que a Troika já elencou a maior parte dessas medidas nas 17 páginas (na versão em inglês) dos pontos 1 e 3 do seu Memorando. Para que servem as 6 páginas adicionais?
Eis o que eu aconselharia aos meus alunos: a) sintetizem o enquadramento macroeconómico numa página, remetendo o resto para anexo; b) idem para a história recente das finanças públicas; c) expliquem em duas ou três páginas porque é que o país precisa de tomar adicionais ao negociado com a Troika; d) enumerem as medidas acordadas com a Troika, descrevendo como vão ser aplicadas; e, paralelamente, expliquem as medidas adicionais; e) apresentem uma estimativa do impacto estrutural e macroeconómico da consolidação orçamental.
Tratando-se de um documento de estratégia, é óbvio que não tem de enumerar os serviços que vão ter de cortar nisto ou naquilo. Porém, esperar-se-ia que tivesse uma quantificação dos cortes por ministério e/ou natureza/função das despesas.
Num contexto de abrandamento da economia mundial é trágico que o nosso país, devido ao seu endividamento, tenha de prosseguir políticas pró cíclicas agravando ainda mais a recessão económica em que já se encontra. É provável que em 2012 o PIB diminua em cerca de 4%; com o consequente aumento do desemprego.
Este cenário não deve ser escondido dos Portugueses e muito menos servir para criar a ilusão de que cumprimos os anunciados cortes da despesa. Os Portugueses precisam de saber a verdade e de acreditar que o sacrifício que vão fazer servirá para corrigir os nossos desequilíbrios estruturais e relançar a economia em bases sólidas e mais justas.
Entretanto, estive a ouvir a interpelação ao Ministro das Finanças na Assembleia da República e fiquei perplexo por verificar que o Prof. Vítor Gaspar parece estar a aprender rapidamente a técnica parlamentar de responder sem nada dizer. Senhor Ministro, não siga esse caminho pois o povo não conseguirá distingui-lo dos restantes políticos. Para acreditar que há realmente mudança o povo Português precisa de transparência inequívoca na forma e no conteúdo.
Tomemos um exemplo simples: O seu Documento de Estratégia Orçamental para 2011-2015, faz-me lembrar os trabalhos dos meus alunos cábulas que para disfarçarem o pouco que estudaram enchem os respectivos relatórios de “palha” irrelevante. O documento tem 65 páginas, das quais apenas 23 tratam das medidas de consolidação orçamental. Note-se que a Troika já elencou a maior parte dessas medidas nas 17 páginas (na versão em inglês) dos pontos 1 e 3 do seu Memorando. Para que servem as 6 páginas adicionais?
Eis o que eu aconselharia aos meus alunos: a) sintetizem o enquadramento macroeconómico numa página, remetendo o resto para anexo; b) idem para a história recente das finanças públicas; c) expliquem em duas ou três páginas porque é que o país precisa de tomar adicionais ao negociado com a Troika; d) enumerem as medidas acordadas com a Troika, descrevendo como vão ser aplicadas; e, paralelamente, expliquem as medidas adicionais; e) apresentem uma estimativa do impacto estrutural e macroeconómico da consolidação orçamental.
Tratando-se de um documento de estratégia, é óbvio que não tem de enumerar os serviços que vão ter de cortar nisto ou naquilo. Porém, esperar-se-ia que tivesse uma quantificação dos cortes por ministério e/ou natureza/função das despesas.
Num contexto de abrandamento da economia mundial é trágico que o nosso país, devido ao seu endividamento, tenha de prosseguir políticas pró cíclicas agravando ainda mais a recessão económica em que já se encontra. É provável que em 2012 o PIB diminua em cerca de 4%; com o consequente aumento do desemprego.
Este cenário não deve ser escondido dos Portugueses e muito menos servir para criar a ilusão de que cumprimos os anunciados cortes da despesa. Os Portugueses precisam de saber a verdade e de acreditar que o sacrifício que vão fazer servirá para corrigir os nossos desequilíbrios estruturais e relançar a economia em bases sólidas e mais justas.
Labels:
capitalismo de mercado,
consolidação orçamental,
Estratégia Orçamental,
Ministro das Finanças,
Orçamento de Estado,
programa de ajustamento,
Troika,
Vitor Gaspar
Wednesday, 31 August 2011
The Anatomy of Power Inside Political Parties
Before we discuss how to apply the principles of representative democracy to political parties, we need to understand the allocation of power inside them. Power struggles within organizations in general and within parties have many features in common studied in organizational theory.
One feature that is salient in political parties is the extreme greed for power, well expressed in the popular saying: “In the other parties I have adversaries; in my party I have enemies”. Another distinctive feature of party organizations is that members tend to be aligned in groups. However, this form of tribal or feudal organization often ends up in two opposite forms of power sharing. In some parties the contenders defeated are selectively invited to join the winners while in others they ostracized into permanent opposition or expulsion.
Such groups are formed in many different ways, including the sharing of ideals or ideology, but generally they fight for power over mundane issues. For instance, the most common is to fight over some obscure amendment to the Party’s charter, which is immediately forgotten once the fight is over. Another bizarre form of fight for succession in communist parties was over the organization of the burial ceremony of deceased leaders. Many leaders also run the parties in a courtier system and therefore give a lot of power to those with the door keys to the courtroom.
In my brief experience as member of a Party Directorate I identified three major sources of power within political parties. These are the Leader’s entourage, the Administration in charge of liaison with the local sections of the party and the Fundraisers. The Leader’s Cabinet is usually made up of at least four or five people: his head of cabinet and secretary, media and intelligence liaison officers and the head of administration.
Among them they manage a network of official and unofficial political advisers. Their role can be quite distinct and there are those who do not seat in the party’s elected bodies and some who are not even party members. There are many that come and go as policies shift and there a few with lasting influence over the leader. The later are the most powerful and are usually on the unofficial or undisclosed list of advisers, often including family members and party financiers. The Cabinet and Administration heads are essential for the relationship of the Party Leader with the party members and interest groups in general.
The second-in-command is usually the Head of Administration (with a title of Secretary-General, Chief of Staff or similar). Because of the role he plays in the control over the party membership, he is essential for the reelection of the leader. His influence derives from the power to distribute resources among the various sections of the party, and, most importantly, from his role in organizing all party events and elections. However, the way the party is organized in terms of local sections and the process of selection of its members to national elections may mitigate the influence of the Head of Administration.
Finally, the third most influential members are those responsible for fund raising. These may include three different types of fund raisers: a Party Treasurer, who in some cases has a simple accounting role without political influence, wealthy supporters of the Party, who are also some of the biggest party donors, and non-donor fund raisers. The second may have some influence in policy setting, but the later are the most active and influential in selling political favors and legislative votes to special interest groups. Among these we often find some obscure and dodgy characters that the parties reward with sinecures or by letting them take a cut in the donations received.
So it is against this background of organizational power within parties that any regulation aimed at improving representative democracy within parties has to be discussed. This will need to consider the relationship within local sections of the party and their role in the selection of candidates for national office as well as the role of the various national bodies representing the party.
One feature that is salient in political parties is the extreme greed for power, well expressed in the popular saying: “In the other parties I have adversaries; in my party I have enemies”. Another distinctive feature of party organizations is that members tend to be aligned in groups. However, this form of tribal or feudal organization often ends up in two opposite forms of power sharing. In some parties the contenders defeated are selectively invited to join the winners while in others they ostracized into permanent opposition or expulsion.
Such groups are formed in many different ways, including the sharing of ideals or ideology, but generally they fight for power over mundane issues. For instance, the most common is to fight over some obscure amendment to the Party’s charter, which is immediately forgotten once the fight is over. Another bizarre form of fight for succession in communist parties was over the organization of the burial ceremony of deceased leaders. Many leaders also run the parties in a courtier system and therefore give a lot of power to those with the door keys to the courtroom.
In my brief experience as member of a Party Directorate I identified three major sources of power within political parties. These are the Leader’s entourage, the Administration in charge of liaison with the local sections of the party and the Fundraisers. The Leader’s Cabinet is usually made up of at least four or five people: his head of cabinet and secretary, media and intelligence liaison officers and the head of administration.
Among them they manage a network of official and unofficial political advisers. Their role can be quite distinct and there are those who do not seat in the party’s elected bodies and some who are not even party members. There are many that come and go as policies shift and there a few with lasting influence over the leader. The later are the most powerful and are usually on the unofficial or undisclosed list of advisers, often including family members and party financiers. The Cabinet and Administration heads are essential for the relationship of the Party Leader with the party members and interest groups in general.
The second-in-command is usually the Head of Administration (with a title of Secretary-General, Chief of Staff or similar). Because of the role he plays in the control over the party membership, he is essential for the reelection of the leader. His influence derives from the power to distribute resources among the various sections of the party, and, most importantly, from his role in organizing all party events and elections. However, the way the party is organized in terms of local sections and the process of selection of its members to national elections may mitigate the influence of the Head of Administration.
Finally, the third most influential members are those responsible for fund raising. These may include three different types of fund raisers: a Party Treasurer, who in some cases has a simple accounting role without political influence, wealthy supporters of the Party, who are also some of the biggest party donors, and non-donor fund raisers. The second may have some influence in policy setting, but the later are the most active and influential in selling political favors and legislative votes to special interest groups. Among these we often find some obscure and dodgy characters that the parties reward with sinecures or by letting them take a cut in the donations received.
So it is against this background of organizational power within parties that any regulation aimed at improving representative democracy within parties has to be discussed. This will need to consider the relationship within local sections of the party and their role in the selection of candidates for national office as well as the role of the various national bodies representing the party.
Labels:
elections,
fund raising,
organizational theories,
political parties,
power anatomy,
representative democracy
Tuesday, 30 August 2011
As modas Parisienses e os Impostos de Américo Amorim e Belmiro de Azevedo
A comunicação social Portuguesa, sempre ávida das novidades Parisienses, tem dado grande destaque à chamada tributação das grandes fortunas. Porém esquece-se que em matéria de tributação a França não é exemplo para ninguém, como se pode facilmente depreender dos seguintes quadros extraídos da base de dados da OCDE.
No que respeita à taxa máxima do imposto sobre o rendimento, a França já tem uma das taxas mais elevadas. No entanto, é ainda assim inferior à da Alemanha, país com o qual acordou recentemente fazer uma harmonização fiscal. Por isso o pedido dos 16 milionários para pagarem mais impostos foi apenas uma manobra demagógica de antecipação ao que o Governo já tinha decidido. Note-se que como o limiar de aplicação da taxa máxima é muito inferior ao Alemão pode acontecer que ainda venham a pagar menos impostos.
No que toca à tributação dos rendimentos de capital os milionários Franceses têm ainda muito mais a ganhar com a harmonização fiscal com a Alemanha, pois a França tem a taxa global mais elevada de toda a OCDE (57.8%).
Nestes dois impostos Portugal tem taxas elevadas, quando comparadas com países de baixa tributação, mas ainda assim mais baixas do que as Francesas, pelo que não temos nada a aprender com eles nesta matéria. No entanto, o debate também trouxe para a ribalta a questão da tributação do património das grandes fortunas referindo-se com frequência os casos de Belmiro de Azevedo e Américo Amorim.
Ora esses dois empresários são um bom exemplo dos desequilíbrios que estão mal no nosso sistema fiscal. O primeiro terá declarado um rendimento anual de um milhão e cem mil Euros dos quais pagou ao Estado cerca de 500 milhões de Euros em IRS. Enquanto o segundo terá declarado cerca de 250 mil Euros dos quais teria pago em IRS cerca de setenta e cinco mil Euros. Ora é sabido que quem é dono da própria empresa pode receber salários ou dividendos sobre os lucros da empresa consoante o regime fiscal que lhe seja mais favorável. Mas quem define as regras é o Estado.
Como ambos são bons gestores escolheram a sua melhor opção de acordo com as regras em vigor. Por exemplo, como Belmiro de Azevedo detém apenas 50% das suas empresas faz sentido fazer-se pagar uma remuneração elevada porque 50% dessa remuneração será paga pelos outros accionistas (pode-se dizer-se que foram eles a pagar o seu IRS). Pelo contrário, Américo Amorim em geral detém participações mais elevadas nas suas empresas pelo que não tem vantagem em pagar-se uma remuneração mais elevada.
Se estes incentivos bem como outros relembrados pelo Presidente da República como a ausência de tributação sobre as heranças estão errados, cabe ao Estado corrigi-los. Não de forma apressada no contexto de uma tributação adicional de emergência, mas no âmbito de uma reforma fiscal bem estudada e ponderada.
Para corrigir a injustiça criada pelo imposto extraordinário sobre o décimo terceiro mês basta alargar esse imposto aos restantes rendimentos e, se necessário, baixar o limiar de rendimento a partir do qual se aplica a taxa máxima do IRS.
No que respeita à taxa máxima do imposto sobre o rendimento, a França já tem uma das taxas mais elevadas. No entanto, é ainda assim inferior à da Alemanha, país com o qual acordou recentemente fazer uma harmonização fiscal. Por isso o pedido dos 16 milionários para pagarem mais impostos foi apenas uma manobra demagógica de antecipação ao que o Governo já tinha decidido. Note-se que como o limiar de aplicação da taxa máxima é muito inferior ao Alemão pode acontecer que ainda venham a pagar menos impostos.
No que toca à tributação dos rendimentos de capital os milionários Franceses têm ainda muito mais a ganhar com a harmonização fiscal com a Alemanha, pois a França tem a taxa global mais elevada de toda a OCDE (57.8%).
Nestes dois impostos Portugal tem taxas elevadas, quando comparadas com países de baixa tributação, mas ainda assim mais baixas do que as Francesas, pelo que não temos nada a aprender com eles nesta matéria. No entanto, o debate também trouxe para a ribalta a questão da tributação do património das grandes fortunas referindo-se com frequência os casos de Belmiro de Azevedo e Américo Amorim.
Ora esses dois empresários são um bom exemplo dos desequilíbrios que estão mal no nosso sistema fiscal. O primeiro terá declarado um rendimento anual de um milhão e cem mil Euros dos quais pagou ao Estado cerca de 500 milhões de Euros em IRS. Enquanto o segundo terá declarado cerca de 250 mil Euros dos quais teria pago em IRS cerca de setenta e cinco mil Euros. Ora é sabido que quem é dono da própria empresa pode receber salários ou dividendos sobre os lucros da empresa consoante o regime fiscal que lhe seja mais favorável. Mas quem define as regras é o Estado.
Como ambos são bons gestores escolheram a sua melhor opção de acordo com as regras em vigor. Por exemplo, como Belmiro de Azevedo detém apenas 50% das suas empresas faz sentido fazer-se pagar uma remuneração elevada porque 50% dessa remuneração será paga pelos outros accionistas (pode-se dizer-se que foram eles a pagar o seu IRS). Pelo contrário, Américo Amorim em geral detém participações mais elevadas nas suas empresas pelo que não tem vantagem em pagar-se uma remuneração mais elevada.
Se estes incentivos bem como outros relembrados pelo Presidente da República como a ausência de tributação sobre as heranças estão errados, cabe ao Estado corrigi-los. Não de forma apressada no contexto de uma tributação adicional de emergência, mas no âmbito de uma reforma fiscal bem estudada e ponderada.
Para corrigir a injustiça criada pelo imposto extraordinário sobre o décimo terceiro mês basta alargar esse imposto aos restantes rendimentos e, se necessário, baixar o limiar de rendimento a partir do qual se aplica a taxa máxima do IRS.
Labels:
Américo Amorim,
Belmiro de Azevedo,
capitalismo de mercado,
França,
justiça,
milionários,
Paris,
Portugal,
reforma fiscal,
Tributação das fortunas
Monday, 29 August 2011
We can’t all deleverage at the same time
We can’t all deleverage at the same time. That would be equivalent to everyone moving to the same spot in a sinking ship. It would capsize immediately. To see why, imagine this nightmare scenario: everywhere and everybody – banks, firms, governments and families – think that they are overleveraged (i.e. is excessively in debt) and decide to reduce debt (deleverage) simultaneously. Regardless of whether they are right or wrong about their excessive level of debt (in a previous post we explain why this is difficult to define); the simultaneous deleveraging could start the following fatal spiral.
Banks reduced excessive leverage by not renewing their lending facilities to firms; these add misery to injury and reduce further their leverage by firing workers and trying to sell assets. Braced with lower tax revenues and higher calls for unemployment insurance, governments answer by reducing public debt through higher taxes and massive cuts in spending; which reduce the revenue streams of banks, firms and families. Families, affected by higher unemployment, loss of revenues and fearing the future, decide also to deleverage by saving more or defaulting on their loans and by massive cuts in spending. This would reduce further the revenues of banks, firms and governments. Thus, to pursue their debt reducing objectives all would initiate a new round of cuts. This would cause a downward spiral of spending cuts that would stop only after the economy was brought to a complete halt and widespread defaults.
Wait, there must exist some break point on this spiral. After all, debts are owed to someone and those receiving the debt repayments must use their surplus money. Yes, but what if, fearing that same spiral, they decide to hoard it by holding cash, exchanging it for some remote currency (e.g. the Swiss Franc) or buying some relic from the past (e.g. gold). The first, if not offset by the Central Bank, would cause a major liquidity crisis accelerating the depression. The other two may lead to absurd bubbles whose anticipated bust would hang on the heads of enterprising people. So, not much hope here.
What if there is somewhere an unleveraged entity willing to finance an orderly sequence of deleveraging through saving and inflation? To a large extent that was the situation at the end of World War II, when the US played that role. Can’t China and other emerging nations play that role now? Probably not, because they do not have the economic size needed to face a much bigger problem. Moreover, by accepting a rescue from a dictatorship, the Western democratic nations would risk losing their freedom.
Indeed, despite some double counting, the following table shows that the net international investment position of the Western countries is less than 3% of their GDP, largely because of the high level of savings in Japan. Yet, Japan has the largest government debt as a percentage of GDP (226%).
Unfortunately, a deleveraging spiral may start without all countries being overleveraged. A debt crisis in one sector (e.g. the Government) may easily infect the remaining or be started off by a generalized downgrade by the rating agencies. In fact, some fear that the leading Western nations (US, European Union and Japan) may be in the brink of getting into such a depression spiral started by deleveraging in the sovereign debt sector. So they desperately need to find an alternative solution.
First, they must plug once and for all the holes emerging in the weaker economies of the Euro Area. Second, they must mobilize the spending power of the few remaining sectors with borrowing capacity. Finally, and most importantly, they must acknowledge that at least one entity must be allowed to continue to increase its leverage while the others deleverage.
Here the obvious choice must be the Government (except in Japan), due to its policy powers, but mostly because it is the only one that can borrow with very long maturities.
Thus, although we live in a peacetime period, sovereign debt limits in the US and Europe can be increased to levels close to those observed at the end of wars. That is, countries with national debts around 60% of GDP could borrow close to a 100%, while those already above the 100% should be allowed to borrow up to 180% of GDP.
The process, relying on multilateral facilities, should be sequential with an agreed calendar and coordinated at the level of the G3 group of countries (not the G20, which should only have a consultative role).
Banks reduced excessive leverage by not renewing their lending facilities to firms; these add misery to injury and reduce further their leverage by firing workers and trying to sell assets. Braced with lower tax revenues and higher calls for unemployment insurance, governments answer by reducing public debt through higher taxes and massive cuts in spending; which reduce the revenue streams of banks, firms and families. Families, affected by higher unemployment, loss of revenues and fearing the future, decide also to deleverage by saving more or defaulting on their loans and by massive cuts in spending. This would reduce further the revenues of banks, firms and governments. Thus, to pursue their debt reducing objectives all would initiate a new round of cuts. This would cause a downward spiral of spending cuts that would stop only after the economy was brought to a complete halt and widespread defaults.
Wait, there must exist some break point on this spiral. After all, debts are owed to someone and those receiving the debt repayments must use their surplus money. Yes, but what if, fearing that same spiral, they decide to hoard it by holding cash, exchanging it for some remote currency (e.g. the Swiss Franc) or buying some relic from the past (e.g. gold). The first, if not offset by the Central Bank, would cause a major liquidity crisis accelerating the depression. The other two may lead to absurd bubbles whose anticipated bust would hang on the heads of enterprising people. So, not much hope here.
What if there is somewhere an unleveraged entity willing to finance an orderly sequence of deleveraging through saving and inflation? To a large extent that was the situation at the end of World War II, when the US played that role. Can’t China and other emerging nations play that role now? Probably not, because they do not have the economic size needed to face a much bigger problem. Moreover, by accepting a rescue from a dictatorship, the Western democratic nations would risk losing their freedom.
Indeed, despite some double counting, the following table shows that the net international investment position of the Western countries is less than 3% of their GDP, largely because of the high level of savings in Japan. Yet, Japan has the largest government debt as a percentage of GDP (226%).
Unfortunately, a deleveraging spiral may start without all countries being overleveraged. A debt crisis in one sector (e.g. the Government) may easily infect the remaining or be started off by a generalized downgrade by the rating agencies. In fact, some fear that the leading Western nations (US, European Union and Japan) may be in the brink of getting into such a depression spiral started by deleveraging in the sovereign debt sector. So they desperately need to find an alternative solution.
First, they must plug once and for all the holes emerging in the weaker economies of the Euro Area. Second, they must mobilize the spending power of the few remaining sectors with borrowing capacity. Finally, and most importantly, they must acknowledge that at least one entity must be allowed to continue to increase its leverage while the others deleverage.
Here the obvious choice must be the Government (except in Japan), due to its policy powers, but mostly because it is the only one that can borrow with very long maturities.
Thus, although we live in a peacetime period, sovereign debt limits in the US and Europe can be increased to levels close to those observed at the end of wars. That is, countries with national debts around 60% of GDP could borrow close to a 100%, while those already above the 100% should be allowed to borrow up to 180% of GDP.
The process, relying on multilateral facilities, should be sequential with an agreed calendar and coordinated at the level of the G3 group of countries (not the G20, which should only have a consultative role).
Labels:
China,
debt crisis,
deleveraging,
democracy,
Emerging economies,
Europe,
Japan,
leverage,
market capitalism,
sovereign debt restructuring,
USA,
Western Nations
Friday, 26 August 2011
Government Stimulus and the Expenditure Multiplier
I am quite fed up with the way professional economists discuss the pros and cons of stimulus spending. I would like to remind them that textbooks teaching the income and expenditure multipliers also explain that the effects of increased spending are partially offset by two types of leakages – savings and imports. So, one would expect that economists would fight their corner by fencing with different estimates about these two effects. But that is not so.
Surprisingly, they keep discussing government spending in general terms rather than the various types of stimulus spending. These can be grouped into four main categories: a) useless spending; b) capital write-off spending; c) productivity enhancing spending; and d) unallocated spending.
The first group includes the so-called roads to nowhere, paying someone to dig a hole and after paying him to fill it again, creating new services that nobody is willing to pay for or wants, etc. The main purpose of these spending programs is to put money in the pocket of those delivering such services and hope that they will go on spending their earnings. So, basically this type of spending is similar to the fourth group of spending.
The fourth group of government spending includes various forms of tax breaks and rebates, showering notes with helicopters or through bank transfers and paying subsidies to various types of recipients. Under these proposals the government does not know where to spend the money and leaves it to the private sector to decide whether to hoard or to spend it. Its advantage in relation to the first group of spending is that taxpayers know best how to use this is “manna from heaven”; its main drawback is that it cannot be targeted to minimize the leakage through savings and imports.
A common problem with these two groups of spending is that they are seen as a waste of resources and taxpayers assume that they will have to pay for them later on. So, they undermine the credibility of governments, raising more the fear that causes inaction than lifting the hope needed to stimulate entrepreneurial animal spirits.
The second type of spending is based on the idea that destruction requires reconstruction and this galvanizes the spending needed to start-off the economy. It may be justified by anticipation or after the disaster. This is often the case with rearmament and war reconstruction or in dealing with natural and manmade catastrophes. Other types of policies within this group include subsidizing the anticipation of capital replacement (e.g. the recent program of cash-for-clunkers) and the acceleration of depreciation charges.
This type of spending is obviously inefficient because the wealth created by the extra people employed as a result of the stimulus is offset by the costs of destroying existing wealth. Moreover, you could use the same money to fix broken assets rather than breaking and then fixing them. But, unfortunately, this is occasionally seen as the most efficient way to stimulate aggregate demand because often politicians only act fast in the presence of calamities.
By contrast the better type of stimulus – the productivity enhancing spending – is often slow to impact on the animal spirits of entrepreneurs and consumers. This type of spending includes infrastructures, research and development, health, education and the arts. Indeed, the development of profitable programs in these fields takes a long time to implement which often is not consistent with the short run impact needed from stimulus programs. Attempts to rush in programs in this field risk turning such spending in useless spending of the type one. Another unfortunate nature of this type of expenditure is that productivity enhancing policies often require lay-offs to reduce the productivity drag caused by over manning and this offsets the intended goal of employment creation.
Apart from discussing the various types of spending stimulus, two other important issues on which economists should focus are the trade-off between speed and efficiency and the phasing out of stimulus programs to prevent perpetuating the consequent growth of the public sector at the expense of the market capitalism sector. Also the potential for collateral damages resulting from increased government spending – unsustainable debt levels, crowding-out and inflation risks – should be discussed in a dispassionate way.
In conclusion, instead of searching for abstract and absolute yes or no answers on the working of the expenditure multiplier and business cycle management policies, economists should focus on the when and how to make the stimulus programs work.
Surprisingly, they keep discussing government spending in general terms rather than the various types of stimulus spending. These can be grouped into four main categories: a) useless spending; b) capital write-off spending; c) productivity enhancing spending; and d) unallocated spending.
The first group includes the so-called roads to nowhere, paying someone to dig a hole and after paying him to fill it again, creating new services that nobody is willing to pay for or wants, etc. The main purpose of these spending programs is to put money in the pocket of those delivering such services and hope that they will go on spending their earnings. So, basically this type of spending is similar to the fourth group of spending.
The fourth group of government spending includes various forms of tax breaks and rebates, showering notes with helicopters or through bank transfers and paying subsidies to various types of recipients. Under these proposals the government does not know where to spend the money and leaves it to the private sector to decide whether to hoard or to spend it. Its advantage in relation to the first group of spending is that taxpayers know best how to use this is “manna from heaven”; its main drawback is that it cannot be targeted to minimize the leakage through savings and imports.
A common problem with these two groups of spending is that they are seen as a waste of resources and taxpayers assume that they will have to pay for them later on. So, they undermine the credibility of governments, raising more the fear that causes inaction than lifting the hope needed to stimulate entrepreneurial animal spirits.
The second type of spending is based on the idea that destruction requires reconstruction and this galvanizes the spending needed to start-off the economy. It may be justified by anticipation or after the disaster. This is often the case with rearmament and war reconstruction or in dealing with natural and manmade catastrophes. Other types of policies within this group include subsidizing the anticipation of capital replacement (e.g. the recent program of cash-for-clunkers) and the acceleration of depreciation charges.
This type of spending is obviously inefficient because the wealth created by the extra people employed as a result of the stimulus is offset by the costs of destroying existing wealth. Moreover, you could use the same money to fix broken assets rather than breaking and then fixing them. But, unfortunately, this is occasionally seen as the most efficient way to stimulate aggregate demand because often politicians only act fast in the presence of calamities.
By contrast the better type of stimulus – the productivity enhancing spending – is often slow to impact on the animal spirits of entrepreneurs and consumers. This type of spending includes infrastructures, research and development, health, education and the arts. Indeed, the development of profitable programs in these fields takes a long time to implement which often is not consistent with the short run impact needed from stimulus programs. Attempts to rush in programs in this field risk turning such spending in useless spending of the type one. Another unfortunate nature of this type of expenditure is that productivity enhancing policies often require lay-offs to reduce the productivity drag caused by over manning and this offsets the intended goal of employment creation.
Apart from discussing the various types of spending stimulus, two other important issues on which economists should focus are the trade-off between speed and efficiency and the phasing out of stimulus programs to prevent perpetuating the consequent growth of the public sector at the expense of the market capitalism sector. Also the potential for collateral damages resulting from increased government spending – unsustainable debt levels, crowding-out and inflation risks – should be discussed in a dispassionate way.
In conclusion, instead of searching for abstract and absolute yes or no answers on the working of the expenditure multiplier and business cycle management policies, economists should focus on the when and how to make the stimulus programs work.
Thursday, 25 August 2011
Américo Amorim, Trabalhador e Bilionário!
Ontem as televisões Portugueses, num exemplo típico de mau jornalismo, entrevistaram quatro bilionários Portugueses sobre a iniciativa dos bilionários Franceses que propuseram um imposto extraordinário sobre as suas fortunas para ajudar o país a sair da crise e concluíram (pasme-se…) que os milionários Portugueses estavam divididos sobre a questão com base em declarações de Américo Amorim que terá dito: “Eu não me considero rico, eu sou um trabalhador”.
Seguiram-se-lhe declarações de dirigentes sindicais e de dirigentes do Bloco de Esquerda indignados por o homem mais rico de Portugal se ter considerado um trabalhador.
Ora não existe qualquer relação entre uma situação e a outra. Há ricos que trabalham e outros não, assim como há pobres que trabalham e outros não. Na sociedade nós temos pessoas que gostam sobretudo de trabalhar, outras que gostam apenas de gastar, outros que desejam ostentar os seus gastos supérfluos e ainda alguns que tanto gostam de ganhar como de gastar.
Em muitos países acontece que os detentores das maiores fortunas são precisamente aqueles que mais gostam de trabalhar e de viver modestamente. Nos Estados Unidos entre os exemplos destacados deste tipo de personalidades temos os casos de Bill Gates e Warren Buffett. Também em Portugal, os empresários que acumularam as maiores fortunas – Américo Amorim, Belmiro de Azevedo e Soares dos Santos – são do tipo trabalhadores e poupadinhos.
É evidente que existem diferenças na forma como cada um deles se relaciona com a sociedade e os cronistas sociais, mas isso são questões de estilo pessoal. Enquanto Belmiro de Azevedo tem dedicado uma parte significativa do seu tempo a promover a educação dos jovens quadros e Soares dos Santos criou uma fundação com fins culturais, Américo Amorim tem mantido um “low-profile” em matéria de intervenção pública talvez porque tem mais negócios em indústrias sujeitas a regulação.
O estereótipo segundo o qual um capitalista é uma pessoa de lazer, que vive de rendas, e que considera o trabalho como algo indigno do seu estatuto que deve ser deixado aos subalternos está tão ultrapassado como a ideia que um dirigente sindical é necessariamente um operário.
Com que direito um dirigente sindical que passa o dia em reuniões e manifestações se considera a si próprio trabalhador enquanto chama parasita a um empresário que tem de coordenar centenas de empresas que empregam milhares de trabalhadores? No fim do dia qual deles contribuiu mais para a riqueza da sociedade?
Em suma, a tributação ou não do património não deve ter como objectivo castigar os ricos; quer estes optem por uma vida de lazer ou de trabalho.
Seguiram-se-lhe declarações de dirigentes sindicais e de dirigentes do Bloco de Esquerda indignados por o homem mais rico de Portugal se ter considerado um trabalhador.
Ora não existe qualquer relação entre uma situação e a outra. Há ricos que trabalham e outros não, assim como há pobres que trabalham e outros não. Na sociedade nós temos pessoas que gostam sobretudo de trabalhar, outras que gostam apenas de gastar, outros que desejam ostentar os seus gastos supérfluos e ainda alguns que tanto gostam de ganhar como de gastar.
Em muitos países acontece que os detentores das maiores fortunas são precisamente aqueles que mais gostam de trabalhar e de viver modestamente. Nos Estados Unidos entre os exemplos destacados deste tipo de personalidades temos os casos de Bill Gates e Warren Buffett. Também em Portugal, os empresários que acumularam as maiores fortunas – Américo Amorim, Belmiro de Azevedo e Soares dos Santos – são do tipo trabalhadores e poupadinhos.
É evidente que existem diferenças na forma como cada um deles se relaciona com a sociedade e os cronistas sociais, mas isso são questões de estilo pessoal. Enquanto Belmiro de Azevedo tem dedicado uma parte significativa do seu tempo a promover a educação dos jovens quadros e Soares dos Santos criou uma fundação com fins culturais, Américo Amorim tem mantido um “low-profile” em matéria de intervenção pública talvez porque tem mais negócios em indústrias sujeitas a regulação.
O estereótipo segundo o qual um capitalista é uma pessoa de lazer, que vive de rendas, e que considera o trabalho como algo indigno do seu estatuto que deve ser deixado aos subalternos está tão ultrapassado como a ideia que um dirigente sindical é necessariamente um operário.
Com que direito um dirigente sindical que passa o dia em reuniões e manifestações se considera a si próprio trabalhador enquanto chama parasita a um empresário que tem de coordenar centenas de empresas que empregam milhares de trabalhadores? No fim do dia qual deles contribuiu mais para a riqueza da sociedade?
Em suma, a tributação ou não do património não deve ter como objectivo castigar os ricos; quer estes optem por uma vida de lazer ou de trabalho.
Labels:
Américo Amorim,
capitalismo,
estilos de vida,
milionários,
património,
personalidades,
Tributação,
virtudes
Wednesday, 24 August 2011
Renegociar ou Nacionalizar as Parcerias Público-Privadas?
As Parcerias Público-Privadas (PPPs), foram um desastre a dois níveis – ficaram desastrosamente caras e serviram para ocultar o despesismo que levou à crise da dívida Portuguesa. Infelizmente, a despesa está feita e nada se pode fazer, há que pagar a irresponsabilidade dos nossos governantes.
No entanto, o seu custo ainda pode ser parcialmente reduzido renegociando as rendas por vencer, nacionalizando as concessionárias ou transformando-as em concessão plena. Qual é a melhor solução?
Antes de responder à questão, convém relembrar porque é que as PPPs foram um desastre financeiro. Em termos simples o que aconteceu é que os Governos da altura em vez de pedir emprestado no mercado às taxas de juro da época (por exemplo 4% a 30 anos) optaram por contratar a construção e exploração de estradas, hospitais, etc. a privados prestando-lhe garantias e assegurando-lhes uma remuneração anual de cerca de 11% por 30 anos. Uma margem financeira desta grandeza era quase um negócio da China para as construtoras e bancos que tivessem o cuidado de fazer o hedging do risco da taxa de juro.
A margem era de tal modo generosa que as construtoras começaram por abusar das tradicionais derrapagens nos preços de construção sem que os seus sócios nas empresas concessionárias (os bancos financiadores) protestassem. Isso só foi possível porque o risco do projecto seria habilidosamente transferido para o Estado através de sucessivas renegociações dos contratos.
Porém, o maior atractivo do negócio não está nos dividendos, mas sim no grau de alavancagem usado na estrutura de financiamento dos projectos. A estrutura de financiamento utilizada permite gerir os projectos como se fossem operações de “buy-out”, em que os investidores triplicam ou quadruplicam o seu investimento em poucos anos através da prestação de diversos serviços a empresas altamente endividadas, independentemente de estas terem sucesso ou não.
Sendo assim, uma eventual renegociação das rendas (alternativa que os concessionários parecem aceitar) não resolve o problema pois os promotores podem facilmente compensá-las com uma redução na manutenção das estradas ou redução dos resultados operacionais. Por isso pensamos que a prevenção das práticas de “buy-out” só pode ser conseguida através da nacionalização das empresas concessionárias e sua transformação futura em institutos ou serviços públicos (ou na sua transformação em concessões plenas com todos os riscos assumidos pelos concessionários).
Para perceber melhor o problema consideremos o caso típico de uma concessão rodoviária. Por exemplo a concessão das Beiras Litoral e Alta (a famigerada IP5, agora denominada A25), com uma extensão de 173 Kms entre Aveiro e Vilar Formoso, e actualmente consolidada na Ascendi, uma empresa do Grupo Mota Engil (60%) e do BES (perto de 40%). A requalificação do IP5 custou perto de 1000 milhões de Euros, financiados em termos concessionais pelo BEI em 470 milhões (garantidos por um sindicato bancário), 385 milhões financiados por um sindicato bancário liderado pelo BES e os restantes 8% (78 milhões de Euros) financiados parcialmente por fundos próprios (51 milhões).
Note-se que os promotores usam um grau de alavancagem superior aos dos bancos (apenas 41 milhões de Euros, ou seja 4.4% de capitais próprios). Como os empréstimos contratados tinham um período de carência de 6 a 7 anos que terminava em Junho de 2008 a empresa aproveitou logo os resultados do primeiro ano de exploração plena (2007) para pagar um dividendo aos accionistas de 12.5 milhões de Euros (isto é, 25% do capital investido).
Como em 2010 o Estado já estava a pagar à Empresa perto de 200 milhões de Euros, basta ao BES e à Mota-Engil prestarem 20% dos serviços que a concessionária necessita para lucrarem por essa via cerca de 15 milhões de Euros/ano. Ou seja, excluindo os dividendos, os promotores podem triplicar o seu investimento em apenas seis anos. As formas como os promotores podem extrair esses ganhos são diversas, incluindo os 275 mil Euros pagos aos corpos sociais em 2007.
Este último custo não é extraordinário quando comparado com outras empresas, mas tem um valor simbólico para os contribuintes. Note-se que, em vez dos 13 Administradores que a Concessionária tinha em 2007 (dos quais 6 executivos), hoje, se ainda tivéssemos a Junta Autónoma de Estradas, a gestão desses Kms de auto-estrada precisaria apenas de um Director de Serviços ou Subdirector Geral que custaria ao Estado menos de 50 mil Euros/ano.
Este simples exemplo mostra como aquilo a que podemos chamar “custos de buy-out” associados à gestão das PPPs podem chegar facilmente aos 30 milhões de Euros/ano. Pode não parecer muito, mas multiplicado por cerca de 40 PPPs temos um custo anual de 1200 milhões de Euros, que podem ser simplesmente poupados através de uma nacionalização das Concessionárias (ou da transformação da PPP em concessão plena no caso das estradas com mais tráfego).
Isto é, os concessionários deviam ter de escolher entre comprar uma concessão plena ou revender a sua concessão ao Estado.
No entanto, o seu custo ainda pode ser parcialmente reduzido renegociando as rendas por vencer, nacionalizando as concessionárias ou transformando-as em concessão plena. Qual é a melhor solução?
Antes de responder à questão, convém relembrar porque é que as PPPs foram um desastre financeiro. Em termos simples o que aconteceu é que os Governos da altura em vez de pedir emprestado no mercado às taxas de juro da época (por exemplo 4% a 30 anos) optaram por contratar a construção e exploração de estradas, hospitais, etc. a privados prestando-lhe garantias e assegurando-lhes uma remuneração anual de cerca de 11% por 30 anos. Uma margem financeira desta grandeza era quase um negócio da China para as construtoras e bancos que tivessem o cuidado de fazer o hedging do risco da taxa de juro.
A margem era de tal modo generosa que as construtoras começaram por abusar das tradicionais derrapagens nos preços de construção sem que os seus sócios nas empresas concessionárias (os bancos financiadores) protestassem. Isso só foi possível porque o risco do projecto seria habilidosamente transferido para o Estado através de sucessivas renegociações dos contratos.
Porém, o maior atractivo do negócio não está nos dividendos, mas sim no grau de alavancagem usado na estrutura de financiamento dos projectos. A estrutura de financiamento utilizada permite gerir os projectos como se fossem operações de “buy-out”, em que os investidores triplicam ou quadruplicam o seu investimento em poucos anos através da prestação de diversos serviços a empresas altamente endividadas, independentemente de estas terem sucesso ou não.
Sendo assim, uma eventual renegociação das rendas (alternativa que os concessionários parecem aceitar) não resolve o problema pois os promotores podem facilmente compensá-las com uma redução na manutenção das estradas ou redução dos resultados operacionais. Por isso pensamos que a prevenção das práticas de “buy-out” só pode ser conseguida através da nacionalização das empresas concessionárias e sua transformação futura em institutos ou serviços públicos (ou na sua transformação em concessões plenas com todos os riscos assumidos pelos concessionários).
Para perceber melhor o problema consideremos o caso típico de uma concessão rodoviária. Por exemplo a concessão das Beiras Litoral e Alta (a famigerada IP5, agora denominada A25), com uma extensão de 173 Kms entre Aveiro e Vilar Formoso, e actualmente consolidada na Ascendi, uma empresa do Grupo Mota Engil (60%) e do BES (perto de 40%). A requalificação do IP5 custou perto de 1000 milhões de Euros, financiados em termos concessionais pelo BEI em 470 milhões (garantidos por um sindicato bancário), 385 milhões financiados por um sindicato bancário liderado pelo BES e os restantes 8% (78 milhões de Euros) financiados parcialmente por fundos próprios (51 milhões).
Note-se que os promotores usam um grau de alavancagem superior aos dos bancos (apenas 41 milhões de Euros, ou seja 4.4% de capitais próprios). Como os empréstimos contratados tinham um período de carência de 6 a 7 anos que terminava em Junho de 2008 a empresa aproveitou logo os resultados do primeiro ano de exploração plena (2007) para pagar um dividendo aos accionistas de 12.5 milhões de Euros (isto é, 25% do capital investido).
Como em 2010 o Estado já estava a pagar à Empresa perto de 200 milhões de Euros, basta ao BES e à Mota-Engil prestarem 20% dos serviços que a concessionária necessita para lucrarem por essa via cerca de 15 milhões de Euros/ano. Ou seja, excluindo os dividendos, os promotores podem triplicar o seu investimento em apenas seis anos. As formas como os promotores podem extrair esses ganhos são diversas, incluindo os 275 mil Euros pagos aos corpos sociais em 2007.
Este último custo não é extraordinário quando comparado com outras empresas, mas tem um valor simbólico para os contribuintes. Note-se que, em vez dos 13 Administradores que a Concessionária tinha em 2007 (dos quais 6 executivos), hoje, se ainda tivéssemos a Junta Autónoma de Estradas, a gestão desses Kms de auto-estrada precisaria apenas de um Director de Serviços ou Subdirector Geral que custaria ao Estado menos de 50 mil Euros/ano.
Este simples exemplo mostra como aquilo a que podemos chamar “custos de buy-out” associados à gestão das PPPs podem chegar facilmente aos 30 milhões de Euros/ano. Pode não parecer muito, mas multiplicado por cerca de 40 PPPs temos um custo anual de 1200 milhões de Euros, que podem ser simplesmente poupados através de uma nacionalização das Concessionárias (ou da transformação da PPP em concessão plena no caso das estradas com mais tráfego).
Isto é, os concessionários deviam ter de escolher entre comprar uma concessão plena ou revender a sua concessão ao Estado.
Labels:
auto-estradas,
capitalismo de mercado,
concessões,
despesa pública,
Parcerias público-privadas,
Portugal,
PPPs,
renegociação
Tuesday, 23 August 2011
Political Parties and Representative Democracy
What do the Norwegian bomber, the London rioters and the Madrid sit-in have in common? All questioned the capacity of the elected representatives to listen to their demands. All used the new media to organize themselves to commit and promote their acts. Politicians and the media have always been blamed for steering the extremism and madness of individuals and mobs. Such events are also invariable followed by repeated calls for regulation of the parties and the media. Let us consider then the case for more party regulation.
It is a well established fact that representative democracy needs to be complemented by constitutional liberalism and an independent judicial system to protect individuals and minorities from unwarranted interference of governments and oppression by the majorities. That is generally considered enough and therefore political parties were usually left to themselves. So, has something changed? Yes and no!
The mainstream parties lost most of their ideological imprint, leaving the confrontation of ideologies for non-parliamentary small parties. There has been also a growing trend towards rotation within a two-party system. Therefore political parties became murky grand coalitions of interests, relying on large secretive organizations fed by an ever increasing number of partisan jobs in government and the regulated industries. Their communication with the electorate is delegated to expensive marketing and public relations groups with enormous resources and privileged access to the mass media, which perpetuates them in a duopolistic position at the expense of the small parties.
The smaller parties (parliamentary and non-parliamentary) occasionally achieve ephemeral visibility but only by taking radical positions on single-issue policies. This is a self-defeating route. It bars them from participating in government or having their views considered by legislators and the public in general. They face a situation similar to that of the small suppliers of large corporations. Likewise they would benefit from a stronger regulation of big political parties to get closer to a leveling playing field in the electoral system.
It is true that technological progress towards internet-based media may give them a new opportunity to challenge the big players. But as the emergence of cheap email brought with it the need for anti-spam programs so will the public ask for protection against a spam of miniscule parties.
Therefore, any increase in regulation needs to address both big and small parties, but it needs to differentiate. For instance, while the public disclosure of membership should be required from both types of parties, rules on the selection of their electoral candidates should apply only to the big parties. Likewise, the same applies to many aspects of the regulation of their financing and access to broadcasting services.
One important area of the regulation of big political parties is the imposition of limits on their campaign spending. This is so because long media-based campaigning periods become absurdly long, and consequently expensive. This gives the incumbent leading parties an unfair competitive advantage. Moreover, it compromises effective public governance and generates “democracy fatigue”.
Yet, although the new realities require a better regulation of political parties, representation in democratic societies is still better protected by restricting it to clearly defined broad political associations like the political parties. Resorting to other types of associations, pursuing specific interests or confessional values, would easily degenerate into broken societies falling either in anarchy or totalitarianism. That is, we need to improve competition between parties rather than search for new players.
It is a well established fact that representative democracy needs to be complemented by constitutional liberalism and an independent judicial system to protect individuals and minorities from unwarranted interference of governments and oppression by the majorities. That is generally considered enough and therefore political parties were usually left to themselves. So, has something changed? Yes and no!
The mainstream parties lost most of their ideological imprint, leaving the confrontation of ideologies for non-parliamentary small parties. There has been also a growing trend towards rotation within a two-party system. Therefore political parties became murky grand coalitions of interests, relying on large secretive organizations fed by an ever increasing number of partisan jobs in government and the regulated industries. Their communication with the electorate is delegated to expensive marketing and public relations groups with enormous resources and privileged access to the mass media, which perpetuates them in a duopolistic position at the expense of the small parties.
The smaller parties (parliamentary and non-parliamentary) occasionally achieve ephemeral visibility but only by taking radical positions on single-issue policies. This is a self-defeating route. It bars them from participating in government or having their views considered by legislators and the public in general. They face a situation similar to that of the small suppliers of large corporations. Likewise they would benefit from a stronger regulation of big political parties to get closer to a leveling playing field in the electoral system.
It is true that technological progress towards internet-based media may give them a new opportunity to challenge the big players. But as the emergence of cheap email brought with it the need for anti-spam programs so will the public ask for protection against a spam of miniscule parties.
Therefore, any increase in regulation needs to address both big and small parties, but it needs to differentiate. For instance, while the public disclosure of membership should be required from both types of parties, rules on the selection of their electoral candidates should apply only to the big parties. Likewise, the same applies to many aspects of the regulation of their financing and access to broadcasting services.
One important area of the regulation of big political parties is the imposition of limits on their campaign spending. This is so because long media-based campaigning periods become absurdly long, and consequently expensive. This gives the incumbent leading parties an unfair competitive advantage. Moreover, it compromises effective public governance and generates “democracy fatigue”.
Yet, although the new realities require a better regulation of political parties, representation in democratic societies is still better protected by restricting it to clearly defined broad political associations like the political parties. Resorting to other types of associations, pursuing specific interests or confessional values, would easily degenerate into broken societies falling either in anarchy or totalitarianism. That is, we need to improve competition between parties rather than search for new players.
Labels:
competition,
London riots,
Madrid sit-in,
mobs,
Norwegian bomber,
political parties,
regulation of political parties,
representative democracy
Monday, 22 August 2011
A lógica do Prof. Marcelo sobre o TGV
O Professor Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa é um comentador televisivo inteligente, influente e popular. Possuindo uma capacidade de comunicação extraordinária e fontes de informação privilegiadas, utiliza a sua aptidão analítica e razoável grau de independência para nos brindar semanalmente com comentários de grande influência sobre a opinião pública.
Apesar de ser militante destacado do PSD e consultor jurídico de vários interesses económicos, o enviesamento dos seus comentários a favor dessas entidades tem sido geralmente explícito e moderado. Por isso, os telespectadores, após o devido desconto, dão-lhe maior credibilidade que à maioria dos outros comentadores que são meros advogados ou porta-vozes de interesses não declarados.
No entanto, por vezes o Professor exagera. Por exemplo, ontem ao tentar defender o iminente volta-face na posição do Governo sobre a construção do TGV utilizou um raciocínio de bradar aos céus, e que daria direito a chumbo imediato em qualquer exame de lógica. Disse ele que como havia uns subsídios da União Europeia que só podiam ser utilizados para o TGV então teria de se avançar com o TGV para utilizar esses subsídios.
Imagine o leitor que eu lhe dava mil Euros na condição de você queimar 10 mil notas de euro. Você aceitava? Claro que não! Ou, se preferir, imagine que eu lhe oferecia 10 mil Euros na condição de você ir comprar um carro de luxo (e.g. um Ferrari) por 100 mil Euros que você não tinha condições para pagar e manter. Você aceitaria? Claro que não! Ora, é precisamente isso que acontece com o TGV.
O país não precisa e não pode pagar a manutenção do TGV Lisboa-Madrid, mesmo que o mesmo lhe seja oferecido totalmente de graça. Para confirmar isso, não é preciso nomear comissões de sábios ou encomendar mais estudos a consultores. Basta olhar para o mapa da Península Ibérica e consultar as contas da RENFE e notícias recentes sobre o encerramento de serviços por falta de passageiros.
No entanto, o problema tem uma solução muito simples e sem custos para Portugal. Portugal pode ceder a sua quota-parte nos subsídios da União Europeia para a rede de alta velocidade à Espanha, na condição desta construir e explorar por conta própria linhas de alta velocidade entre Madrid e Lisboa, Sevilha e Lisboa e Corunha Porto. Portugal poderia mesmo ceder gratuitamente os respectivos terrenos, desde que a RENFE garantisse que durante 40 anos fazia pelo menos quatro viagens diárias entre aquelas cidades. Mas nunca deverá aceitar suportar os inevitáveis défices de exploração.
Portugal não pode ignorar que o nosso vizinho, com o pretexto de preservar o centralismo de Madrid e a unidade de Espanha face às Autonomias, de forma insensata e financeiramente desastrosa, enveredou há 20 anos pela construção da 2ª maior rede mundial de alta velocidade. É pois natural que deseje alargar essa rede a Portugal.
Por nós tudo bem, desde que sejam eles a pagar a sua exploração deficitária.
Apesar de ser militante destacado do PSD e consultor jurídico de vários interesses económicos, o enviesamento dos seus comentários a favor dessas entidades tem sido geralmente explícito e moderado. Por isso, os telespectadores, após o devido desconto, dão-lhe maior credibilidade que à maioria dos outros comentadores que são meros advogados ou porta-vozes de interesses não declarados.
No entanto, por vezes o Professor exagera. Por exemplo, ontem ao tentar defender o iminente volta-face na posição do Governo sobre a construção do TGV utilizou um raciocínio de bradar aos céus, e que daria direito a chumbo imediato em qualquer exame de lógica. Disse ele que como havia uns subsídios da União Europeia que só podiam ser utilizados para o TGV então teria de se avançar com o TGV para utilizar esses subsídios.
Imagine o leitor que eu lhe dava mil Euros na condição de você queimar 10 mil notas de euro. Você aceitava? Claro que não! Ou, se preferir, imagine que eu lhe oferecia 10 mil Euros na condição de você ir comprar um carro de luxo (e.g. um Ferrari) por 100 mil Euros que você não tinha condições para pagar e manter. Você aceitaria? Claro que não! Ora, é precisamente isso que acontece com o TGV.
O país não precisa e não pode pagar a manutenção do TGV Lisboa-Madrid, mesmo que o mesmo lhe seja oferecido totalmente de graça. Para confirmar isso, não é preciso nomear comissões de sábios ou encomendar mais estudos a consultores. Basta olhar para o mapa da Península Ibérica e consultar as contas da RENFE e notícias recentes sobre o encerramento de serviços por falta de passageiros.
No entanto, o problema tem uma solução muito simples e sem custos para Portugal. Portugal pode ceder a sua quota-parte nos subsídios da União Europeia para a rede de alta velocidade à Espanha, na condição desta construir e explorar por conta própria linhas de alta velocidade entre Madrid e Lisboa, Sevilha e Lisboa e Corunha Porto. Portugal poderia mesmo ceder gratuitamente os respectivos terrenos, desde que a RENFE garantisse que durante 40 anos fazia pelo menos quatro viagens diárias entre aquelas cidades. Mas nunca deverá aceitar suportar os inevitáveis défices de exploração.
Portugal não pode ignorar que o nosso vizinho, com o pretexto de preservar o centralismo de Madrid e a unidade de Espanha face às Autonomias, de forma insensata e financeiramente desastrosa, enveredou há 20 anos pela construção da 2ª maior rede mundial de alta velocidade. É pois natural que deseje alargar essa rede a Portugal.
Por nós tudo bem, desde que sejam eles a pagar a sua exploração deficitária.
Labels:
alta velocidade,
Aveiro,
Espanha,
lógica,
Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa,
Portugal,
TGV,
trabalho productivo,
volta-face
Thursday, 18 August 2011
Alerta ao Governo: Não Agravem o Sentimento de Injustiça
Os três principais factores que mais contribuem para a crescente desmotivação dos portugueses são: a) a falta de perspectivas para o futuro, b) a percepção de que são sempre enganados pelos políticos, e c) o sentimento de injustiça na repartição dos sacrifícios necessários para sair da crise. O último é frequentemente expresso através do dito popular “são sempre os pequeninos a pagar”.
Como eu costumo dizer aos meus alunos, qualquer programa de ajustamento macroeconómico para ter sucesso precisa de ter um rede de protecção para os mais vulneráveis e repartir os custos do ajustamento de uma forma justa. Isto é, deve penalizar primeiro os que mais beneficiaram das políticas que levaram ao descalabro financeiro e repartir os restantes custos com um sentido visível de justiça.
A rede de protecção aos mais vulneráveis foi recentemente apresentada pelo Ministro da Solidariedade e Segurança Social através do chamado Programa de Emergência Social que visa apoiar cerca de um terço dos Portugueses e terá uma dotação anual de 400 milhões de Euros. Esperemos que seja suficiente.
Quanto à penalização dos beneficiários pelo descalabro financeiro ainda não vimos qualquer medida. Pior ainda, tivemos vários sinais preocupantes em sentido contrário, de que destacamos os seguintes exemplos. O Ministro da Economia continua a passear-se vaidosamente e ufano rodeado dos mesmos dirigentes empresariais que desde 1986 têm desbaratado os milhares de milhões de Euros em subsídios recebidos da União Europeia. Mais ainda, afirmou recentemente no Financial Times que os produtores de energia eólica (que desde 2005 já receberam mais de 7.5 mil milhões de euros de subsídios) não teriam os seus contratos renegociados.
Quanto ao Ministro das Finanças, deixou que as empresas oligopolistas onde o Estado detinha direitos preferenciais (e.g. PT e EDP) cancelassem esses direitos sem compensação ao Estado. Quando precisou de recorrer a receitas extraordinárias para tapar o chamado buraco orçamental de 2011 recorreu a medidas sem grande preocupação de justiça. Por exemplo, o imposto extraordinário sobre os rendimentos do trabalho (vulgarmente conhecido por corte do 13º mês) deixou de fora os juros e dividendos. Aumentou o IVA de bens essenciais como a electricidade e o gás de 6 para 23% mas deixou de fora muitos bens supérfluos (ainda que simbólicos) actualmente no escalão dos 6% (e.g. o Golfo). Finalmente, satisfazendo uma reivindicação antiga dos bancos, aceitou comprar os fundos de pensões dos bancos que foram uns dos principais responsáveis pela crise. Também o aumento do número de administradores da CGD, ainda que insignificante em termos de custos, não deixou de dar uma má imagem.
Todas estas posições e decisões levam muitos dos que depositaram a sua esperança no novo governo a pensar que afinal temos mais do mesmo. É por isso indispensável que no Orçamento de Estado para 2012 o governo arrepie caminho. Os anunciados aumentos de impostos e o corte da despesa em 9% provavelmente irão causar a maior recessão jamais vivida em Portugal. Se os mesmos não forem feitos com justiça (tal como sugerimos no passado) corremos o risco de agravar o sentimento de injustiça ao ponto de romper a tradicional resignação e pacifismo dos Portugueses. Adicionar a uma grave crise económica uma crise de ordem pública seria desastroso para o país.
Continuamos a acreditar que o Primeiro-ministro e o Ministro das Finanças são pessoas sensatas e justas que tentarão inverter esta tendência para o abismo da injustiça. Porém, parafraseando o dito sobre a mulher de César, “a sua determinação em restabelecer o sentido de justiça entre os Portugueses tem de estar acima de qualquer suspeita ”.
Como eu costumo dizer aos meus alunos, qualquer programa de ajustamento macroeconómico para ter sucesso precisa de ter um rede de protecção para os mais vulneráveis e repartir os custos do ajustamento de uma forma justa. Isto é, deve penalizar primeiro os que mais beneficiaram das políticas que levaram ao descalabro financeiro e repartir os restantes custos com um sentido visível de justiça.
A rede de protecção aos mais vulneráveis foi recentemente apresentada pelo Ministro da Solidariedade e Segurança Social através do chamado Programa de Emergência Social que visa apoiar cerca de um terço dos Portugueses e terá uma dotação anual de 400 milhões de Euros. Esperemos que seja suficiente.
Quanto à penalização dos beneficiários pelo descalabro financeiro ainda não vimos qualquer medida. Pior ainda, tivemos vários sinais preocupantes em sentido contrário, de que destacamos os seguintes exemplos. O Ministro da Economia continua a passear-se vaidosamente e ufano rodeado dos mesmos dirigentes empresariais que desde 1986 têm desbaratado os milhares de milhões de Euros em subsídios recebidos da União Europeia. Mais ainda, afirmou recentemente no Financial Times que os produtores de energia eólica (que desde 2005 já receberam mais de 7.5 mil milhões de euros de subsídios) não teriam os seus contratos renegociados.
Quanto ao Ministro das Finanças, deixou que as empresas oligopolistas onde o Estado detinha direitos preferenciais (e.g. PT e EDP) cancelassem esses direitos sem compensação ao Estado. Quando precisou de recorrer a receitas extraordinárias para tapar o chamado buraco orçamental de 2011 recorreu a medidas sem grande preocupação de justiça. Por exemplo, o imposto extraordinário sobre os rendimentos do trabalho (vulgarmente conhecido por corte do 13º mês) deixou de fora os juros e dividendos. Aumentou o IVA de bens essenciais como a electricidade e o gás de 6 para 23% mas deixou de fora muitos bens supérfluos (ainda que simbólicos) actualmente no escalão dos 6% (e.g. o Golfo). Finalmente, satisfazendo uma reivindicação antiga dos bancos, aceitou comprar os fundos de pensões dos bancos que foram uns dos principais responsáveis pela crise. Também o aumento do número de administradores da CGD, ainda que insignificante em termos de custos, não deixou de dar uma má imagem.
Todas estas posições e decisões levam muitos dos que depositaram a sua esperança no novo governo a pensar que afinal temos mais do mesmo. É por isso indispensável que no Orçamento de Estado para 2012 o governo arrepie caminho. Os anunciados aumentos de impostos e o corte da despesa em 9% provavelmente irão causar a maior recessão jamais vivida em Portugal. Se os mesmos não forem feitos com justiça (tal como sugerimos no passado) corremos o risco de agravar o sentimento de injustiça ao ponto de romper a tradicional resignação e pacifismo dos Portugueses. Adicionar a uma grave crise económica uma crise de ordem pública seria desastroso para o país.
Continuamos a acreditar que o Primeiro-ministro e o Ministro das Finanças são pessoas sensatas e justas que tentarão inverter esta tendência para o abismo da injustiça. Porém, parafraseando o dito sobre a mulher de César, “a sua determinação em restabelecer o sentido de justiça entre os Portugueses tem de estar acima de qualquer suspeita ”.
Labels:
cortes,
democracia representativa,
governo,
justiça,
Ministro da Economia,
Ministro das Finanças,
Passos Coelho,
Portugal,
programa de ajustamento
Wednesday, 17 August 2011
A Merkel & Sarkozy’s Europe? No, Thank You!
Yesterday’s press conference of the German and French leaders to announce their vision of Europe was so dull, leaderless and uninspiring that in itself it was enough to put off any followers of their proposals.
However, their plans for an Euro Zone closer integration are so misguided and meaningless that they need to be denounced as such. They include: a) closer economic integration; b) enforcing compliance with budgetary targets; c) greater fiscal harmonization; and d) better European governance. Let’s examine them one by one.
Full economic integration in Europe has been achieved a long time ago with the implementation of the common market and the single market. All that lacks is a more efficient judicial system to punish attempts by member-states to circumvent the rules when it benefits domestic special interest groups. To have their economic ministers meeting regularly adds nothing. Instead it might increase their propensity to mess with the competition rules whenever it suits them.
Enforcing compliance with budgetary targets by inscribing debt limits in their constitutions is a major mistake as we show in a recent post and the recent history of the US confirms. In short, once you reach the limit there is nothing you can do except to increase the ceiling while creating a lot of uncertainty about the nation’s creditworthiness. The experience in enforcing the Maastricht deficit and debt limits has also shown that France was among the first to bend the rules.
Greater fiscal harmonization on corporate taxation may suit the two countries but it would be a disaster for the rest of Europe. The OECD Tax Database for 2011 shows that France applies a combined corporate income tax rate of 34.4% with a number of special exemptions, while Germany applies a general tax rate of 30.2%. Dividends in France are taxed under a partial inclusion system without withholding, with an overall personal plus corporate income tax rate of 57.8%, while Germany uses a classical system with a withholding rate of 26.4% and a combined personal and corporate income tax rate of 48.6%. Harmonization would give Mr. Sarkozy an electoral boost by reducing tax rates and would allow Mrs. Merkel to get away with a tax rise, but the final result would still be a very high level of taxation. Should other countries follow suit, all the remaining Euro Zone countries would have to raise rates and lose their current tax advantage.
Finally, on European Governance, the two leaders propose an elected president for the Euro Zone area with a mandate of two and a half years and the appointment of an economics minister. This double-headed European Union would aggravate an already messy situation in Europe about who is in charge. What would happen to the head of the Euro Group? Who remembers the names of the current European Union President and Foreign Minister? But, most importantly, it would institutionalize a de facto two-speed Europe that would endanger progress towards an ever closer union.
Overall the meeting of the two leaders was another missed opportunity. The other European leaders should politely say: no thanks!
However, their plans for an Euro Zone closer integration are so misguided and meaningless that they need to be denounced as such. They include: a) closer economic integration; b) enforcing compliance with budgetary targets; c) greater fiscal harmonization; and d) better European governance. Let’s examine them one by one.
Full economic integration in Europe has been achieved a long time ago with the implementation of the common market and the single market. All that lacks is a more efficient judicial system to punish attempts by member-states to circumvent the rules when it benefits domestic special interest groups. To have their economic ministers meeting regularly adds nothing. Instead it might increase their propensity to mess with the competition rules whenever it suits them.
Enforcing compliance with budgetary targets by inscribing debt limits in their constitutions is a major mistake as we show in a recent post and the recent history of the US confirms. In short, once you reach the limit there is nothing you can do except to increase the ceiling while creating a lot of uncertainty about the nation’s creditworthiness. The experience in enforcing the Maastricht deficit and debt limits has also shown that France was among the first to bend the rules.
Greater fiscal harmonization on corporate taxation may suit the two countries but it would be a disaster for the rest of Europe. The OECD Tax Database for 2011 shows that France applies a combined corporate income tax rate of 34.4% with a number of special exemptions, while Germany applies a general tax rate of 30.2%. Dividends in France are taxed under a partial inclusion system without withholding, with an overall personal plus corporate income tax rate of 57.8%, while Germany uses a classical system with a withholding rate of 26.4% and a combined personal and corporate income tax rate of 48.6%. Harmonization would give Mr. Sarkozy an electoral boost by reducing tax rates and would allow Mrs. Merkel to get away with a tax rise, but the final result would still be a very high level of taxation. Should other countries follow suit, all the remaining Euro Zone countries would have to raise rates and lose their current tax advantage.
Finally, on European Governance, the two leaders propose an elected president for the Euro Zone area with a mandate of two and a half years and the appointment of an economics minister. This double-headed European Union would aggravate an already messy situation in Europe about who is in charge. What would happen to the head of the Euro Group? Who remembers the names of the current European Union President and Foreign Minister? But, most importantly, it would institutionalize a de facto two-speed Europe that would endanger progress towards an ever closer union.
Overall the meeting of the two leaders was another missed opportunity. The other European leaders should politely say: no thanks!
Labels:
economic integration,
Euro Zone,
European Union,
fiscal harmonization,
market capitalism,
Merkel,
Sarkozy
Tuesday, 16 August 2011
The Euro Zone Bond Debate: Can we have a common treasury without a common budget?
The debate on whether an European Agency (some kind of Euro Area Treasury department) should replace the Euro Zone countries in financing a substantial share of each country’s public sector borrowing requirements (some suggest a minimum of 60%) has gained new momentum since leading German business groups called for the issuance of Euro Zone bonds in defiance of the official German position.
The centralization of the debt issuing function in the Euro Zone is seen by many (including George Soros) as a solution for the current sovereign debt crisis as well as a way out of the intrinsic weakness of a Monetary Union built without a corresponding budgetary policy. Indeed, the later is the only convincing reason to argue for joint Eurobond issues and the debate should focus on its pros and cons.
Indeed, the European Union has already a long history of joint debt issues. Through the European Investment Bank it finances a non-negligible share of infrastructure projects in Europe. Through the European Commission it has also made several issues to finance specific programs of industrial restructuring and balance of payments support, the most recent being the EFSF mechanism to support the adjustment programs in Greece, Ireland and Portugal. However these issues were for limited purposes and for limited amounts. The centralization of the public sector borrowing requirements is an entirely new game.
In principle, a central Treasury Department for the Euro Zone makes sense. Indeed, that is what happens within national governments where debt issuance by local, state or regional governments is often supplemented by grants, borrowing and guarantees provided by the Ministry of Finance or National Treasurer. However, the later are usually granted under nationally agreed budgetary policies and often require the setting of borrowing limits. These are often the source of frequent disputes between national and sub-national governments that occasionally end up in blackmail by separatist movements.
In a Union like the Euro Area, which is taking the first steps towards a future political unification, a simple setting of borrowing limits by a central Treasurer (no matter how well designed they are) is more prone to such separatist threats because there is no national solidarity. These separatist threats would be a permanent risk undermining the credit standing of the central Treasurer and would become a burden for the remaining members.
To some extent national solidarity can be substituted by common interest in joint spending. For this reason, tying a large share of joint debt issues to the financing of centralized spending in common policies needs to be considered as an essential part of a monetary union package.
Although the experience of common policies in the EU is nothing to write home about (e.g. agriculture) it does not mean that it cannot succeed in areas like transport infrastructure, security (defense and policing), research and population policies (health, education, migration, etc.).
The only certainty is that, like a stool, a solid monetary union also needs three legs – a monetary authority, a treasurer and a spending authority.
The centralization of the debt issuing function in the Euro Zone is seen by many (including George Soros) as a solution for the current sovereign debt crisis as well as a way out of the intrinsic weakness of a Monetary Union built without a corresponding budgetary policy. Indeed, the later is the only convincing reason to argue for joint Eurobond issues and the debate should focus on its pros and cons.
Indeed, the European Union has already a long history of joint debt issues. Through the European Investment Bank it finances a non-negligible share of infrastructure projects in Europe. Through the European Commission it has also made several issues to finance specific programs of industrial restructuring and balance of payments support, the most recent being the EFSF mechanism to support the adjustment programs in Greece, Ireland and Portugal. However these issues were for limited purposes and for limited amounts. The centralization of the public sector borrowing requirements is an entirely new game.
In principle, a central Treasury Department for the Euro Zone makes sense. Indeed, that is what happens within national governments where debt issuance by local, state or regional governments is often supplemented by grants, borrowing and guarantees provided by the Ministry of Finance or National Treasurer. However, the later are usually granted under nationally agreed budgetary policies and often require the setting of borrowing limits. These are often the source of frequent disputes between national and sub-national governments that occasionally end up in blackmail by separatist movements.
In a Union like the Euro Area, which is taking the first steps towards a future political unification, a simple setting of borrowing limits by a central Treasurer (no matter how well designed they are) is more prone to such separatist threats because there is no national solidarity. These separatist threats would be a permanent risk undermining the credit standing of the central Treasurer and would become a burden for the remaining members.
To some extent national solidarity can be substituted by common interest in joint spending. For this reason, tying a large share of joint debt issues to the financing of centralized spending in common policies needs to be considered as an essential part of a monetary union package.
Although the experience of common policies in the EU is nothing to write home about (e.g. agriculture) it does not mean that it cannot succeed in areas like transport infrastructure, security (defense and policing), research and population policies (health, education, migration, etc.).
The only certainty is that, like a stool, a solid monetary union also needs three legs – a monetary authority, a treasurer and a spending authority.
Labels:
debt crisis,
Eurobonds,
Europe,
European Central Bank,
European Union,
market capitalism,
Soros
Tuesday, 2 August 2011
Proof that One Should Not Put All the Eggs in the Same Basket
It is common sense that a simple form of risk mitigation is through portfolio diversification. This principle has been popularized as “do not put all the eggs in the same basket!” That is, do not invest all your Euros in a single investment. However, a few discordant voices claim that one should put all the eggs in a just a couple of baskets, so that they can be properly monitored.
The view proclaiming the advantage of diversification is based on the use of a statistical measure of dispersion called variance. It has the unique property that the variance of (a+b) is smaller than the variance of (a) plus the variance of (b). Since modern portfolio theory adopted variance as a proxy to measure risk it follows that the more securities one adds to a portfolio the smaller its risk. In fact, in most markets a substantial degree of risk reduction can be achieved by holding between 25 and 50 assets. So, a simple rule of thumb (for an equally weighted portfolio) is that investors should invest no more than 2 or 4% of their capital on each exposure.
In practice this simple rule has three major drawbacks: a) it is difficult to adopt by small investors without enough funds to buy economically at least 25 different assets, and is also hard to follow by those with large amounts of money without incurring excessive exposures to a single entity; b) exposures to 25 or 50 investments are hard to monitor by a single person; and c) most importantly, the expected risk reduction is strongly dependent on the degree of correlation between the different assets and correlations are extremely difficult to forecast.
On logical grounds it is clearly questionable to prove a property by choosing to identify it with something that has the property we wish to prove. In addition, it has also three more theoretical limitations: a) price and total return volatilities are not necessarily correlated with other important sources of risk, namely bankruptcy and market delisting; b) for some investment strategies volatility is more useful as a measure of opportunity rather than risk; and c) it does not fully accounts for the reduced returns caused by its implicit bias towards cash-like exposures.
So it seems worthwhile to add an alternative proof that reinforces the case for the superiority of diversification. Marginalist theories tell us that we should invest up to the point where the expected marginal efficiency of capital equals the risk free rate of return. This may be so at the aggregate level. But, when assessing individual investment opportunities, it implies that investors should invest as much as possible on the exposure with the highest expected returned, followed by the second and so on until they invest all their funds. For most investors this rule would mean investing their entire capital in the single most promising investment opportunity.
Yet, with the schedules of the marginal efficiency of capital sloping downwards (the normal textbook case), investing up to the point where it meets the free risk rate of return is not an optimal solution. To verify this imagine the case of an investor considering opportunities A and B with linear schedules sloping downwards. The first Euro invested in opportunity A has an expected return of 30% while the last Euro invested earns the same as the risk free rate of return, which is 10%. The first Euro invested in the second best opportunity B earns only 20% while the last earns the risk free return. As a result the expected total return for A is 20% and for B it is only 15%. Naturally, ignoring risk or assuming identical levels of risk, investors would put all their money into opportunity A.
This would not be an optimal solution, since by switching the last Euro invested in opportunity A to B it would earn 20% instead of 15%. Likewise one may improve the total return by switching the penultimate Euro and so on until it is no longer worthwhile. This point will be reached when the integrals of the two marginal efficiency curves in the two defined ranges are equal. In the numerical example given above an investor would be able to invest up to two thirds of his capital in opportunity B and still achieve a total return of 20%. However, his optimal allocation would be to invest two thirds into A and one third in B to achieve an expected total return of 21.67%.
Note that our proof of the supremacy of diversification was given under conditions of certainty. Should we wish to add risk we may consider a worst case scenario where the investment opportunity with the highest return has also the highest risk. We may, for instance, assume that the expected return of the first Euro invested in A might be missed by ten percentage points while that of B may be missed by only 2 percentage points. With these revised marginal efficiency curves the return for A would be 15% and for B would be 14%. Under this scenario investors could allocate up to 89% of their capital to B and still achieve a total return of 15%. But now the optimal capital allocation to A would be only 56%, with an expected total return for both assets of 16.78%.
Our simple model may be extended to more than two assets and to incorporate the effects of leverage and still prove the case for diversification. Its theoretical value is that it proves the case for diversification with or without risk (uncertainty). Its main practical drawback is the reliance on the marginal efficiency of capital curves which are not as easy to estimate as the volatilities. Still we believe that it will be enough to convince the few remaining skeptics about the superiority of diversification.
The view proclaiming the advantage of diversification is based on the use of a statistical measure of dispersion called variance. It has the unique property that the variance of (a+b) is smaller than the variance of (a) plus the variance of (b). Since modern portfolio theory adopted variance as a proxy to measure risk it follows that the more securities one adds to a portfolio the smaller its risk. In fact, in most markets a substantial degree of risk reduction can be achieved by holding between 25 and 50 assets. So, a simple rule of thumb (for an equally weighted portfolio) is that investors should invest no more than 2 or 4% of their capital on each exposure.
In practice this simple rule has three major drawbacks: a) it is difficult to adopt by small investors without enough funds to buy economically at least 25 different assets, and is also hard to follow by those with large amounts of money without incurring excessive exposures to a single entity; b) exposures to 25 or 50 investments are hard to monitor by a single person; and c) most importantly, the expected risk reduction is strongly dependent on the degree of correlation between the different assets and correlations are extremely difficult to forecast.
On logical grounds it is clearly questionable to prove a property by choosing to identify it with something that has the property we wish to prove. In addition, it has also three more theoretical limitations: a) price and total return volatilities are not necessarily correlated with other important sources of risk, namely bankruptcy and market delisting; b) for some investment strategies volatility is more useful as a measure of opportunity rather than risk; and c) it does not fully accounts for the reduced returns caused by its implicit bias towards cash-like exposures.
So it seems worthwhile to add an alternative proof that reinforces the case for the superiority of diversification. Marginalist theories tell us that we should invest up to the point where the expected marginal efficiency of capital equals the risk free rate of return. This may be so at the aggregate level. But, when assessing individual investment opportunities, it implies that investors should invest as much as possible on the exposure with the highest expected returned, followed by the second and so on until they invest all their funds. For most investors this rule would mean investing their entire capital in the single most promising investment opportunity.
Yet, with the schedules of the marginal efficiency of capital sloping downwards (the normal textbook case), investing up to the point where it meets the free risk rate of return is not an optimal solution. To verify this imagine the case of an investor considering opportunities A and B with linear schedules sloping downwards. The first Euro invested in opportunity A has an expected return of 30% while the last Euro invested earns the same as the risk free rate of return, which is 10%. The first Euro invested in the second best opportunity B earns only 20% while the last earns the risk free return. As a result the expected total return for A is 20% and for B it is only 15%. Naturally, ignoring risk or assuming identical levels of risk, investors would put all their money into opportunity A.
This would not be an optimal solution, since by switching the last Euro invested in opportunity A to B it would earn 20% instead of 15%. Likewise one may improve the total return by switching the penultimate Euro and so on until it is no longer worthwhile. This point will be reached when the integrals of the two marginal efficiency curves in the two defined ranges are equal. In the numerical example given above an investor would be able to invest up to two thirds of his capital in opportunity B and still achieve a total return of 20%. However, his optimal allocation would be to invest two thirds into A and one third in B to achieve an expected total return of 21.67%.
Note that our proof of the supremacy of diversification was given under conditions of certainty. Should we wish to add risk we may consider a worst case scenario where the investment opportunity with the highest return has also the highest risk. We may, for instance, assume that the expected return of the first Euro invested in A might be missed by ten percentage points while that of B may be missed by only 2 percentage points. With these revised marginal efficiency curves the return for A would be 15% and for B would be 14%. Under this scenario investors could allocate up to 89% of their capital to B and still achieve a total return of 15%. But now the optimal capital allocation to A would be only 56%, with an expected total return for both assets of 16.78%.
Our simple model may be extended to more than two assets and to incorporate the effects of leverage and still prove the case for diversification. Its theoretical value is that it proves the case for diversification with or without risk (uncertainty). Its main practical drawback is the reliance on the marginal efficiency of capital curves which are not as easy to estimate as the volatilities. Still we believe that it will be enough to convince the few remaining skeptics about the superiority of diversification.
Labels:
diversification,
financial investments,
marginal efficiency of capital,
portfolio management,
portfolio theory,
risk
Monday, 25 July 2011
Leverage as Friend and Foe
As far as I am aware there are only four legal ways to become seriously rich in a short period of time: to inherit or marry into money, to hit a lottery or sales jackpot, to become the CEO of a large public company or investment fund in the USA or to leverage one’s way into wealth. Out of the four, only leverage is not fundamentally determined by destiny or luck.
Not surprisingly, this explains why, throughout history, leverage never ceased to fascinate people as a kind of “Aladdin's lamp” for immense wealth. In fact, the history of financial innovation is little more than a continual re-invention of some form of leverage. Leverage or gearing is the percentage of external financing and it is often measured as the ratio of capital to debt or as the ratio of total debt to total assets.
Indeed, credit is an essential element of market capitalism. It allows those with entrepreneurial spirit to invest beyond their own capital and gives those without such spirit the chance to share in the success of entrepreneurship. This means that passive investors must accept a lower return to make it worthwhile for entrepreneurs to take the added risk.
The case to make debt-financed investments applies equally to families and governments. So, in a closed economy this might create an impossible situation where everyone wants to be a net borrower, leaving the central bank as the only net lender by creating the money necessary to fulfill the demand for debt. In such a system those in charge of dispensing credit have an extraordinary power over the fate of the borrowers.
In practice market economies rarely reach this extreme situation for three main reasons. First, many people cannot or do not bother to search for investment opportunities with returns well above the risk free rate of return. In particular, families and governments are often in this situation. Second, many do not have the collateral required by lenders or do not fulfill the requirements to access non-recourse finance. Finally, leverage is a double-edged sword and not all can or know how to cope with the risks of debt-financing.
To understand that there is a thin line between fortune and misery in the use of leverage, imagine that one can invest up to four times the value of his capital to achieve an expected return of 25%. If he succeeds his return will be 100%. But what if instead of an appreciation of 25% there is a loss of 25%? He would be completely wiped out.
The fact that the likelihood of a 25% loss is very small is not enough comfort because it will happen one day. And, if one keeps reinvesting all his proceeds, he will lose all his previous gains. Any roulette player knows this, but people often tend to forget it. Especially when prices have been going always in the same direction, as happened recently in the real estate market (many people had never observed a fall in housing prices).
So is it true that leverage, like death, in the end will always finish by catching us on the wrong side of the bet? Not necessarily, provided that we do not re-leverage all our gains, do not exceed a prudent level of leverage and manage it correctly (for instance by not carrying leveraged positions over-night).
To be prudent one needs to answer the important question of whether there is an optimal level of leverage and what are its determinants. Unfortunately, neither in theory nor in practice can we find an answer to this question.
First, different assets have different levels of volatility (for instance in the last 10 years, intra-day, the Dollar never fell by more than 4.8% in the Euro/Dollar market while in the stock market the shares of Microsoft never fell by more than 12%). Second, in itself, leverage changes the optimal composition of investment portfolios. Thirdly, because the optimal level of leverage may be above what lenders consider safe and lenders are often prone to stampede behavior creating wild fluctuations in what they judge as safe or not.
But, most importantly, at the theoretical level we find ourselves in a difficult position. This is true, even after ignoring the wild fluctuations in banker’s lending limits while considering only the spreads (or mark-ups) they charge to compensate for risk. Theoretically the optimal level can be defined as the level of leverage that maximizes the difference between the returns achieved with debt finance and those obtained without any leverage. The problem lies in the fact that the two curves depicting the marginal efficiency of capital cannot be derived separately.
In the absence of estimates for the optimal level of leverage, prudence dictates that one should err on the down side by keeping a reasonable margin below the level of debt capacity acceptable to lenders. This can be easily defined in relation to margin requirements or the present value of future free cash-flows. With this proviso and knowledge of the nature of debt-financing, investors may be able to turn a potential foe into a friend.
Not surprisingly, this explains why, throughout history, leverage never ceased to fascinate people as a kind of “Aladdin's lamp” for immense wealth. In fact, the history of financial innovation is little more than a continual re-invention of some form of leverage. Leverage or gearing is the percentage of external financing and it is often measured as the ratio of capital to debt or as the ratio of total debt to total assets.
Indeed, credit is an essential element of market capitalism. It allows those with entrepreneurial spirit to invest beyond their own capital and gives those without such spirit the chance to share in the success of entrepreneurship. This means that passive investors must accept a lower return to make it worthwhile for entrepreneurs to take the added risk.
The case to make debt-financed investments applies equally to families and governments. So, in a closed economy this might create an impossible situation where everyone wants to be a net borrower, leaving the central bank as the only net lender by creating the money necessary to fulfill the demand for debt. In such a system those in charge of dispensing credit have an extraordinary power over the fate of the borrowers.
In practice market economies rarely reach this extreme situation for three main reasons. First, many people cannot or do not bother to search for investment opportunities with returns well above the risk free rate of return. In particular, families and governments are often in this situation. Second, many do not have the collateral required by lenders or do not fulfill the requirements to access non-recourse finance. Finally, leverage is a double-edged sword and not all can or know how to cope with the risks of debt-financing.
To understand that there is a thin line between fortune and misery in the use of leverage, imagine that one can invest up to four times the value of his capital to achieve an expected return of 25%. If he succeeds his return will be 100%. But what if instead of an appreciation of 25% there is a loss of 25%? He would be completely wiped out.
The fact that the likelihood of a 25% loss is very small is not enough comfort because it will happen one day. And, if one keeps reinvesting all his proceeds, he will lose all his previous gains. Any roulette player knows this, but people often tend to forget it. Especially when prices have been going always in the same direction, as happened recently in the real estate market (many people had never observed a fall in housing prices).
So is it true that leverage, like death, in the end will always finish by catching us on the wrong side of the bet? Not necessarily, provided that we do not re-leverage all our gains, do not exceed a prudent level of leverage and manage it correctly (for instance by not carrying leveraged positions over-night).
To be prudent one needs to answer the important question of whether there is an optimal level of leverage and what are its determinants. Unfortunately, neither in theory nor in practice can we find an answer to this question.
First, different assets have different levels of volatility (for instance in the last 10 years, intra-day, the Dollar never fell by more than 4.8% in the Euro/Dollar market while in the stock market the shares of Microsoft never fell by more than 12%). Second, in itself, leverage changes the optimal composition of investment portfolios. Thirdly, because the optimal level of leverage may be above what lenders consider safe and lenders are often prone to stampede behavior creating wild fluctuations in what they judge as safe or not.
But, most importantly, at the theoretical level we find ourselves in a difficult position. This is true, even after ignoring the wild fluctuations in banker’s lending limits while considering only the spreads (or mark-ups) they charge to compensate for risk. Theoretically the optimal level can be defined as the level of leverage that maximizes the difference between the returns achieved with debt finance and those obtained without any leverage. The problem lies in the fact that the two curves depicting the marginal efficiency of capital cannot be derived separately.
In the absence of estimates for the optimal level of leverage, prudence dictates that one should err on the down side by keeping a reasonable margin below the level of debt capacity acceptable to lenders. This can be easily defined in relation to margin requirements or the present value of future free cash-flows. With this proviso and knowledge of the nature of debt-financing, investors may be able to turn a potential foe into a friend.
Sunday, 24 July 2011
Marx and Friedman Were Wrong About the Suicidal Nature of Capitalism
The suicidal nature of capitalism has been predicted by several authors, both supporters and enemies of capitalism. By suicidal we mean a process through which capitalism would weave its own destruction.
Among the most influential theories we found Karl Marx’s surplus value theory of capital accumulation, Schumpeter’s claim that the success of capitalism would lead to a form of corporatism fostering values hostile to capitalism, especially among intellectuals, Milton Friedman’s theory on the suicidal nature of capitalists and Solzhenitsyn's attack on the commercialized nature of Western culture. In this post we will examine why Marx’s and Friedman’s predictions are wrong.
Marx’s prediction derives from his theory of capital accumulation presented in Chapter XXV of his book The Capital. In a nutshell Marx breaks down capital into fixed costs (the value of fixed capital) and variable costs (the sum of wages) and assumes that as the accumulation of capital proceeds the ratio between the two would increase resulting in a growing number of unemployed (the so-called industrial army reserve). This system would implode through over-production, over-population and misery.
It is easy to see why his model is wrong. First, not all technical progress is labor saving (on the contrary). Second, his Malthusian assumption of an ever growing population is wrong because fertility rates diminish with increasing incomes. Finally, and most importantly, he failed to see that workers would become capitalist and now hold a large part of a nation’s capital through pension funds and personal holdings. This was his most clamorous failure. Instead of his prediction that we would all become proletarians we all became capitalists. His motto “workers of the world unite” should have been “capitalists of the world unite”.
Friedman’s theory on the doom of capitalism was given in a Lecture at the Cato Institute entitled “The Suicidal Impulse of the Business Community”. His main contention was that when faced with policy issues business people tend to be very short-sighted. This leads them to seek government protection for their own industry, to favor public education which tends to be socialist-oriented, to lobby for the transformation of anti-trust laws into regulatory controls and to give more political contributions to nonprofit left wing organizations (three times more) than to non-profit right wing institutions.
He admits that he has not a good explanation for this suicidal behavior but advances three possible reasons. These include the presumption among business people that everyone is an expert in economics, the Schumpeterian argument that within large organizations people develop essentially bureaucratic-socialist attitudes and that there is a general propensity to look out for government action as an all-purpose cure for every ill. He dismisses the first two and retains the last.
By doing so, Friedman makes four mistakes. First, he ignores that like everybody else, given the chance, business people will be free riders on Government money. Second, payments to left wing organizations are made as insurance or protection against those from where they see more danger. Third, he fails to make a distinction between the different types of capitalism (managerial capitalism, state capitalism and market capitalism). Finally, as Adam Smith noted long ago, capitalists and conservatives are not necessarily the great defenders of capitalism. The true defenders of capitalism are consumers and investors without a controlling stake in their companies.
It is one of the great ironies of history that the capitalistic economic system, the greatest wealth creation machine ever invented, has so many enemies and critics among its beneficiaries (ranging from the church, government, academia to the business community). Yet, the supreme proof of its superiority is the fact that despite so many enemies and without an army of supporters it has nevertheless conquered the world.
Among the most influential theories we found Karl Marx’s surplus value theory of capital accumulation, Schumpeter’s claim that the success of capitalism would lead to a form of corporatism fostering values hostile to capitalism, especially among intellectuals, Milton Friedman’s theory on the suicidal nature of capitalists and Solzhenitsyn's attack on the commercialized nature of Western culture. In this post we will examine why Marx’s and Friedman’s predictions are wrong.
Marx’s prediction derives from his theory of capital accumulation presented in Chapter XXV of his book The Capital. In a nutshell Marx breaks down capital into fixed costs (the value of fixed capital) and variable costs (the sum of wages) and assumes that as the accumulation of capital proceeds the ratio between the two would increase resulting in a growing number of unemployed (the so-called industrial army reserve). This system would implode through over-production, over-population and misery.
It is easy to see why his model is wrong. First, not all technical progress is labor saving (on the contrary). Second, his Malthusian assumption of an ever growing population is wrong because fertility rates diminish with increasing incomes. Finally, and most importantly, he failed to see that workers would become capitalist and now hold a large part of a nation’s capital through pension funds and personal holdings. This was his most clamorous failure. Instead of his prediction that we would all become proletarians we all became capitalists. His motto “workers of the world unite” should have been “capitalists of the world unite”.
Friedman’s theory on the doom of capitalism was given in a Lecture at the Cato Institute entitled “The Suicidal Impulse of the Business Community”. His main contention was that when faced with policy issues business people tend to be very short-sighted. This leads them to seek government protection for their own industry, to favor public education which tends to be socialist-oriented, to lobby for the transformation of anti-trust laws into regulatory controls and to give more political contributions to nonprofit left wing organizations (three times more) than to non-profit right wing institutions.
He admits that he has not a good explanation for this suicidal behavior but advances three possible reasons. These include the presumption among business people that everyone is an expert in economics, the Schumpeterian argument that within large organizations people develop essentially bureaucratic-socialist attitudes and that there is a general propensity to look out for government action as an all-purpose cure for every ill. He dismisses the first two and retains the last.
By doing so, Friedman makes four mistakes. First, he ignores that like everybody else, given the chance, business people will be free riders on Government money. Second, payments to left wing organizations are made as insurance or protection against those from where they see more danger. Third, he fails to make a distinction between the different types of capitalism (managerial capitalism, state capitalism and market capitalism). Finally, as Adam Smith noted long ago, capitalists and conservatives are not necessarily the great defenders of capitalism. The true defenders of capitalism are consumers and investors without a controlling stake in their companies.
It is one of the great ironies of history that the capitalistic economic system, the greatest wealth creation machine ever invented, has so many enemies and critics among its beneficiaries (ranging from the church, government, academia to the business community). Yet, the supreme proof of its superiority is the fact that despite so many enemies and without an army of supporters it has nevertheless conquered the world.
Labels:
capitalism,
free markets,
Friedman,
history,
market capitalism,
Marx,
suicidal
Saturday, 23 July 2011
Financial Investment – Art, Science or Gambling?
In principle, everything we buy can be treated as an investment and therefore to a large extent investment is like breathing, something that everybody knows about. However when dealing in financial assets we should avoid the traditional statement that investment is the commitment of funds with the hope of gain, or a process of buying and selling securities with a view to get the greatest possible return, or, more plainly, the art of buying low and selling high.
This is so because the services provided by financial assets (money, securities, contracts or hybrids) include the protection and transfer of wealth, the facilitation of partial ownership and the provision of liquidity. That is the utility we derive from them depends primarily not on its material use but on rotating our exposure to them so that we may profit from distributions and changes in their market value (mostly in secondary markets).
Thus, we define financial investment as “a process of rotation between financial exposures which at the time of our choosing will allow us to attain the highest possible net liquidation value above that achievable without rotation and risk”. This means that at any given moment in time we may compare the valuation of our holdings in long, short and hedged positions in financial instruments with the valuation of such portfolio in a previous date.
The success of exposure rotation is the result of skill and luck. The skills required depend on the investment approach chosen (day-trading, event-trading or portfolio management) as well as on the strategies pursued. The net returns achieved may be amplified or reduced through taxation and leverage which also require specific skills.
Like in many activities the skills are both innate and nurtured through practice and education. Thus skills must necessarily be a combination of art, science and gambling. And, specific strategies and instruments require different combinations. For instance, investing in derivatives is closer to gambling while investment in fixed-income securities is more reliant on science.
In terms of science we could look at investment as an optimization problem defined as the maximization of total return over a given time horizon subject to a number of risk constraints. However, because of the uncertain nature of the investment outcomes, this mathematical formulation of investment is not feasible.
Alternatively we may look at investing as a form of gambling. To draw analogies with gambling we must distinguish games that combine luck and skill, like poker and football, from those that are purely games of chance like the roulette or the lottery. This distinction is fundamental because investment can clearly be considered as a game of the first kind, a game that mixes skills with luck but not a game based on pure luck or randomness.
Finally, we may define the investment activity as an art, an art not only in buying and selling but an art in forecasting prices and in undertaking calculated risks. What distinguishes science from art is not the degree of science and technique used in a particular activity but rather the creative and aesthetic nature of the activity. This is crucial to spot short-lived market imperfections and in this regard some view investment as a craft while others consider it to be the last liberal art.
Our preference goes to classify investment as a liberal art, defined as an activity based on worldly wisdom achieved by developing mental models enabling investors to extract knowledge acquired through multidisciplinary approaches (including the traditional disciplines of accounting, economics and finance, but also physics, biology, philosophy, psychology and literature). To a large extent, such an art form must be developed on an individual basis and as a self-satisfying activity.
Unfortunately not everyone can be an artist. However, the beauty of market capitalism is that not all investors need to pursue the art of investment. They may outsource it to honest professional investors.
This is so because the services provided by financial assets (money, securities, contracts or hybrids) include the protection and transfer of wealth, the facilitation of partial ownership and the provision of liquidity. That is the utility we derive from them depends primarily not on its material use but on rotating our exposure to them so that we may profit from distributions and changes in their market value (mostly in secondary markets).
Thus, we define financial investment as “a process of rotation between financial exposures which at the time of our choosing will allow us to attain the highest possible net liquidation value above that achievable without rotation and risk”. This means that at any given moment in time we may compare the valuation of our holdings in long, short and hedged positions in financial instruments with the valuation of such portfolio in a previous date.
The success of exposure rotation is the result of skill and luck. The skills required depend on the investment approach chosen (day-trading, event-trading or portfolio management) as well as on the strategies pursued. The net returns achieved may be amplified or reduced through taxation and leverage which also require specific skills.
Like in many activities the skills are both innate and nurtured through practice and education. Thus skills must necessarily be a combination of art, science and gambling. And, specific strategies and instruments require different combinations. For instance, investing in derivatives is closer to gambling while investment in fixed-income securities is more reliant on science.
In terms of science we could look at investment as an optimization problem defined as the maximization of total return over a given time horizon subject to a number of risk constraints. However, because of the uncertain nature of the investment outcomes, this mathematical formulation of investment is not feasible.
Alternatively we may look at investing as a form of gambling. To draw analogies with gambling we must distinguish games that combine luck and skill, like poker and football, from those that are purely games of chance like the roulette or the lottery. This distinction is fundamental because investment can clearly be considered as a game of the first kind, a game that mixes skills with luck but not a game based on pure luck or randomness.
Finally, we may define the investment activity as an art, an art not only in buying and selling but an art in forecasting prices and in undertaking calculated risks. What distinguishes science from art is not the degree of science and technique used in a particular activity but rather the creative and aesthetic nature of the activity. This is crucial to spot short-lived market imperfections and in this regard some view investment as a craft while others consider it to be the last liberal art.
Our preference goes to classify investment as a liberal art, defined as an activity based on worldly wisdom achieved by developing mental models enabling investors to extract knowledge acquired through multidisciplinary approaches (including the traditional disciplines of accounting, economics and finance, but also physics, biology, philosophy, psychology and literature). To a large extent, such an art form must be developed on an individual basis and as a self-satisfying activity.
Unfortunately not everyone can be an artist. However, the beauty of market capitalism is that not all investors need to pursue the art of investment. They may outsource it to honest professional investors.
Labels:
arte,
dismal science,
financial investments,
gambling,
investment funds,
market capitalism,
trade investors
Friday, 22 July 2011
Bond swap plan is for Greece and Greece only, but it won’t be enough.
The FT just published a few details of the bond swap agreement in the new bailout for Greece. The swap agreement is only for Greece, and “All other euro countries solemnly reaffirm their inflexible determination to honour fully their own individual sovereign signature”.
The only interesting feature of the agreement is the voluntary exchange of bonds maturing before 2019 by 15 and 30 year bonds, paying 5.9 and 6.8%, as a compensation for the banks accepting a 21% “haircut” on the value of the existing bonds. IIF, the Banker’s designer of the plan, estimates a participation rate of 90%.
The Greek government will have to use the new funding to buy European AAA bonds to post as collateral for the new bonds. The cover ratio was not specified, but if it is close to one the “haircut” will be meaningless. Even at 50% and with a take up rate of 90% the effect of the effective haircut would be only “9.45%”.
As been amply demonstrated in last few years the Greek problem is not one of liquidity but of solvency. We and many other observers have estimated that to get out of insolvency Greece needs a debt pardon of about 50%.
All the other measures announced to support Greece are not enough to fill the gap between these 50% and the expected “haircut” of 9.45%. So, it is only a matter of time before Greece needs another bailout, probably as early as 2013.
The only interesting feature of the agreement is the voluntary exchange of bonds maturing before 2019 by 15 and 30 year bonds, paying 5.9 and 6.8%, as a compensation for the banks accepting a 21% “haircut” on the value of the existing bonds. IIF, the Banker’s designer of the plan, estimates a participation rate of 90%.
The Greek government will have to use the new funding to buy European AAA bonds to post as collateral for the new bonds. The cover ratio was not specified, but if it is close to one the “haircut” will be meaningless. Even at 50% and with a take up rate of 90% the effect of the effective haircut would be only “9.45%”.
As been amply demonstrated in last few years the Greek problem is not one of liquidity but of solvency. We and many other observers have estimated that to get out of insolvency Greece needs a debt pardon of about 50%.
All the other measures announced to support Greece are not enough to fill the gap between these 50% and the expected “haircut” of 9.45%. So, it is only a matter of time before Greece needs another bailout, probably as early as 2013.
Labels:
bailouts,
bond swap,
debt crisis,
Europe,
Greece,
market capitalism
Thursday, 21 July 2011
Taxation and Moral Values – the Case of Conspicuous Consumption
Everywhere, politicians advocate public policies to foster virtues (e.g. philanthropy) and discourage vices (e.g. smoking) through both the revenue and the spending side of the budget. However, they frequently treat them differently by failing to measure separately the costs of tax breaks and surcharges applied to achieve such policies.
Free markets do not require neutrality in the rates of taxation on property, income and consumption. Indeed, they should not be neutral in relation to the taxation of consumption for the satisfaction of basic needs (food, healthcare, etc.) and the taxation of luxuries and conspicuous consumption. Fiscal neutrality is often defined as in the FT Lexicon: “when the impact of taxes and of government spending cancel each other out, with demand neither boosted nor curbed”. Others add the requisite that it does not cause distortions. Besides, to some extent, the use of taxation for policy purposes goes against the principle of budget unity, and the repudiation of earmarking specific revenues for given expenditures.
However, in general, when it comes to differentiating between different classes of conspicuous consumption there is a strong case to advocate the rule of fiscal neutrality. We will exemplify with a choice between spending on impressionist masters and trophy wives, because the first may have some cultural value while the second may be morally degrading.
Imagine for example an ostentatious billionaire who is considering spending 50 million on a master’s painting or in marriage to a super-model under a pre-nuptial agreement that grants her the same amount if the marriage lasts three years. Since he is neither an art lover nor is he in love with his trophy wife both types of investment are morally questionable.
Yet, most countries will treat differently the two investments when he decides to file for divorce or sell the painting. Assuming that he cannot earn transfer fees on his wife and makes a capital gain in the painting, some tax codes will give him a tax credit on his divorce settlement and charge capital gains in the sale of the painting. As a result, he will be rewarded in the most degrading investment and will be punished in the cultural investment. This is exactly the opposite of the proclaimed objective of encouraging virtue and discouraging vice.
Not only is the taxation of virtues and vices difficult on practical grounds. For instance, it is impossible to distinguish between a genuine and a convenience marriage. But it is also impossible to make a distinction between capital gains and losses on ethical grounds. Therefore, taxation should be kept away from policies based on moral judgments. Its concerns should be based mostly in a fair sharing of the funding and the minimization of the government revenue collection costs.
You do not need to agree with James Buchanan and other libertarians that a moral order is preferable to moral anarchy and moral communities because it only requires a minimal intervention of the Government. Simple common sense tells us that governments are not apt to judge on the basis of moral merits, without becoming an easy prey of vocal interest groups.
Free markets do not require neutrality in the rates of taxation on property, income and consumption. Indeed, they should not be neutral in relation to the taxation of consumption for the satisfaction of basic needs (food, healthcare, etc.) and the taxation of luxuries and conspicuous consumption. Fiscal neutrality is often defined as in the FT Lexicon: “when the impact of taxes and of government spending cancel each other out, with demand neither boosted nor curbed”. Others add the requisite that it does not cause distortions. Besides, to some extent, the use of taxation for policy purposes goes against the principle of budget unity, and the repudiation of earmarking specific revenues for given expenditures.
However, in general, when it comes to differentiating between different classes of conspicuous consumption there is a strong case to advocate the rule of fiscal neutrality. We will exemplify with a choice between spending on impressionist masters and trophy wives, because the first may have some cultural value while the second may be morally degrading.
Imagine for example an ostentatious billionaire who is considering spending 50 million on a master’s painting or in marriage to a super-model under a pre-nuptial agreement that grants her the same amount if the marriage lasts three years. Since he is neither an art lover nor is he in love with his trophy wife both types of investment are morally questionable.
Yet, most countries will treat differently the two investments when he decides to file for divorce or sell the painting. Assuming that he cannot earn transfer fees on his wife and makes a capital gain in the painting, some tax codes will give him a tax credit on his divorce settlement and charge capital gains in the sale of the painting. As a result, he will be rewarded in the most degrading investment and will be punished in the cultural investment. This is exactly the opposite of the proclaimed objective of encouraging virtue and discouraging vice.
Not only is the taxation of virtues and vices difficult on practical grounds. For instance, it is impossible to distinguish between a genuine and a convenience marriage. But it is also impossible to make a distinction between capital gains and losses on ethical grounds. Therefore, taxation should be kept away from policies based on moral judgments. Its concerns should be based mostly in a fair sharing of the funding and the minimization of the government revenue collection costs.
You do not need to agree with James Buchanan and other libertarians that a moral order is preferable to moral anarchy and moral communities because it only requires a minimal intervention of the Government. Simple common sense tells us that governments are not apt to judge on the basis of moral merits, without becoming an easy prey of vocal interest groups.
Labels:
Buchanan,
enlightenment,
ethics,
libertarian,
moral values,
taxation,
vices,
virtues
Wednesday, 20 July 2011
Capitalism, What Capitalism?
In most countries wealth is created under various economic systems. An economic system is defined by a set of rules defining the relationship between interacting economic agents. For instance, in a feudal system the relationship between the landlords and their subjects was based on serfdom. Similarly the relation between the state and its citizens is exerted through coercion.
By contrast in voluntary and capitalist sectors the relationships between economic agents are defined freely through contractual arrangements. The first is based on bundling resources, risks and benefits while capitalism is based on unbundling them. In a capitalist system capitalists own the resources and profits but take the risks, while guaranteeing a contractual wage paid to workers. Both systems require the right to private property and its protection but only capitalism requires that most transactions between different agents be carried out through free and competitive markets.
The study of wealth predates the emergence of capitalistic systems but the modern economic science has its foundations in Adam Smith’s book on the Wealth of Nations. His book does not use the words capitalism or capitalist (curiously, the word capitalism had been used since 1633 but it was only popularized in the mid 19th century by the Marxist opponents of capitalism). Instead, the book is centered in showing why competition through competitive markets is the most efficient way of allocating resources and producing wealth. Since the capitalist system is the only system dependent on market competition it follows that, apart from a short experiment with communism, the history of modern economics and capitalism are inextricably intertwined.
Yet, the statisticians who have been developing the system of national accounts since the 1930s have never attempted to report the wealth contributed by each economic system – state, voluntary and capitalist. Instead they give us a breakdown of employment and GDP by sectors of activity and type of organization (e.g. households, government, financial and non-financial firms). Thus, when one wants to measure the contribution of the agents working in the capitalistic sector the task becomes almost impossible.
This is so because the so-called for-profit sector includes many types of capitalism. Moreover, the exchanges between for-profit firms and the other two sectors (state and voluntary) have reached a large volume of transactions which are not always executed on a competitive basis. Often such activities create a sector called grey-capitalism.
The various types of capitalism must be defined on the basis of their reliance on free and competitive markets. The purest form of capitalism is called market capitalism and it includes all self-employed and investor-controlled firms which are basically price-takers trading in free and atomistic markets. Other types of capitalism include the regulated industries, oligopolies, and management-controlled firms that operate under various not-fully-competitive systems, namely: managerial capitalism, crony capitalism, socialist state capitalism, corporatist state capitalism or social market capitalism.
Since economic theory has only proved the supremacy of pure competitive systems, any departures from such systems should be accepted only as a second best option justifiable solely by market failures and externalities. However, in the absence of entirely free markets, competition between the various types of capitalism does not ensure that the winner in terms of market share will be market capitalism. Indeed, quite the opposite may happen.
So, paradoxically, a rising share of market capitalism can only be achieved by regulating the growth of the other not-for-profit and capitalistic sectors. The rationale for such regulation is that the maximum collective welfare can be only achieved by a growing sector of market capitalism. That is, true capitalism ≡ market capitalism!
By contrast in voluntary and capitalist sectors the relationships between economic agents are defined freely through contractual arrangements. The first is based on bundling resources, risks and benefits while capitalism is based on unbundling them. In a capitalist system capitalists own the resources and profits but take the risks, while guaranteeing a contractual wage paid to workers. Both systems require the right to private property and its protection but only capitalism requires that most transactions between different agents be carried out through free and competitive markets.
The study of wealth predates the emergence of capitalistic systems but the modern economic science has its foundations in Adam Smith’s book on the Wealth of Nations. His book does not use the words capitalism or capitalist (curiously, the word capitalism had been used since 1633 but it was only popularized in the mid 19th century by the Marxist opponents of capitalism). Instead, the book is centered in showing why competition through competitive markets is the most efficient way of allocating resources and producing wealth. Since the capitalist system is the only system dependent on market competition it follows that, apart from a short experiment with communism, the history of modern economics and capitalism are inextricably intertwined.
Yet, the statisticians who have been developing the system of national accounts since the 1930s have never attempted to report the wealth contributed by each economic system – state, voluntary and capitalist. Instead they give us a breakdown of employment and GDP by sectors of activity and type of organization (e.g. households, government, financial and non-financial firms). Thus, when one wants to measure the contribution of the agents working in the capitalistic sector the task becomes almost impossible.
This is so because the so-called for-profit sector includes many types of capitalism. Moreover, the exchanges between for-profit firms and the other two sectors (state and voluntary) have reached a large volume of transactions which are not always executed on a competitive basis. Often such activities create a sector called grey-capitalism.
The various types of capitalism must be defined on the basis of their reliance on free and competitive markets. The purest form of capitalism is called market capitalism and it includes all self-employed and investor-controlled firms which are basically price-takers trading in free and atomistic markets. Other types of capitalism include the regulated industries, oligopolies, and management-controlled firms that operate under various not-fully-competitive systems, namely: managerial capitalism, crony capitalism, socialist state capitalism, corporatist state capitalism or social market capitalism.
Since economic theory has only proved the supremacy of pure competitive systems, any departures from such systems should be accepted only as a second best option justifiable solely by market failures and externalities. However, in the absence of entirely free markets, competition between the various types of capitalism does not ensure that the winner in terms of market share will be market capitalism. Indeed, quite the opposite may happen.
So, paradoxically, a rising share of market capitalism can only be achieved by regulating the growth of the other not-for-profit and capitalistic sectors. The rationale for such regulation is that the maximum collective welfare can be only achieved by a growing sector of market capitalism. That is, true capitalism ≡ market capitalism!
Labels:
capitalism,
competition,
economic growth,
free markets,
managerial capitalism,
market capitalism,
profits,
state capitalism
Monday, 18 July 2011
Subsidy Madness: The New Energy Policy of Germany
Free money is everywhere and every time a sure way to waste money in the most ludicrous ways.
Often this is only pathetic without causing serious damage to the economy. For instance when Brussels pays you to keep your pony paddock or when you no longer need even to pretend to grow olives; you simply have to show that you have title to the land and that you are keeping it in good nick, olives or no olives.
French farmers used to be the champions when it came to exploit the madness of government subsidies, but they are now being surpassed by the German producers of the so-called renewable energy (mostly wind and solar power).
Some years ago Germany established by law a ‘feed-in tariff,’ which obligated private utilities to buy renewable electricity from private producers at prices up to seven times higher than the market price and make their ratepayers pay for it (other countries like Portugal followed with similar measures). Some years after the German government imposed a moratorium on building nuclear power plants (one of the cheapest producers of electricity, see the table below) and ordered the existing ones – which produced 25 percent of the country’s electricity – decommissioned by the year 2021. The annual cost of this madness costs German taxpayers more than 17 billion Euros, this is an amount equivalent to more than 10% of the entire European Union annual budget).
To understand why this is economic madness you just need to consider this example. Imagine that a firm has two power plants, one powered by wind and the other by oil. The first has fixed costs of 40 cents per Kwh and zero variable costs. The second has 10 cents in fixed costs and 5 cents in variable costs. In a free market firms would build a second fuel-powered plant and decommission the wind-powered plant. But this not so as long as the government pays them a subsidy or lets them charge a tariff high enough to make the wind-power profitable. Now the firm’s optimal mix in terms of the two technologies will depend on the vagaries of the government policy not on the economics of the most efficient technology.
Unfortunately the madness of this policy is not an exclusive of the rich Germans. The debt-laden Portuguese responded to the recent rise in imported energy prices by switching to a similar energy policy and they have even overtaken Germany. Portugal now gets 53% of its electricity from renewable sources. The bad news is that it costs them 3 or 4 times more than conventional sources (at their current high level). Not a rational move, is it?
Often this is only pathetic without causing serious damage to the economy. For instance when Brussels pays you to keep your pony paddock or when you no longer need even to pretend to grow olives; you simply have to show that you have title to the land and that you are keeping it in good nick, olives or no olives.
French farmers used to be the champions when it came to exploit the madness of government subsidies, but they are now being surpassed by the German producers of the so-called renewable energy (mostly wind and solar power).
Some years ago Germany established by law a ‘feed-in tariff,’ which obligated private utilities to buy renewable electricity from private producers at prices up to seven times higher than the market price and make their ratepayers pay for it (other countries like Portugal followed with similar measures). Some years after the German government imposed a moratorium on building nuclear power plants (one of the cheapest producers of electricity, see the table below) and ordered the existing ones – which produced 25 percent of the country’s electricity – decommissioned by the year 2021. The annual cost of this madness costs German taxpayers more than 17 billion Euros, this is an amount equivalent to more than 10% of the entire European Union annual budget).
To understand why this is economic madness you just need to consider this example. Imagine that a firm has two power plants, one powered by wind and the other by oil. The first has fixed costs of 40 cents per Kwh and zero variable costs. The second has 10 cents in fixed costs and 5 cents in variable costs. In a free market firms would build a second fuel-powered plant and decommission the wind-powered plant. But this not so as long as the government pays them a subsidy or lets them charge a tariff high enough to make the wind-power profitable. Now the firm’s optimal mix in terms of the two technologies will depend on the vagaries of the government policy not on the economics of the most efficient technology.
Unfortunately the madness of this policy is not an exclusive of the rich Germans. The debt-laden Portuguese responded to the recent rise in imported energy prices by switching to a similar energy policy and they have even overtaken Germany. Portugal now gets 53% of its electricity from renewable sources. The bad news is that it costs them 3 or 4 times more than conventional sources (at their current high level). Not a rational move, is it?
Labels:
competition,
Economics,
energy policy,
free markets,
Germany,
madness,
market capitalism,
nuclear,
Portugal,
renewable
Tuesday, 12 July 2011
Means vs. Ends: Hedonism and Happiness
Our blog is mostly about reflections on the means to achieve human happiness. Still, from time to time, we need to keep sight of what are the end pursuits of humankind. Often, these are not easily distinguishable from the means like when we pursue a long but healthy live or when we need to trade immediate pain for future pleasures.
The later is often discussed when pursuing a hedonist approach to achieve happiness. A hedonist is defined as “someone who strives to maximize net pleasure (pleasure minus pain)”. This definition is vulnerable to the usual caveats of defining inter-temporal maximization in an environment of life uncertainty and volatile preferences. Equally important is the trade-off between individual and group satisfaction (family, social, national, etc.), sometimes called utilitarianism.
Constrained maximization is not only complex but also a poor guide for action when inter-temporal choice is involved. Despite the fact that at the unconscious level we seem to be wired in a hedonistic way to seek pleasure and avoid pain at the conscious level the science of the brain has not yet uncovered ways to explain masochist or depressive behaviors and similar deviations. Consequently a simplistic taking up of hedonism would lead us to sacrifice the future for the present.
Yet, despite its limitations, hedonism can also help us to tackle the eternal human despair over life expectancy. Almost 2000 years ago, when Seneca wrote his essay “On the Shortness of Life”, life expectancy was about one third of what it is now in developed countries. Nevertheless we continue to suffer over the same issue. Should medical science find ways to treble it again our descendents will still despair over the same issue and so on until eternity? Like Seneca, in the end we all conclude that life is never too short if we do not waste most of it. By living a full life we mean enjoying both the immediate sensorial pleasures as well as the pleasure obtained from friendship and idealistic conscious pursuits, whether metaphysical or not.
In conclusion, a mild and responsible pursuit of hedonism when complemented by love and enlightened virtues is an essential means to achieve human happiness.
The later is often discussed when pursuing a hedonist approach to achieve happiness. A hedonist is defined as “someone who strives to maximize net pleasure (pleasure minus pain)”. This definition is vulnerable to the usual caveats of defining inter-temporal maximization in an environment of life uncertainty and volatile preferences. Equally important is the trade-off between individual and group satisfaction (family, social, national, etc.), sometimes called utilitarianism.
Constrained maximization is not only complex but also a poor guide for action when inter-temporal choice is involved. Despite the fact that at the unconscious level we seem to be wired in a hedonistic way to seek pleasure and avoid pain at the conscious level the science of the brain has not yet uncovered ways to explain masochist or depressive behaviors and similar deviations. Consequently a simplistic taking up of hedonism would lead us to sacrifice the future for the present.
Yet, despite its limitations, hedonism can also help us to tackle the eternal human despair over life expectancy. Almost 2000 years ago, when Seneca wrote his essay “On the Shortness of Life”, life expectancy was about one third of what it is now in developed countries. Nevertheless we continue to suffer over the same issue. Should medical science find ways to treble it again our descendents will still despair over the same issue and so on until eternity? Like Seneca, in the end we all conclude that life is never too short if we do not waste most of it. By living a full life we mean enjoying both the immediate sensorial pleasures as well as the pleasure obtained from friendship and idealistic conscious pursuits, whether metaphysical or not.
In conclusion, a mild and responsible pursuit of hedonism when complemented by love and enlightened virtues is an essential means to achieve human happiness.
Labels:
enlightenment,
hapiness,
hedonistic,
life expectancy,
philosophy,
productive work,
Seneca,
virtues
Friday, 1 July 2011
Grow or Fail!?
The FT published recently some comments by James Murdoch claiming that News Corporation – the world’s largest media conglomerate – is not big enough. The reason, he argues, is that “When you actually look at the competitive set in an all-media market place, where you have monolithic brands, from Google and Apple etc, to the big [telecoms incumbents] Telefónica, Deutsche Telekom, Verizon – all the characters on a playing field or a terrain that has essentially collapsed – there are much, much bigger beasts than a News Corporation, or a Time Warner”.
So, he means that because the whole media sector (from production to distribution) is going through a technological revolution we are in for a “winner-takes-all competition”. I do not think so!
Interestingly enough the founders of News Corp, Google and Apple still control their companies and are not considered as part of the managerial capitalism sector, which thrives on rent-seeking behavior secured through oligopoly and regulatory protection. So, he is probably just voicing the usual kids whine about “that boys’ toy is bigger than mine” so dear to CEOs of managerial controlled firms.
There is however a case to consider whether the new technologies are promoting a mitigated from of winner-takes-all, the so called long-tail business model. In this model (with a long history in music and book publishing) the top sellers take about 80/90% of the total revenue while the remaining millions of producers have to fight for the residual 10/20% of revenues.
Whether this will be exacerbated or attenuated will depend not only on technology but also on the profit maximization choices of the leading companies. Should those “running the pipes” and the viewing devices – the telecoms and IT companies (e.g. Verizon and Apple) – be allowed to build oligopolistic positions based on competition for subscribers by offering “”all-you-can-eat” contents and devices for free, and then some producers and content aggregators (e.g. News Corp) would become almost entirely dependent on an oligopolistic advertising aggregator (e.g. Google). Under this scenario, it is not unreasonable to expect that content aggregators would also need to build oligopolistic positions.
Thus the fundamental question is whether atomized content producers and end-consumers would be well served by a supply chain (from aggregators to device manufacturers) that would be mostly oligopolistic. I do not think that they would benefit from such an end-game. Here is where economists and regulators should focus their attention. Our first impression is that some size limits should be considered before we get into “too big to fail” situations, regardless of whether they are managerial or entrepreneurial run firms.
These limits should be designed in a way similar to those that we advocate for the managerial sector in general. Not based on some old fashioned ideas like the percentages of ownership and national content.
Only a leading sector of market capitalism can protect the entire capitalist system as one of the main pillars of happiness for humankind.
So, he means that because the whole media sector (from production to distribution) is going through a technological revolution we are in for a “winner-takes-all competition”. I do not think so!
Interestingly enough the founders of News Corp, Google and Apple still control their companies and are not considered as part of the managerial capitalism sector, which thrives on rent-seeking behavior secured through oligopoly and regulatory protection. So, he is probably just voicing the usual kids whine about “that boys’ toy is bigger than mine” so dear to CEOs of managerial controlled firms.
There is however a case to consider whether the new technologies are promoting a mitigated from of winner-takes-all, the so called long-tail business model. In this model (with a long history in music and book publishing) the top sellers take about 80/90% of the total revenue while the remaining millions of producers have to fight for the residual 10/20% of revenues.
Whether this will be exacerbated or attenuated will depend not only on technology but also on the profit maximization choices of the leading companies. Should those “running the pipes” and the viewing devices – the telecoms and IT companies (e.g. Verizon and Apple) – be allowed to build oligopolistic positions based on competition for subscribers by offering “”all-you-can-eat” contents and devices for free, and then some producers and content aggregators (e.g. News Corp) would become almost entirely dependent on an oligopolistic advertising aggregator (e.g. Google). Under this scenario, it is not unreasonable to expect that content aggregators would also need to build oligopolistic positions.
Thus the fundamental question is whether atomized content producers and end-consumers would be well served by a supply chain (from aggregators to device manufacturers) that would be mostly oligopolistic. I do not think that they would benefit from such an end-game. Here is where economists and regulators should focus their attention. Our first impression is that some size limits should be considered before we get into “too big to fail” situations, regardless of whether they are managerial or entrepreneurial run firms.
These limits should be designed in a way similar to those that we advocate for the managerial sector in general. Not based on some old fashioned ideas like the percentages of ownership and national content.
Only a leading sector of market capitalism can protect the entire capitalist system as one of the main pillars of happiness for humankind.
Labels:
Apple,
business models,
competition,
Google,
internet,
market capitalism,
Media Sector,
Murdoch,
News Corp,
Oligopolies
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